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Showing contexts for: removal from service in Rajendra Prasad Sah And Anil Kumar Ojha vs State Of Bihar And Ors. on 19 September, 2000Matching Fragments
3. The petitioners filed, separate writ petitions submitting that their removal from service, without giving them any notice to show cause or an opportunity of hearing was violative of the principles of natural justice. In support of the submission reliance was placed on an unreported Division Bench decision of this Court in C.W.J.C. No. 8642 of 1988, Sri Biresh Tripathi v. State of Bihar and Ors.. In that case also an order of removal from service passed by the Administrator, Biscomaun on the same ground and under similar circumstances came under challenge. A Bench of this Court by judgment and order, dated December 15, 1989, allowed the application holding that the order of removal from service having been passed in violation of principles of natural justice was unsustainable in law.
5. The order of the authority was challenged before this Court in a writ petition filed on behalf of the Biscomaun. In the reported decision it was held by a Bench of this Court that removal from service on the appointment was irregular and illegal was covered by the expression "for a reasonable cause" within the meaning of Section 26(1) of the Act and it, therefore, did not attract the principles of natural justice and the action of the Administrator in passing the order of removal from service without giving the concerned employee an opportunity of being heard in the matter could not; therefore be said to be unreasonable or arbitrary. In that case, however, the authority under the Shops Act had also field that the order of removal from service was made without making payment of one month's wages in lieu of one month's notice and, therefore, the termination of employment was further bad for non-compliance with the requirement of Section 26(1) of the Act. The Division Bench of this Court did not disturb that finding but remitted the matter to the authority to reconsider whether the relief of monetary compensation in lieu of reinstatement in service, as earlier directed by it might not be a more appropriate relief having regard to the fact that the termination of employment was for a reasonable cause being on the ground that the initial appointment was irregular and illegal.
7. At the first glance the two decisions may not appear comparable; one (in Biresh Tripathi) was given on a petition filed under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution directly before this Court challenging the order of removal from service while the other (in Biscomaun) came in a case arising from a proceeding under Section 26 of the Shops Act. It may further be said that the Division Bench in the case of Biscomaun examined and interpreted the import and scope of Section 26 of the Shops Act, issues that did not arise in Biresh Tripathi and that do not arise in these two cases, either. This is quite true but the irreconcilable conflict between the two lies in the completely different outcome flowing from the two decisions. A person starting from the same set of facts will get completely different results on following one or the other of the two decisions. For illustrations, if a removal order of this kind was directly challenged before this Court in a petition under Arts. 226 and 227 of the Constitution, a learned single Judge before whom such a petition would be normally placed (or even a Division Bench) would be obliged to up hold the challenge and set aside the order of removal following the Division Bench decision in Biresh Tripathi. On the other hand, the same order was taken before the authority in a complaint under Section 26(2) of the Shops Act the authority would be bound to dismiss the complaint following the decision in the earlier case of Biscomaun (supra). Needless to say that this is highly an anamolous and undesirable situation where the same case between the same parties is bound to be decided differently before two different Courts. To say the same thing differently, if an employee dismissed from the service of the Biscomaun fails to get any relief before the Authority under the Shops Act which is also a Court of fact, there is no reason why he should get any relief on the same facts before a writ Court and on the other hand when the employee removed from service is bound to get relief before a writ Court, there is no conceivable reason why he should not get the same relief before the Authority under the Shops Act. It follows, therefore, that either the case of Biresh Tripathi (supra), or the earlier case of Biscomaun was not correctly decided and there is, therefore, a need to review and re-examine the correctness of the two decisions.
10. No counter-affidavit has been filed in this case and it is not denied that the petitioner was not given any notice to show cause or an opportunity of hearing in the matter before passing the order removing him from service.
11. Anil Kumar Ojha, the petitioner in C.W.J.C. No. 7507 of 1989, was appointed as an Assistant by an order issued by the Managing Director under his Memo No. 1619-AR, dated June 11, 1987 (Annexure 2). Pursuant to his appointment he gave his joining report on July 3, 1987 (Annexures 3 and 4) after the supersession of the Managing Committee, however, he too was removed from service by an order passed by the Administrator under his Memo No. M/8066, dated April 5, 1989 (Annexure 1). The termination of employment was with immediate effect and this petitioner was also given one month's wages in lieu of one month's notice at the time of his removal from service. But no show-cause notice or an opportunity of hearing was given to this petitioner either.