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1. The question to be determined in this case is whether immovable property, obtained by a Hindu widow on partition of the joint family property under the Mitakshara law, is part of her stridhan in the narrow sense of that word, indicating her separate property or peculium which passes on her death to her own heirs; or is merely part of her stridhan in the wider sense in which the word is sometimes used, as indicating any property in which she may have some right of proprietorship.

2. The property in question originally belonged to one Gaya Prasad, who, with his three sons, formed a Hindu joint family governed by the Mitakshara law. He died leaving three sons and a widow, Dulhan Sahibzad Kunwari. One of his sons, Sheo Partap Singh, died in 1889, leaving a widow and his son, the plaintiff appellant. In 1894 a partition of the joint family property took place, at the suit of the plaintiff, under the guardianship of his mother, and in that suit the court apportioned one-fourth share of the property to Dulhan Sahibzad Kunwari, who remained in possession thereof until her death on the 19th of November 1900.

9. The six-fold enumeration of the sources of a "woman's property," as given by Yajnyawalcya and Manu, corresponds with the technical or narrow signification of stridhan indicating property which is under her absolute control during life on her death is descendible to her heirs. Do the same characteristics attach to a woman's property derived from the additional sources specified by Vijnanesvara, viz., inheritance, partition, &c.? The words "any other" with which Yajnyawalcya concluded his enumeration are a translation of the word "adi" or "adya," which, according to Mr. Mayne (Hindu Law, 7th ed., page 823) means "and the like." In that view, Yajnyawalcya meant to limit his description of "woman's property," or stridhan, to property acquired in any of the six modes he had just, specified, or in any other manner ejusdem generis with those modes. Vijnanesvara's additional enumeration goes beyond that. When read with Yajnyawalcya's description, it constitutes a practically complete statement of the means by which a woman can acquire property rights. Dealing with this extended signification of the term "woman's property" Vijnanesvara says in paragraph 3 of the same Section that it "conforms in its import with its etymology and is not technical." In paragraphs 2, 3 and 4, therefore, he is speaking of stridhan in the wider sense. In paragraphs 5, 6 and 7, Vijnanesvara cites the description of "woman's property" given by Katyayana, which does not expressly profess to be exhaustive, but which closely approximates in character to that given by Yajnyawalcya and Manu, and does not include any of the heads (inheritance, partition, &c.) added to the list by Vijnanesvara in paragraph 2. Then comes paragraph 8, which gives rise to the difficulty. It runs thus :--"A woman's property has been thus described. The author next propounds the distribution of it. 'Her kinsmen take it if she die without issue.'"

14. This observation puts partition on the same footing as inheritance, so far as the rights of a widow are concerned.

15. In Chotay Lall v. Chunnoo Lall (1878) I.L.R. 4 Calc. 744 L.R. 6 I.A. 15 it was held that, under the law of Mitakshara, a daughter's estate inherited from the father is a limited and restricted estate only and not stridhan, so that upon her death the next heirs of the father succeed thereto.

16. The cases on the question of a woman's inherited property came under review by their Lordships' Board in Sheo Shankar Lal v. Debi Sahai (1903) I L.R. 25 All. 468 : L.R. 90 I.A. 202 before referred to and Lal Sheo Partab Bahadur Singh v. Allahabad Bank (1903) I.L.R. 25 All. 470 L.R. 30 I.A. 209. The construction of the Mitakshara was again considered, and it was held that, under the Hindu law of the Benares school, property which a woman has taken by inheritance from a female is not her stridhan in such sense that on her death it passes to her stridhan heirs in the female line to the exclusion of males.

17. Each of these authorities is inconsistent with the wide scope which the respondents, on their construction of the Mitakshara, seek to give to the definition of stridhan.

18. The question now arises whether there is any substantial difference in principle between a woman's property acquired by inheritance and that acquired by partition. It is a question attended with some difficulties, especially in the construction of the Mitakeshara, whatever view of it may be taken. While a family remains joint a woman has no right under the Mitakshara for a specific share of the family estate. She is only entitled to maintenance, or in due course to her customary inheritance, and if a partition takes place a mother gets a share equal to that of a son. If the share given to a widow on partition is given to her as a substitute for that to which she would be entitled upon inheritance, then, according to the foregoing authorities, it would seem reasonable that it should follow the same rule of descent and revert on her death to her husband's heirs. If, on the other hand, it is given to her by way of provision for her maintenance, it seems equally reasonable that when the necessity for her maintenance has ceased the property should revert to the estate from which it was taken. Of course, the members of a joint family effecting a partition may agree that a portion of the property shall be transferred to the widow by way of absolute gift, as part of her stridhan, so as to constitute a provision for her stridhan heirs; but, in the absence of any such intention, their Lordships do not feel justified in putting property acquired by a widow, on a partition of the joint estate, upon a footing different from that on which property coming to her by way of inheritance has been placed. The contrary view was taken by the High Court at Allahabad in Chhiddu v. Naubat (1901) I.L.R. 24 All. (sic). The learned Judges in that case laid great stress upon chap. I, Section 6, para. 2 of the Mitakshara. Vijnanesvara there deals with the rights of a son born after the partition, and says that on the demise of his parents he obtains both their portions,--