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4. The scheme of the will may briefly be slated thus: The testator at the time of his death owned an ancestral impartible Estate called Seithur Zamin, a self-acquired zamin called the Elumalai Zamin and other movable and immovable properties. He had certain debts and other obligations to discharge; he had to provide, after his death, for the maintenance of his mother, son, daughter, nephew and others. He gave A Schedule property, i.e., the Seithur Zamin, to his son, the Zamindar; B Schedule property, i.e., Elumalai Zamin, to his nephew, C Schedule property, to his daughter; D Schedule property, to Challam, who served his wives faithfully, and E Schedule property to Muthiah Bhagavathar. In addition he made other bequests, directed his debts to be paid and other obligations discharged out of his entire Estate. He appointed an Executor to carry out the terms of his will.

5. Strong reliance is placed by learned counsel for the appellants on the preamble to the will, and, emphasizing on the words "After us there is our only son Sevuga Pandia Dorai, aged 11 years, who is entitled to get all our properties as the heir and at present there is none excepting the said person", an argument is advanced that the said words indicate the intention of the testator that the Estate should go to his son as his heir. But the preamble was not the dispositive clause: it only gave the financial position of the testator, the persons to be provided for and declared his right to dispose of the property in favour of the persons mentioned in the will. Consistent with the preamble, the heading of the clauses making the bequests stated "The arrangements made hereby are as follows". What follows were the arrangements made by him and not what the law of inheritance brought about. Under the will the testator bequeathed A, B, C, D and E Schedule properties to different persons and the clauses making the disposition were couched in the same terminology. Though different words were used in the document as translated, both the learned counsel, who know Tamil, agreed that the same Tamil word was used for bequeathing the different properties to different persons. What is more, whenever the testator wanted to give an absolute Estate to a legatee he used the same words of inheritance such as "shall enjoy hereditarily from son to grandson and so on in succession." It is a well settled rule of construction that the same words used in a document shall be given the same meaning unless there is a clear intention to the contrary. It is not disputed that in the case of C, D and E Schedules the said words of disposition conveyed an absolute interest to the legatees mentioned therein. If that be so, we cannot without violating the said rule of construction and without doing violence to the language used give a different meaning to the clause containing the disposition of the A Schedule property in favour of the Zamindar. Under the relevant clause the testator said "Our son Sevuga Pandia Dorai Avergal shall take the properties set out in A Schedule herein after our lifetime and hold and enjoy the same with absolute rights and from son to grandson and so on in succession." If the testator intended to bequeath an absolute interest to the legatee, he could not have done so in words clearer than the said words. We find it impossible to construe the said words to mean that the testator was only recognizing the rights of the son to the Estate if he died intestate: that will be rewriting the will. The appointment of an Executor to administer all the properties, including the A Schedule property, is another indication that the said property was also subject to a bequest. The appointment of an Executor would not have arisen in respect of the A Schedule property if the said property had not been bequeathed under the will. Further, the testator directed all the debts due by him to be paid out of his entire property including the A Schedule property. If the Zamindar was taking the impartible Estate as an heir, he would take it free from the liabilities not binding on the Estate. He was taking it subject to the liabilities not binding on the Estate, because he was taking it as a legatee and not as an heir. For instance, in the matter of purchase of Elumalai Zamin, which is admitted to be not a part of the impartible Estate, the testator borrowed money from others; he directed the Executor to discharge the said debt from and out of the A Schedule property and the assets relating to the same irrespective of the property that might have been secured in respect of that debt. In respect of other obligations he directed them to be discharged from and out of the entire property bequeathed, including the A Schedule property. For instance, he directed the Executor to spend from the said two zamins amounts necessary to meet the expenses for performing the marriage of his younger brother's son, Muthuswami Pandian, for palace construction and repair and also for making jewels for the wife of Muthuswami Pandian. He also directed him to spend from both the zamins the amounts necessary for performing and conducting festivals. What is more, some items of properties forming part of the impartible Estate, i.e., A Schedule property, were bequeathed to others. The following 3 items prima facie formed part of the Seithur Zamin; (1) a palace in the Seithur Zamin Estate; (2) pannai lands in the Estate purchased from Dalava Madaliar; and (3) Pannai lands in Seithur Zamin in Devadanamkulam village; and pannai lands in Kooraipadugai punja in Pallathavu. Though the palace and pannai lands formed part of the impartible Estate, under the will they were bequeathed to Muthuswami Pandian, Muthathal and others. Under the will the Zamindar got not only the impartible Estate, i.e., the A Schedule property, but also properties other than B, C, D and E Schedules The Estate as well as other properties were bequeathed to him under the same clause couched in the same language. Therefore, it cannot be said that in respect of the A Schedule property there was no bequest and in respect of other properties there was a bequest. Such a construction will introduce inconsistency and incongruity in the dispositive clause. Briefly stated, the testator did not make any distinction in the matter of bequests between the impartible Estate and his other properties. He divided all his properties into A, B, C, D and E Schedules. He asserted his absolute right to dispose of them. Having regard to the circumstances obtaining at the time of executing the will, by using appropriate words he bequeathed them in the manner described by him in the various clauses of the will. He gave to his only son most of the A Schedule property and also some other properties. A small part of the A Schedule property was bequeathed by him to others also. The A Schedule property and other properties were made equally liable to discharge some of the specified debts. There was a clear bequest of the A Schedule property to the Zamindar, subject to the obligations mentioned above and it is impossible to read into the will the contention of the learned counsel that, though in terms it was a bequest, in fact, having regard to the preamble, it was only a recognition of the Zamindar's right to succeed to the Estate. To accept the argument of the appellants is to read into the will something which is not there. Obviously that cannot be done.

This sub-section in terms limits the unrestricted power to incur debts or alienate properties possessed by an impartible estate-holder in respect of his Estate. The limits of his power are defined by reference to the power of a managing member of a joint Hindu family, not being the father or grandfather of the other coparceners, to make an alienation of the joint family property or to incur a debt. His power in regard to alienations and debts is equated to that of a manager of a joint Hindu family. While an impartible estate-holder before the Act could alienate the Estate or a part thereof or incur debts binding on the Estate without any restrictions on his power, after the Act he can only do so under the circumstances where a manager of a Hindu joint family can do so. But it is not possible to hold that the sub-section by its own force converted a self-acquired impartible Estate before the Act into a joint family-Estate thereafter. The words of the sub-section do not bear any such contention. If so, it follows that though the Seithur Zamin was an impartible Estate under Madras Act II of 1904, it continued to, be a self-acquired property of the Zamindar.

Rule 4. (1) In the case of (1) a partible Estate other than that specified in rule (3) or (ii) an impartible Estate not governed by Section 45 the Tribunal shall determine the aggregate compensation payable to all the following persons considered as a single group:--

(i) the persons, who immediately before the notified date, owned the Estate......"

The question is whether Section 45 (1) of the Act applied to the Estate, in which case the persons mentioned in Section 45 (2), i.e., the appellants and the Zamindar, would get the compensation, or whether rule 4 (1) would apply, in which case the persons mentioned therein, i.e., the persons who immediately before the notified date had owned the Estate, would get the compensation. Learned counsel for the appellants contends that the impartible Estate mentioned in Section 45 (1) is the same as that described in Section-4 (1) of the Impartible Estates Act II of 1904. We do not see any justification for this contention. Section 45 (1) only gives the description of an ancestral impartible Estate as evolved by judicial decisions. As noticed earlier it has been held by the Judicial Committee that an impartible Estate, though ancestral, is clothed with the incidents of a self-acquired and separate property, but the right of survivorship alone still remains and to that extent the Estate still retains the character of a joint family property. Section 45 (1) of the Act in terms succinctly describes an ancestral impartible Estate in the light of the said decisions. As we have held that Seithur Zamin is not an ancestral impartible Estate in the hands of the Zamindar, it is outside the scope of Section 45 of the Act. It follows that it will be governed by Rules 1 and 4 (1) of the Rules made under the Act. It is not disputed that if Rule 4 (1) applies, the appellants are out of Court, for the Zamindar alone owned the Estate before the notified date.