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"Provided that an appeal may be admitted after the said period of thirty days if the appellant satisfied the appellate authority that he had sufficient cause for not preferring the appeal within that period."

Having regard to this provision the second respondent preferred an interlocutory application for the condonation of the delay. That was opposed by the writ petitioner (employer). In paragraph 4 of the counter it was stated thus :

"The petitioner has approached this Hon'ble Court on the footing that there was an order of termination on 12th January, 1979. Even assuming without admitting that there was an order of termination on 12th January, 1979, the appeal under S. 41(2) should have been filed within 30 days of the order of termination and in the instant case by 11th February, 1979. It would appear that the petitioner has filed the appeal on 28th May, 1979, i.e., after a delay of more than three months. The respondent does not admit the reasons given by the appellant for the condonation of the delay and in any event they are neither genuine nor justified calling for the exercise of discretion by this Hon'ble Authority in favour of the appellant."

17. As per the wording of S. 41 of the Act, no employer shall dispense with the services of a person 1) except for a reasonable cause; or 2) by way of misconduct, where there is no dispensation with the service by the petitioner, the employer, but the dispensation was brought about by the act of resignation, the court can have no jurisdiction. This is all the more so when in the appeal all that the authority could hold in under S. 41(2) there was no reasonable cause nor was the employee guilty of the misconduct alleged. Then again, it can merely uphold or set aside the order of termination and cannot exercise a discretion like the Courts established under the Industrial Law which are entrusted with powers under S. 11-A of the Industrial Disputes Act or the authorities constituted under the Catering and Establishment Act. What is required to be noted in this case is, if there is no termination by the employer the fact that the resignation was brought about by coercion is not a matter which falls within the jurisdiction of the authority, because the authority will then be assuming jurisdiction like that of a civil court as to whether the resignation was voluntary or not which falls totally outside the purview of S 41(2) of the Act. Ammapet Handloom Weavers' Cooperative Productions and Sales Society v. Kadalamuthu (K.S.) and other [1969-II L.L.J. 52] is cited for the proposition that this Court in a case arising under S. 41 of the Act took the view that when a workman failed to turn up, if his name was removed from the register or rolls, that would not amount to termination. Citing The Lakshmi Vilas Bank Ltd., Karur v. L. S. Pattabi Chettiar and another [1970-II L.L.J. 211] it is contended that superannuation does not tantamount to premature termination. M/s. Southern Roadways, Bangalore v. K. Padmanabhan and another [1979-L.I.C. 224] is cited for the contention as to how the matter could be approached under S. 2-A of the Industrial Disputes Act. In conclusion Mr. Narayanaswamy submits that unless and until the premature termination by the dispensation with the services of the employee is brought about by an act attributable to the employer, S. 41(2) cannot clothe the authority with jurisdiction.

23. The appeal Preferred by the employee under S. 41 of the Shop Act was allowed on the ground that bank gave no explanation for not accepting the medical certificate and horoscope produced by the employee and no notice was given as required under S. 41(1) of the Madras Shops and Establishments Act.

24. Allowing the writ petition preferred by the bank, held that the retirement of an, employee on reaching the age of superannuation according to service rules would not come within the scope of S. 41. From the very nature of the Language employed in S. 41(1) only a premature termination of the services of an employee could be brought within the scope of that section, thereby meaning a premature termination as the termination of the services of an employee prior to the period fixed in a contract of service, if there is one, or a termination of service prior to the period fixed for retirement on reaching the age of superannuation prescribed either in a contract of service, if there is one, or in the rules or regulations governing such service. Consequently if there is a contract of service and the contract of service itself prescribes the period of service, the termination of service of the employee pursuant to the expiry of such period of employment could not fall within the scope of the S. 41(1). Equally if there are terms in the contract of service or provisions in the rules applicable to the service providing for the retirement of the employee on reaching the age of superannuation, such a case also cannot fail within the scope of S. 41(2). The dispensing with the service for a reasonable cause or the dispensing with the service on a charge of misconduct, both of them, contemplate a termination of service anterior and prior to the date on which the service would come to an end automatically either as a result of the terms on the terms on the contract of service or as a result of a rule application to the service in question.

"When an employer discharges, dismisses, retrenches or otherwise terminates the services of an individual workman, any dispute relating to such discharge, dismissal, retrenchment or termination is required to be treated as an industrial dispute notwithstanding the fact that no other workman or any Union of workman has sponsored such a dispute.

If an employer secures resignation of any of his employees by force or against his will, in substance it amounts to the termination of the services of the concerned employee. It is to cover such cases of termination brought about in any form whatsoever the Legislature has designedly used the words 'or otherwise terminates the services' in S. 2-A. The question whether in a given case the resignation was tendered voluntarily or secured under duress, is a question of fact. Therefore, if a workman complains that he has not tendered his resignation voluntarily but his resignation was secured under threat or coercion and by that process the termination of his services is brought about, such a dispute between an individual workman and the employer is squarely covered by the provisions of S. 2-A of such a case falls within the scope of the words 'otherwise terminates the services." In the present case the workman complained that his resignation was secured under threat and by that method his services were terminated by the employer. Therefore, the State Government was competent to refer the dispute to the Labour Court."