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28. In support of the proposition that Section 24(2) of RFCTLARR Act is applicable to acquisitions of Chapter VII under MRTP Act, in short, the following contentions were advanced.

(i) By Maharashtra Act XLII of 2015, the MRTP Act has been amended to substitute the LA Act with RFCTLARR Act on account of repeal of L.A. Act of 1894 it's substitution with RFCTLARR Act and a proviso has been incorporated in Section 125. The State legislature has only made provisions 4 to 15 of the RFCTLARR Act inapplicable and not the other provisions and what needs to be seen is whether contra-intention as contemplated under Section 8 of General Clauses Act, is evident. In view of this position the decision in the case of Girnar(3) is no longer applicable.

(v) Section 8 of General Clauses Act will apply only to a provision and not when the entire enactment has been repealed. Even otherwise Section 8 cannot apply since the reference to RFCTLARR Act is a legislation by Incorporation. Furthermore the MRTP Act is a complete code.

30. We have considered the rival contentions. As suggested by the learned Advocate General, which is not opposed, we have rephrased the question referred, to bring the issue in a sharper focus. The debate lies in a narrow ambit. In view of the decision of the Constitution Bench in Girnar (3), the law is settled that Section 11A of L.A. Act is not applicable to acquisition under Section 125 to 127 of MRTP Act. The Petitioners are attempting to restrict the dicta of Girnar (3) only to Section 11A of L.A. Act contending that it cannot be extended to Section 24(2) of RFCTLARR Act. According to them, the subsequent changes in the law also have made has made the ratio of Girnar (3) inapplicable. If we hold that the law declared by the Constitution Bench in Girnar (3) holds the field and is made applicable even to Section 24(2) of the RFCTLARR Act, then the Reference will have to be answered in negative. Only if the Petitioners succeed in their endeavour to establish that Girnar (3) is no longer applicable, then the issue is open for consideration. It is necessary to analyse the decision of Girnar (3) to cull out the ratio underlying the decision. It will have to be examined whether subsequent changes in the law such as, enactment of RFCTLARR Act, amendments to MRTP Act and framing of Rules by the State of Maharashtra under RFCTLARR Act have made any difference to the law laid down by the Constitution Bench.

51. When the RFCTLARR Act came in force, a bench of two learned Judges of the Apex Court in the case of Special Land Acquisition Officer, KIAD v/s. Anusaya Bai 14 considered the question of applicability of Section 24(2) of the RFCTLARR Act to the proceedings initiated under Karnataka Industrial Areas 13 2002(7) SCC 657 14 2003(7) SCC 313 Development Act, 1966. The Division Bench of the Karnataka High Court had accepted the contention that Section 24(2) of RFCTLARR Act applied to KIAD Act and had quashed the acquisition proceedings. The decision was appealed from by the Corporation. The Apex Court took note of the earlier decision in the case of Munithimmaiah v/s. State of Karnataka15 regarding applicability of Section 6 and Section 11A of the L.A. Act. In Munithimmaiah, the Apex Court had held that KIAD Act is a code in itself and therefore Section 11A of the L.A. Act was not applicable. Following this law, the learned Judges in Anusaya Bai, on parity of reasoning, held that the provisions of Section 24(2) of the RFCTLARR Act cannot be made applicable to the KIAD Act. The Apex Court allowed the appeal filed by the State and set aside the decision of the Division Bench. Thus, even while considering the provisions of Section 24(2), the Apex Court in the case of Anusaya Bai applied the legal position of not applying the provisions leading to lapsing of acquisition and different time frames to the State enactments governing planned development which are codes in themselves. The law laid down by the Constitution Bench in Girnar (3) and Offshore Trading stood reiterated.

68. In view of the above position, the applicability of Section 4 to 15 of the RFCTLARR Act is hardly necessary in MRTP Act. Since the Social Impact Assessment study is required if the acquisition generally is to be made for a public purpose, the State Legislature thought it fit to clarify the position that such Social Impact Assessment study is not required when the land is to be acquired under the MRTP Act. The special provisions to safeguard food security and the mandate on non-acquisition of irrigated agricultural land, are not strictly relevant to the MRTP Act. Section 11 of RFCTLARR Act is relatable to Section 4 of the L.A. Act. Section 15 of RFCTLARR Act is relatable to Section 5A of the L.A. Act. Even when the L.A. Act was in force, for the acquisitions under Section 126(2) of MRTP Act operation of Section 4 and Section 5A of the L.A. Act was excluded. Section 6 was referred to for the purpose of format. By excluding the application of Section 4 to 15 of the RFCTLARR Act, the legislature has merely clarified the existing position to remove any doubt. By enacting the proviso to Section 125 of MRTP Act, the State legislature, therefore, has not brought in change in law, but to obviate any confusion, by way of precaution has merely re-stated the existing position.