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"We see only one answer to that question, namely, that it does. The sweep of the right of life conferred by Article 21 is wide and far-reaching. It does not mean merely that life cannot be extinguished or taken away as, for example, by the imposition and execution of the death sentence, except according to procedure established by law. That is but one aspect of the right to life. An equally important facet of that right is the right to livelihood because, no person can live without the means of living, that is, the means of livelihood. If the right to livelihood is not treated as a part of constitutional right to life, the easiest way of depriving a person of his right to life would be to deprive him of his means of livelihood to the point of abrogation. Such deprivation would not only denude the life of its effective content and meaningfulness but it would make life impossible to live. And yet, such deprivation would not have to be in accordance with the procedure established by law, if the right to livelihood is not regarded as a part of the right to life. That, which alone makes it possible to live, leave aside what makes life livable, must be deemed to be an integral component of the right to life. Deprive a person of his right to livelihood and you shall have deprived him of his life."

15. In Unni Krishnan, J.P. v. State of A.P. (supra) a Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court considered the question - whether right to education is a fundamental right. By a majority judgment, the Supreme Court held that "right to receive education upto the age of 14 years as enshrined in Article 45 of the Constitution of India is a part of right to life under Article 21". In his judgment Mohan, J., made reference to the provisions of Articles 14, 19, 21, 25 and 26 and observed that" there is no need to provide a right to life in a positive manner because right to life and property inheres in every man and quoted with approval the following observations in Pathumma v. State of Kerala, A.I.R. 1978 SC 771 :-

(Underlying is ours)

19. In Francis C. Mullin v. Administrator, Union Territory of Delhi, A.I.R. 1981 SC 746, the Supreme Court elaborated on the scope of Article 21 and held :-

"But the question which arises is whether the right to life is limited only to protection of limb or faculty or does it go further and embrace some thing more. We think that the right to life includes right to live with human dignity and all that goes along with it viz., the bare necessities of life such as adequate nutrition, clothing and shelter and facilities for reading, writing and expressing oneself in diverse forms, freely moving about the mixing and commingling with fellow human being. Of course, the magnitude and content of the components of this right would depend upon the extent of the economic development of the country, but it must in any view of the matter, include a right to the basic necessities of life and also the right to carry on such functions and activities as constitute the bare minimum expression of the human self."
XX XX XX XX XX It is otherwise important to bear in mind that self preservation of one's life is the necessary concomitant of the right to life enshrined in Article 21 of the Constitution of India, fundamental in nature, scared, precious and inviolable. The importance and validity of the duty and right to self preservation has a species in the right of self defence in criminal law. Centuries ago thinkers of this Great Land conceived of such right and recognised it."

29. Even though the various judgments of this Court would have been enough for the Government to have accepted the claim made by all the petitioners and similarly situated persons but what has happened is that in a large number of cases, the employees (serving and retired) who have received treatment in the hospitals and institutions recognised by the Government have been forced to seek intervention of the Court for issue of a mandamus to the Government to reimburse the expenses incurred by them. It is disquietening that the Government should have adopted a purely ministerial approach in these matters and where a more humanistic approach should have been adopted, the Government has by and large resisted the claims on hypertechnicalities. It should be a matter of great concern for all those who run the Government that these matters should also come to the Court Frequently inspite of the observations made by a Division Bench of which one of us (G.S. Singhvi, J.) was a party. While allowing the Civil Writ Petition No. 82761 of 1994 (Smt. Devki Rani v. State of Punjab) on 30.8.1994, the Division Bench observed:-