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See also Tej Singh v. Ghasi Ram, ILR 49 All 812 ; (AIR 1927 All 563). In Ram Harakh Singh v. Mumtaz Husain. AIR 1949 All 679, the question of acquiescence and ratification was also considered. Following ILR 48 All 239 : (AIR 1926 All S38) and AIR 1925 Mad 621, Ghulam Hasan J, held that the foundation of the jurisdiction of the Court is the consent of the parties and the subsequent ratification does not validate the reference which was void ab initio. Calcutta and Madras High Courts have also taken a similar view. The question was considered by a Full Bench of the Calcutta High Court in Ladnram v. Nandlal, AIR 1920 Cal 113(2). Mookerjec J., at page 114 of the report observed as follows :

For this reason, the cases, where ratification has been held to validate the reference made when no case is pending, will have no bearing on the Question before us. AIR 1952 Punj 234, is an illustration of such a case where the reference was without the intervention of the Court. The case of AIR 1949 E.P. 46, was, however, a case of reference to arbitration through the intervention of the Court. Achhru Ram the case, referred to Section 196 of the Contract Act, and observed as follows :

"Assuming that the initial reference of the dispute in the present case was made by the referring partner without any express or implied authority from his other partners, there was nothing to prevent such partners from ratifying his act which was unauthorised at its inception. There is no further discussion, of this point and the learned Judge then dealt with the question whether the ratification must necessarily be express or can the same be implied from the conduct of the parties. Similarly, in AIR 1952 Punj 373, which was also a case of reference through the intervention of the Court, there is no discussion of the question as to how by the subsequent act of ratification of the partners the order of the Court, passed earlier which was void at the time when it was passed for lack of jurisdiction, would be legalised.

The case of Ancona v. Marks, (1862) 126 R. R. 646, is also of no help because that seems to have been decided on the peculiar facts of, and the procedure applicable fo, that case. The observations made in Lindley on Partnership (eleventh edition), at page 193 to the effect that "the partner actually referring the dispute is, however, himself bound by the award, and the other partners may become bound by ratification", are based on (1878) 10 Ch. D. 185.

We are, however, not concerned with the general principles of ratification, but are concerned with the interpretation of section 21 of the Arbitration Act, corresponding to which there is no provision in the English law. The English authorities cannot, therefore, be of much help in this case-As already stated, ratification would certainly validate a reference to arbitration where it is not necessary to have an order of the Court for this purpose.

13. NO decided case, directly dealing with the question of ratification in the matter of reference to arbitration by one person on behalf of another without authority vis-a-vis the provisions of section 21, has been brought to our notice by the counsel for the parties, nor have we been able to find out any such ca.se. On general principles, therefore, as discussed above, I am of the view that subsequent ratification cannot validate the order of reference passed by a Court at a time when there was in fact, no agreement between all the parties interested, and the application made to the Court was not by all such parties, and such an order must be treated as void ab initio. I therefore, would answer the first question in the negative.