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It was contended that no eviction of the landlord from the premises in his occupation had taken place but merely action had been indicated. Therefore, recourse to section 24-B and section 24-C of the Act was unwarranted. The learned District Judge was unable to accept those conten- tions. He accordingly dismissed the revision application. An application was moved under Article 226 of the Con- stitution before the High Court and the High Court by the impugned judgment and order has set aside the order of eviction. It held that the building was situated within the Cantonment of Meerut. The U.P. Act No. 28 of 1976 added Chapter IV-A as to the question whether this Act would apply to buildings constructed and situated within the cantonment limit, it was observed that by the notification issued in exercise of the powers conferred by section 3 of the Canton- ments, (Extension of Rent Control Laws) Act, 1957, the Central Government had extended to all the cantonments in Uttar Pradesh the provisions of the present Act in question as in force on the date of notification, and as a result of the issuance of the said notification Chapter IV-A, became applicable to the building in question, according to the High Court. It was, however, urged before the High Court on behalf of the respondent that Chapter IV-A had been applied to the Cantonment areas on a subsequent date, i.e. 27th February, 1982, the Act being not applicable to the accommo- dation in question in November, 1979 when the application under section 24-B of the Act was filed by the respondent and as such the same was liable to be dismissed. It was, however, conceded by respondent that the revision order had been passed by the Additional District Judge on 27th April, 1983. It was therefore submitted that the proper course in the circumstances of the instant case would have been to send back the case for fresh decision. Reliance had been placed by the appellant on the decision in the case of Jai Singh Jairam Tyagi etc. v. Mamanchand Ratilal/Igarwal and Ors., [1980] 3 SCR 224. However, as the learned judge felt that on the second point the respondent was entitled to succeed, he did not decide this point taken in the writ petition by the respondent. The second point urged before the learned judge was that as the appellant landlord was living in the ground floor of the said house, section 24-B was not maintainable. The learned judge found 'that the central idea of conferring the power on such a landlord to recover imme- diately possession was that he was being evicted from his government quarter for residence. The learned judge observed that the legislature did not want to leave such a person at the mercy of the laws delay. Such a landlord was a class by himself and was entitled to take summary proceedings. His case had to be urgently dealt with. But, according to the High Court, if he had any house in the same, building then he would not come within the purview of section 24-B of the Act. He was, however, not without a remedy. He can take recourse to section 21(1A) of the said Act. It was noted while chapter IV-A which incorporated section 24-B and 24-C provided summary trial, the object of the two provisions namely section 21 on the one hand and section 24-B and 24-C of the said Act on the other differ from each other. In this connection reliance was placed on certain decisions of this Court. After referring to certain decisions, it was held that the expression "to recover immediately" indicated the ground where section 24-B could be applied there, there was consequential urgency to recover the possession of the building. According to the learned judge, there would be no consequential urgency to recover if he was already in pos- session of a dwelling house or where it could be made avail- able to him at his choice. The High Court accordingly al- lowed the application under article 226 and set aside the orders of the delegated authority and the appellate authori- ty.

Aggrieved by the said decision, the appellant has come up to this Court.

Two questions, therefore, arise in this appeal namely, firstly, whether the building with which we are concerned and which is situated in Cantonment of Meerut would be governed by the provisions of section 24-B and section 24-C of the Act, and secondly, whether in view of the facts and circumstances found, have the grounds been made out under section 24~B of the Act for eviction of the respondent from the premises in question in summary manner? It is not dis- puted that the building in question is within the cantonment limits. In the Act of 1972 (Act No. 13 of 1972), there was an amendment in 1976 and Chapter IVA was added by the U.P. Act. No. 28 of 1976 with effect from 1976. Section 24A, section 24-B and section 24-C are contained in the said chapter. The said Amendment Act No. 28 of 1976 did not state whether the said chapter would be applicable to buildings constructed and situated within the cantonment limit. The first question posed before the High Court but not answered by it was whether in view of the answer given to the second question, the provisions of those sections would be applica- ble to the building in question.

In the instant case, as noted hereinbefore, the appel- lant had moved an application under section 24-C of the Act on 14th December, 1979 in respect of the premises in ques- tion on receipt of notice to quit the government premises in his occupation. The delegated authority made the order of release on 17th August, 1981. There was a revision applica- tion and it was disposed of by the Additional District Judge dismissing the revision on 27th April, 1983. Therefore when the order was made in this case and the application was filed the building in the cantonment area did not come within the ambit of the Act in question. When, however, the revisional order was passed by the Additional District Judge, the Act had come into operation and the building. in question was within the purview of the operation of the Act. In view of the ratio of Jai Singh Jairam Tvagi Etc. v. Mamanchand Ratilal Agarwal and Ors. (supra) it must be held that the provisions of Chapter IVA of the Act would be applicable. The amending Act was passed for the express purpose of saving decrees which had already been passed. Therefore action under section 24-C of the Act in this case was justified. The High Court did not decide this point because it was of the opinion that the second point which we shall note presently, the High Court was in favour of the respondent. We are, however, of the opinion that the first point urged on behalf of the respondent cannot be accepted in view of the position in law as discussed hereinbefore. It was submitted on behalf of the respondent that section 24-B gave substantive rights to the appellant and section 24-C was the procedure for enforcing those substantive rights. Therefore, these were not only procedural rights. Therefore, there was no question of retrospective operation to take away vested fight. We are, however, of the opinion that it would be an exercise in futility if the application is dismissed on this ground it can be fried again and in view of the subsequent legislation as noted hereinbefore it was bound to succeed on this point. In exercise of our discretionary power under article 136 of the Constitution it would not be proper to interfere in the facts and circumstances of the case on this ground. In the premises in view of the ratio of the decision of this Court in Jai Singh's case (supra) and reason mentioned hereinbe- fore this contention urged on behalf of the respondent must be rejected.