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32. Judged by Rule 25, the award made on 28th April, 1954, was clearly made within time. Unlike Article 3, the Rule prescribes a single starting point for limitation which is the date when the Court enters on the reference. The somewhat troublesome problem of construction presented by Article 3 of Schedule I as to whom the two alternatives, "after entering on the reference" and "after having been called upon to act"', shall respectively apply is not thus presented by the Rule. It is also to be noticed that while Article 3 speaks of the "arbitrators" entering on the reference, Rule 25 speaks of the 'Court' doing so. Apart from extensions of time, of which mere was none here, what is to be seen under Rule 25 is whether the arbitral Court made the award within four months of its entering on the reference. When an arbitrator enters on a reference made to him is a question on which slightly different views have been taken and one view is that he does not do so till the parties are before him. But it appears to me that even if an arbitrator may be said to enter on the reference on an earlier date such date, under the rules of the Bengal Chamber of Commerce and Industry, cannot be earlier than the date on which the Registrar first asks the parties to file their respective statements. Under Rule 11 of those Rules, "the parties shall within such time as may be directed by the Court, prepare and submit to the Registrar in duplicate a written statement of their respective cases". Since the direction as to the time for filing the statements is to be given by the Court, it may be said that the Court enters on the reference when it gives such direction. Assuming that is correct, the first notice in this case, calling for the submission of statements after the appellant had asked for further arbitration, was given on or about 5th February, 1954. If that notice was given under the direction of the second Court, as it must be presumed to have been, the date on which the Court entered on the reference was the date on which the direction was given and that date, in the absence of any earlier date proved by the respondent, must be faken to be the date of the notice. In no view can the date on which the second Court entered on the reference be pushed further back. It follows that even if, for the purpose of computing limitation in the present case, the entering on the reference must be taken to be the entering by the Court constituted of Messrs. Carstairs and Mc Craw on their re-appointment, the award made On 28th April, 1954, was clearly made within the period of four months prescribed by Rule 25. It was more within that period if the Court to be regarded be the Court constituted of Mr. Luke and Mr. McCraw which actually made the award. The respondent's attack on the award on the ground of limitation must therefore fail. The question of limitation, however, is of no importance, since the award was made by an illegally constituted Court and was therefore invalid in law.