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Jethanand, the appellant herein, was prosecuted, along with another, in the Court of the Magistrate, First Class, Delhi, under s. 6(1-A) of the Act for possessing a wireless transmitter in contravention of the provisions of s. 3 of the Act, and was sentenced to six months rigorous imprisonment. On appeal, the learned First Additional Sessions Judge, Delhi, upheld the conviction but reduced the sentence to the period of imprisonment already undergone plus a fine of Rs. 500. On revision, the High Court confirmed both the conviction and the sentence. On an application filed for special leave, this Court gave the same, but limited it to the question of sentence. Learned Counsel raised before us the following contentions: (1) s. 6(1-A) of the Act was repealed, and, therefore, neither the conviction nor the sentence thereunder could be sustained; and (2) if s. 6(1-A) of the Act was repealed, this Court in limiting the appeal to the question of sentence only went wrong, for, if that section was not on the statute book at the time of the alleged commission of the offence, not only the sentence but also the conviction thereunder would be bad. Both the contentions raised turn upon the same point. The different steps in the argument may be stated thus: In the Act XVII of 1933, as it originally stood, there was no specific provision making the possession of wireless transmitter an offence. By the Indian Wireless Telegraphy (Amendment) Act, 1949 (XXXI of 1949) (hereinafter called the " 1949 Act"), s. 6(1-A) was inserted in the Act, whereunder the possession of a wireless transmitter was constituted a separate offence. The amending Act was repealed by the Repealing and Amending Act, 1952 (XLVIII of 1952) (hereinafter called the " 1952 Act "), with the result that on the date of the alleged commission of the offence the said section was not on the statute book. If that was the legal position, the limitation on the leave granted by this Court would result in an anomaly, namely, that the conviction would stand but the sentence would be quashed. The argument so presented appears to be plausible, but, in our view, not sound. There is a real justification for this Court limiting the scope of the special leave. The High Court by mistake cited in its judgment the provisions of s. 6(1) of the Act instead of s. 6(1-A) thereof. If the conviction was under s. 6(1), the maximum sentence permissible on the first offence thereunder was only fine which may extend to Rs. 100. Presumably on the assumption that the conviction could be sustained under s. 6(1), even if s. 6(1 -A) was not on the statute book-there may be justification for this view, as the words it wireless telegraphy apparatus " in s. 6(1) are comprehensive enough to take in " wireless telegraphy transmitter "-this Court gave leave limited to the question of sentence. The inconsistency, if any, was the result of the appellant's presentation of his case at that stage, and he cannot now be allowed to take advantage of his default to enlarge the scope of the appeal.

" Such Acts have no Legislative effect, but are designed for editorial revision, being intended only to excise dead matter from the statute book and to reduce its volume. Mostly, they expurgate amending Acts, because having imparted the amendments to the main Acts, those Acts have served their purpose and have no further reason for their existence. At times inconsistencies are also removed by repealing and 'amending Acts. The only object of such Acts, which in England are called Statute Law Revision Acts, is legislative spring-cleaning and they are not intended to make any change in the law. Even so, they are guarded by saving clauses drawn with elaborate care,. . .".

It is, therefore, clear that the main object of the 1952 Act was only to strike out the unnecessary Acts and excise dead matter from the statute book in order to lighten the burden of ever increasing spate of legislation and to remove confusion from the public mind. The object of the Repealing and Amending Act of 1952 was only to expurgate the amending Act of 1949, along with similar Acts, which had served its purpose.

The next question is whether s. 4 of the Act of 1952 saved the operation of the amendments that had been inserted in the Act of 1933 by the repealed Act. The relevant part of s. 4 only saved other enactments in which the repealed enactments have been applied, incorporated or referred to. Can it be said that the amendments are covered by the language of the crucial words in s. 4 of the Act of 1952, namely, applied, incorporated or referred to". We think not. Section 4 of the said Act is designed to provide for a different situation, namely, the repeal of an earlier Act which has been applied, incorporated or referred to in a later Act. Under hat section the repeal of the earlier Act does not affect the subsequent Act. The said principle has been succinctly stated in Maxwell on Interpretation of Statutes, 10th Edition, page 406:

Harbhajan Kaur (1) and in Darbara Singh v. Shrimati Karnail Kaur(2)that s. 4 of the Repealing and Amending Act of 1952 applies to a case of repeal of an amending Act. This legal position does not really help the appellant, for the case on hand directly falls within the four corners of s. 6-A of the General Clauses Act, 1897 (X of 1897). - The above section reads:

"Where any Central Act or Regulation made after the commencement of this Act repeals any enactment by which the text of any Central Act or Regulation was amended by the express omission, insertion or substitution of any matter, then, unless a different intention appears, the repeal shall not affect the continuance of any such amendment made by the enactment so repealed and in operation at the time of such repeal."