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3 Going by plain memory, it is difficult to reach any conclusion whether this issue was in fact argued before the court, when the order under review was passed. Be that as it may be, since this issue is being raised on admitted documents, I propose to consider the same. What is submitted is that the first Respondent bank had actually compromised its dues on the principle of accord and satisfaction, when the Petitioners were before BIFR and the sale was effected of one of the main assets of the first Petitioner company in pursuance of BIFR orders. The defence of accord and satisfaction is based exclusively on minutes of meeting between the company and its secured creditors including the first Respondent bank. The minutes indicate that the representatives of the creditors, including the first Respondent bank herein, were generally agreeable to the proposal of sale of assets of the first Petitioner company. A specific assertion on the part of the representative of the first Respondent bank is noted in the minutes. The assertion is to the effect that consent was given by the first Respondent bank for sale of the secured assets and that all other rights of the bank against the promoters/guarantors were to continue for recovery of balance dues. Based on this, it is submitted Chittewan 3/4 7. rpl 47-19.doc that there was a waiver on the part of the first Respondent bank to its claim against the principal debtor, i.e. the first Petitioner company, other than what was coming to it as its pro-rata share in the sale proceeds of the secured assets; the only claim left out was the claim agaisnt the promoters of the first Petitioner, who had guaranteed its debt. This submission was certainly advanced before the learned arbitrator, who was of the view that merely from the statement of the representative of the first Respondent bank, which was recorded in the minutes, it could not be said that the bank's right to recover balance monies from the borrowers was foregone. The learned arbitrator observed that waiver of right to recover legitimate dues has to be clear and unequivocal, and that it was not shown that the question of waiver by the lenders was on the anvil at the time when these minutes were made. The arbitrator further observed that the minutes did not seem to be a well-drafted document by legal personnel and seemed to be prepared merely for the purpose of the creditors' consent for sale of properties. The finding of the learned arbitrator on this aspect is clearly a possible finding, which is supported by some evidence and cannot be termed as a finding based on no evidence; it is also not opposed to any provision or principle of law. It cannot be termed either as an impossible or perverse view, that is to say, a view which no reasonable person duly instructed in law would take, or something which would shock the conscience of the court. The award, accordingly, does not merit any interference even on the issue of accord and satisfaction.