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On the other hand, Mr. Joymalya Bagchi, the learned advocate appearing on behalf of the opposite party No. 2. The West Bengal State Electricity Board, at the very outset, strenuously urged that it is highly preposterous to suggest that the Section 151 of the Principal Act creates a substantive and vested right in favour of an accused. According to Mr. Bagchi the said provisions have merely prescribed the procedure as to how a prosecution for an offence punishable under the provisions of the said Act be initiated before a Court of law upon collection of the prima facie materials against an accused and by no stretch of imagination it can be said that an accused has acquired any right far less any substantive or vested thereunder. Mr. Bagchi further submitted that the offences punishable under the Electricity Act, 2003 are undoubtedly cognizable, which means that the legislative intention was to permit the police to investigate into any complaint made on the allegation of commission of such offences and as such there cannot be any valid and justifiable reason for not to empower a Court to initiate a prosecution on such a police report and to try the offender for such offences. He submitted that non-mentioning of police report in Section 151 of the said Act was a mere omission due to draftsman mistake, which being subsequently noticed by the legislature and to overcome such anomalous situation, by Electricity (Amendment) Act, 2007 certain provisos have been inserted in Section 151 of the said Act. According to Mr. Bagchi that the amendment apart from being procedural is purely declaratory and curative statute, brought into effect to clear up an obvious error and to clear up doubts about legislative intention. He further submitted that the amendment not only relates to a procedural law, the same being declaratory or curative statute would operate retrospectively i.e. would apply in respect of all pending cases, Mr, Bagchi in support of his contentions is relied upon the following decisions:

It is a cardinal principle of construction that every statute is prima facie prospective unless it is expressly or by necessary implication made to have a retrospective operation. But the rule in general is applicable where the object of the statute is to affect vested rights or to impose new burdens or to impair existing obligations. Unless there are words in the statute sufficient to show the intention of the legislature to affect existing rights, it is deemed to be prospective only--"nova constitutio futuris formam imponere debet non praeteritis"--a new law ought to regulate what is to follow, not the past. It is not necessary that an express provision be made to make a statute retrospective and the presumption against retro-spectivity may be rebutted by necessary implication especially in a case where the new law is made to cure an acknowledged evil for the benefit of the community as a whole." (Para 13) The presumption against retrospective operation is not applicable to declaratory statutes.... In determining, therefore, the nature of the Act, regard must be held to the substance rather than to the form. If a new Act is "to explain" an earlier Act, it would be without object unless construed retrospectively. An explanatory Act is generally passed to supply an obvious omission or to clear up doubts as to the meaning of the previous Act. It is well settled that if a statute is curative or merely declaratory of the previous law retrospective operation is generally intended.... An amending Act may be purely declaratory to clear a meaning of a provision of the Principal Act which was already implicit. A clarificatory amendment of this nature will have retrospective effect. (Para 14) Though retrospectivity is not to be presumed and rather there is presumption against retrospectivity. according to Craies (Statute law, 7th Edn.) it is open for the legislature to enact laws having retrospective operation. Thus can be achieved by express enactment or by necessary implication from the language employed. If it is a necessary implication from the language employed that the legislature intended a particular section to have a retrospective operation, the Courts will give it such an operation., In the absence of a retrospective operation having been expressly given, the Courts may be called upon to construe the provisions and answer the question whether the legislature has sufficiently expressed that intention giving the statute retrospectivity. Four factors are suggested as relevant: (i) general scope and purview of the statute; (ii) the remedy sought to be applied; (iii) the former state of the law; and (iv) what it was the legislature contemplated. (p. 388) The rule against retrospectivity does not extend to protect from the effect of a repeal, a privilege which did not amount to accrued right, (p. 392)" (para 15) Where a statute is passed for the purpose of supplying an obvious omission in a former statute or to "explain" a former statute, the subsequent statute has relation back to the time when the prior Act was passed. The rule against retrospectivity is inapplicable to such legislations as are explanatory and declaratory in nature. (para 16)

22. This Court has found that in the case of Shri Chaman Singh v. Srimathl Jaikaur the Apex Court observed it is well settled that if a statute is curative or merely declare the previous law retroactive operation would be more rightly scribed to it than the legislation which may prejudicially affect past right and transaction.

23. Undoubtedly, without specifying in the Electricity Act, 2003, when the offence under Section 135 of the Electricity Act was made punishable with imprisonment upto 3 years, the true intention of the legislature was nothing but, to make the same cognizable in terms of Part II of the First schedule of the Code of Criminal Procedure relating to classification of offences against other laws. Thus, when the legislature intended to make such offences cognizable thereby empowering the police to investigate into the case without the Court's order there cannot be any justifiable cogent reason for the legislature at the same time to render the result of such investigation nugatory and otiose by restricting the Court from taking cognizance of commission of such offences, on police report i.e. on charge-sheet and initiation of proceedings thereupon. In my opinion, non-inclusion in Section 151 of the Act, a police report or charge-sheet as one of the foundation on which cognizance may be taken and a proceeding can be initiated before a Court of law against any accused person for commission of an offence punishable under the said Act, was an obvious omission and never really intended by the legislature and the legislature having noticed such error or mistake stepped in by inserting the amended proviso and removed the absurdity between the real legislative intention and what was actually enacted, and brought the act in conformity with what legislature had really intended to provide and such amendment has been passed for the purpose of rectifying an obvious omission in the former statute. By this amendment the obvious error has been explained, and removed and clarifies what law always was and shall remain to be. No vested right has been taken away or curtailed. The amendment in question is not only procedural in nature but at the same time is curative and declaratory.