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b) Dr.A.C.Muthiah, the appellant/plaintiff filed C.S.No.930 of 2008 for a permanent injunction restraining the BCCI from permitting Mr.N.Srinivasan, the second respondent herein, to participate in the General Body Meeding scheduled in Mumbai on 27.09.2008 or any other subsequent date for the election of new office bearers. He also sought for a judgment and decree of mandatory injunction directing the BCCI to act under clause 32 (II) of the Memorandum of Association and Rules and Regulations by appointing a Commissioner to make a preliminary enquiry against the said N.Srinivasan. He also prayed for a mandatory injunction directing the BCCI to exercise the power as per clause 8(6) of the Regulations relating to the misconduct. Basically, the suit was filed on the ground that the said N.Srinivasan, who was holding the post of Honorary Treasurer in BCCI and was also the Managing Director of India Cements Limited, should not have been awarded the franchised Indian Premier League rights for ownership of 'Chennai Super Kings' team by the BCCI, as in terms of clause 32 (II) of the rules and regulations, it amounts to an act of indiscipline or misconduct.

5.2. As far as the challenge to the clause 6.2.4 is concerned, he would submit that it is nothing to do with the rules or regulations of the BCCI. It is only a separate code evolved for the purpose of conduct of T20 matches. He would also submit, in any event, the Board unanimously decided to include such a clause and the appellant, not even a member of the BCCI and as a stranger cannot question the said clause. He would submit that, that clause being only a code, is not amenable to challenge and that too, by an individual without a suit being filed under Order 1 Rule 8 C.P.C. on the representative capacity. In any event, there is no public interest involved in the matter, which is opposed to public policy. In any case, the learned Advocate General would submit that as both the reliefs sought for in the suit as well as in the interim applications are identical, such reliefs cannot be ordered unless a strong prima facie case is shown and as no such prima facie case is shown, grant of such interim reliefs would amount to grant of decree as such, even without any trial. With the above submissions, the learned Advocate General sought for dismissal of the appeals.

Question No.4 :

"Whether clause 6.2.4 of the Regulations for Players, Team Officials, Managers, Umpires and Administrators of BCCI should be suspended ?"

12. It is the contention of Mrs.Nalini Chidambaram, learned senior counsel, that after the Regulations for Players, Team Officials, Managers, Umpires and Administrators of 2008 were made and in the light of the regulations including Twenty20 matches as well, clause 6.2.4. should not have been excluded the events like IPL and Champions League Twenty20. In this context, we may mention that BCCI has its own set of Rules and Regulations in the form of Memorandum and Rules and Regulations, which we have considered in the earlier portion of the judgment. That Rules and Regulations relate to the Players, Umpires, Team Officials and Administrators. Those regulations shall also apply to the test matches, ODI matches, tour matches and any domestic or international matches. It is the specific stand of the BCCI that the above matches are arranged, conducted, controlled and regulated by these regulations. These regulations have nothing to do with the subsequent regulations of 2008, viz., Regulations for Players, Team Officias, Managers, Umpires and Administrators, which were framed for the purpose of conducting Twenty20 matches on commercial basis. Though BCCI organises and controls such matches, the players are purchased by individuals and in such circumstances, the application of Memorandum of Association and Rules and Regulations of BCCI cannot be pressed into service. Therefore, the contention that clause 6.2.4. are to be read with the Memorandum of Association and Rules and Regulations of BCCI is not acceptable.

13. From the rival contentions, it appears to us that whether these subsequent Regulations of 2008 could be questioned by an individual in a suit on the ground that they are part of the Memorandum of Association and Rules and Regulations of BCCI and not a separate code of conduct for the conduct of Twenty20 matches. That apart, though as rightly pointed out by Mrs.Nalini Chidambaram, learned senior counsel, that the Memorandum and Rules and Regulations of BCCI also include Twenty20 matches and the definition of an Administrator under the said regulations includes the past President as well, in view of the inclusion of Twenty20 in the Regulations of 2008 with a definition to the same, viz., a limited over international match classified as Twenty20 in accordance with ICC Regulations, we are unable to agree with the contention that clause 6.2.4. should have been included with IPL or Champions League Twenty20. However, the question is as to whether clause 6.2.4 should include or exclude those events is a matter for this Court to consider and decide at the interlocutory stage. When we point out that when a set of Memorandum and Rules and Regulations were framed for the conduct of BCCI and the present rule, which was introduced in the year 2008, is only a code of conduct for the Administrators and cannot be considered, prima facie, as part and parcel of Memorandum and Rules and Regulations of BCCI itself and such code of conduct is unanimously framed by the entire Board members to exclude certain events, it is not for this Court to go in deep the question as to whether such exclusion displaces the fairness on the part of BCCI. As the clause stands today, it excludes certain events wherein even the Administrators could franchise a team in Twenty20 matches, which is purely commercial in nature. Further, there are no materials placed before this Court whether these IPL matches are official matches conducted by ICC or they are conducted on commercial basis. In the absence of those materials and in view of the fact that the parties would also be entitled to let in evidence at the time of trial, the exclusion in the clause which has been incorporated in the Rules and Regulations cannot be stayed unless there is a strong prima facie case made out. The learned Judge has also rightly appreciated the stand of the respondents and has rejected the contention of the appellant/plaintiff.