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29), it was held as under: -
"The quota rule will be enforced with reference to vacancies in all posts, whether permanent or temporary included in the sanctioned strength of the cadre (except such vacancies as are purely of a fortuitous or adventitious nature)......................"

In P.S. Mahal vs. Union of India (1984) 3 SCR 847, it was held as under: -

"It is therefore obvious that if a vacancy arises on account of an incumbent going on leave or for training or on deputation for a short period, it would be a fortuitous or adventitious vacancy and the quota rule would not be attracted in case of such a vacancy. But where a vacancy arises on account of the incumbent going on deputation for a reasonably long period and there is no reasonable likelihood of the persons promoted to fill such vacancy having to revert, the vacancy would be subject to the quota rule."
"It is, therefore, apparent that what has to be considered for the applicability of the quota rule is a vacancy in a post included in the sanctioned strength of the cadre............................"
"It is thus clear that the vacancies in the posts of Executive Engineer arising on account of deputation of Executive Engineers to other departments, organizations and public undertakings for a period of one or more years were long term vacancies and they could not be regarded as fortuitous or adventitious in character and hence they were subject to the quota rule."

The aforesaid observations certainly support the contention of the appellants that as no vacancy either permanent or temporary in the quota meant for promotees was available on 30.4.1991, the period of officiation/service rendered by the contesting respondents till a vacancy in their quota became available to them, cannot be counted towards their seniority.

19. The learned counsel for the appellants has also submitted that the appointment of the contesting respondents was not only contrary to Rules but was fortuitous in nature and they can get no advantage of such fortuitous appointment until a substantive vacancy was available in their quota, which in fact became available much later some time in the year 1993-94, which is long after the appointment of the appellants. What is a fortuitous appointment has been explained in a Constitution Bench decision of this Court in Rudra Kumar Sain vs. Union of India (2000) 8 SCC 25. After observing that the Rules in question did not define the terms "ad hoc", "stopgap" and "fortuitous", which are in frequent use in service jurisprudence, the Court referred to several dictionaries. The meaning given to the expression "fortuitous" in Stroud's Judicial Dictionary is "accident or fortuitous casualty". This should obviously connote that if an appointment is made accidentally, because of a particular emergent situation, such appointment obviously would not continue for a reasonably long period. In Black's Law Dictionary the expression "fortuitous" means "occurring by chance", "a fortuitous event may be highly unfortunate". It thus indicates that it occurs only by chance or accident, which could not have been reasonably foreseen. In Oxford dictionary the meaning given to the word "fortuitous" is  happening by accident or chance rather than design. In our opinion it will not be proper to hold that the promotion of the contesting respondents was fortuitous as contended by learned counsel for the appellants. It cannot be said that the contesting respondents were promoted by accident or by chance. Their promotion order was passed as there were vacancies to the posts of Additional District and Sessions Judges, though in the quota or direct recruits, but as no recruitment from the said channel had been made for a long time and sufficient number of candidates were not available, the vacancies were filled in by giving promotion to members of Bihar Civil Service (Judicial Branch). If promotion orders had not been passed and the posts had not been filled in, the judicial work in the districts would have suffered. However, it is clear that having regard to the various orders passed on the judicial side by the Patna High Court and the legal position being well settled that the temporary posts have also to be counted for determining the one-third quota of direct recruits, the promotion given to the contesting respondents was not in accordance with law. Instead of taking the harsh step of rescinding their order of promotion the Patna High Court, on the administrative side, took the decision to treat them promoted against subsequent quota of promotees. Therefore, the contesting respondents can under no circumstances claim seniority over the appellants and the view to the contrary taken by the Jharkhand High Court on 29.8.2002 on administrative side and also in the judgment and order dated 1.4.2003, which is the subject-matter of challenge in the present appeal, is wholly erroneous in law.