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The Court, however, further added :-

"In the absence of a statutory provision permitting expressly or impliedly delegation of disciplinary powers, an authority other than the disciplinary authority has clearly no power to frame, on its own initiative, charges against a civil servant and hold an enquiry into them."

It would be clear even from the judgment that only when the statute does not expressly or impliedly authorise the disciplinary authority to delegate his power to any other subordinate authority, the disciplinary proceedings cannot be initiated by any authority other than the appointing authority but the statute or the Rules governing these proceedings may validly provide otherwise and if they so provide, the proceedings would not be without jurisdiction. The authority so empowered would be competent to take up the proceedings. So far as Rule 27 of the C.R.P.F. Rules is concerned, it authorises not only the Commandant, by also such other superior Officer as is appointed by the Commandant to take up departmental enquiry and frame charges. When Shri S.S. Khaira, Deputy Superintendent of Police, who was a "Superior Officer", signed the charge-sheet and served it on the plaintiff who was non-gazetted Officer, he was fully empowered to do so by Rule 27(b). Moreover, he did not act on his own. He did not initiate disciplinary proceedings. It was Commandant who took the decision to initiate disciplinary proceedings against the plaintiff and appointed him as an Enquiry Officer. Thus Shri S.S. Khaira was competent not only to conduct the departmental proceedings, but also frame charges. The decision to initiate disciplinary proceedings against the plaintiff herein was taken by the Commandant, the charge-sheet was approved by the Commandant, the enquiry was conducted under his orders and the ultimate punishment was imposed by the Commandant. That order, therefore, becomes unassailable. The M.P. High Court itself held that if the statute itself permitted delegation, the disciplinary proceedings would not be vitiated. It does not lay down that even if such delegation is permitted by the statute, the disciplinary authority should initiate the disciplinary proceedings. On the other hand it authorises even the framing of the charges by the delegate. It was this decision which was followed by the Assam High Court in Manihar Singh v. Supdt. of Police, Shillong, A.I.R. 1969 Assam 1. That decision does not declare that the disciplinary proceedings initiated by the delegatee would be without jurisdiction. The decision of the Supreme Court in Sunil Kumar v. State of W.B., leads to the same conclusion. That was a case where the Vigilance Commissioner referred its report of investigation to Shri A.N. Mukherji, who was later appointed as an Enquiry Officer, for his views as to whether institution of disciplinary proceedings was to be recommended and for the preparation of draft charges. Shri Mukherji opined that there was sufficient material for framing charges and also prepared five draft charges and forwarded the same to the Vigilance Commissioner. The Vigilance Commissioner in turn forwarded those papers to the Government which finally decided to institute disciplinary proceedings against the appellant. The Supreme Court held that the decision to initate disciplinary proceedings was in fact taken by the Competent authority and that neither the charges framed nor departmental proceedings taken were vitiated. So too in this case merely because the Enquiry Officer prepared the draft charges, it does not mean that the disciplinary proceedings were initiated by the Enquiry Officer and not by the Commandant who was the competent Officer. These draft charges were submitted for approval to the Commandant who was admittedly the competent authority to initiate the proceedings. The draft charges were also approved by him. The decision to initiate disciplinary proceedings was also taken by him. The order of removal cannot be assailed on this ground.