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There seems to be force in this argument because according to this reply, the file was submitted to the detaining authority on 6th May, 2003 along with the document at Sl.No.37 of the relied upon documents together with the draft Grounds of detention by the Deputy Secretary (COFEPOSA) so that in case the detaining authority ultimately decided to pass the detention order against the accused person, it may also like to go through the Grounds of detention placed on the file and vet the same with whatever changes or additions it may deem fit. Whether such a procedure/practice as has been adopted in the case can be said to be in accordance with law or established procedure and practice which is followed in such like matters? We must remember that Section 3 of the Act provides for power to make detention order. Sub-section (1) of Section 3 of the Act speaks of the authorities who are competent to make detention orders. In the case of Central Government, an officer not below the rank of a Joint Secretary and in the case of State Government, not below the rank of a Secretary to that Government, who have been specially empowered for the purposes of Section 3, can only make detention orders. This clearly depicts the legislative intent that the task of passing a detention order can only be entrusted to high/senior functionaries of the State. Only such functionaries who are specially empowered in this behalf are entitled to pass the detention order if they are satisfied that the detention of any person is required with a view to preventing him from acting in any manner prejudicial to the conservation or augmentation of foreign exchange or with a view to preventing him from smuggling of goods etc. Therefore, the satisfaction envisaged in Section 3 has necessarily to be of the officer specially empowered in that behalf and of nobody else. We do not mean to stretch this proposition to the extent that only the specially empowered officer himself has to do each and every thing in connection with the passing of the detention order. He is certainly entitled to take the assistance, from his lower functionaries for accomplishing this task but their input will be limited only to place the entire material before the detaining authority and they should not involve themselves in decision making process about the recording of satisfaction. That is entirely within the domain of the detaining authority. What has been done in the case in hand is somewhat disturbing because even before the detaining authority considered the matter and applied its mind to the material placed before him and recorded his satisfaction about making the detention order, the lower functionaries had actually put up a draft of detention order for the approval/vetting by the detaining authority which implies that the lower functionaries presumed that the detaining authority is going to pass the detention order in all eventualities/probabilities. Such a procedure or practice of putting up draft orders for approval/vetting by the competent authorities/senior functionaries can perhaps be justified in the routine discharge of administrative functions and duties in various Ministries and Departments of the Governments while dealing with purely administrative matters. The Rules of business allocation of the Government permits such a procedure but when it comes to the passing of quasi-judicial orders or a detention order under various preventive detention laws, it has to be different. Adoption of such a practice or procedure would vitiate the order as the detaining authority is likely to be influenced by such an assistance rendered by the lower functionaries, with whatever bona fide or sincerity it may be. It would have been a different thing if the entire material had been placed before the detaining authority and he had applied his mind and reached a satisfaction about the need to detain the petitioner on certain grounds and then the lower functionaries had assisted him in formalising the task of preparation and issuance of the detention order. We have, therefore, no hesitation in holding that the impugned detention order can again be termed as without application of mind by the detaining authority himself and the satisfaction recorded in the case in hand was not solely of the detaining authority. The impugned order is vitiated on this count as well.