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10. Though Section 177 I.P.C. and Section 52 of the Income Tax Act of 1922 appear to be substantially the same, the former is wider in its scope whereas the latter confines only to the matters mentioned in the said section. Section 177 I.P.C. deals with the offence mentioned therein generally making any false information furnished by a person who is legally bound to give such information to any public servant, an offence whereas Section 52 of the Income-tax Act of 1922 confines itself in respect of false information furnished in the verification submitted by the assessee to the Income-tax Officer. It does not include even any false information furnished by an assessee in any proceeding under the Income-tax Act other than the verification mentioned in the said section. It, therefore, appears that any false statement in the proceedings under the Income-tax Act other than the statements made in verification mentioned in Section 52, will come within the mischief of Section 177 I.P.C. The facts constituting an offence under Section 52 of the Income-tax Act may very well be an offence under Section 177, I.P.C. But the facts constituting an offence under Section 52 of the Income-tax Act, as the scope of the latter, as pointed out already, is confined to the matters mentioned therein. Section 26 of the General Clauses Act provides that when two or more statutes create an offence of the same nature, the offender shall be liable to be prosecuted and punished under either or any of these statutes but shall not be liable to be punished twice for the same offence. Prima facie from the facts of the present case, the prosecution of the petitioner under Section 177 I.P.C. and Section 52 of the Income-tax Act of 1922 would appear to be competent by virtue of Section 26 of the General Clauses Act. But even if both the charges are proved, there cannot be two punishments.

11. It is contended that Section 177 I.P.C. must be deemed to have been repealed as it is repugnant to Section 52 of the Income-tax Act of 1922 as both cannot co-exist in view of certain material differences between these two sections, The differences are said to be as follows:-

Section 177, I.P.C. Is non-compound-able whereas the offence under Section 52 of the Income-tax Act is compoundable with the permission of the Inspecting Assistant Commissioner by virtue of Clause (2) of Section 53 of the said Act. The prosecution under Section 177 I.P.C. can be instituted by any public servant under c whereas the prosecution tinder Section 53 of the Incometax Act has to be instituted at the instance of the Inspecting Assistant Commissioner as provided under Section 53 (1) of the said Act. An offence under Section 177 I.P.C. is triable by a Presidency Magistrate, a Magistrate of the First Class or Second Class whereas the offence under Section 52 cannot be tried by a Second Class Magistrate unless specially empowered by the Central Government, If penalty is levied under the Income-tax Act in respect of certain matters, no prosecution can be instituted by virtue of the provision under Section 28(4) of the Income-tax Act in respect of the same matters whereas there is no such bar under Section 177 I.P.C. It is contended that both the provisions cannot co-exist as they are repugnant to each other,

22. We have already noted the apparent differences between the two provisions, namely (1) Section 52 of the Income-lax Act is compoundable whereas Section 177 I.P.C. is not; (2) the prosecution under Section 52 of the Income-tax Act is to be instituted at the instance of the Inspecting Assistant Commissioner whereas the prosecution under Section 177 I.P.C. Is by any public servant provided under Section 195, Cri.P.C. (3) the offence under Section 177 I.P.C. Is triable by a Presidency Magistrate, a Magistrate of the First Class or Second Class whereas the offence under Section 52 cannot be tried by a Second Class Magistrate unless specially empowered by the Central Government, and (4) if a penalty is levied under the Income-tax Act, the prosecution for any offence under that Act relating to the same matter for which the penalty has been levied, will be barred. It has been already noted that there was no difference either in the procedure to be adopted in respect of trial of both these offences or in the matter of punishment. These differences. In my opinion, are not at all inconsistent or repugnant to each other.

23. If the offence under Section 52 of the Income-tax Act is compoundable, that may not be a reason to say that a person cannot be prosecuted under Section 177 I.P.C. since it is not compoundable. There cannot be any dispute that a person can be prosecuted under both the enactments, if the facts disclosed the offences provided under the said enactments. If for instance, in the present case, it is shown that the offence under the Income-tax Act was compounded, that may be a defence for him when he is prosecuted under that Section; but he cannot escape the prosecution under Section 177 I.P.C. if the facts disclosed offences under that section. If in a particular case, a person is prosecuted under several offences and some of them being compoundable, it cannot be said that the prosecution for non-compoundable offences along with compoundable offences is incompetent. If in such a case, the parties compound the compoundable offences, the prosecution could still continue with the trial of non-compoundable offences. Similarly, if the prosecution has to be instituted at the instance of the Inspecting Assistant Commissioner, for an offence under Section 52 of the Act, it can still co-exist and stand together with the offence under Section 177 I.P.C. though the prosecution under that Section could be instituted only by the public servant. If under both these sections a person is prosecuted and it is shown that the prosecution under any one of these two sections is incompetent for the lack of proper sanction, to that extent the prosecution will be void. For instance, if proper sanction was not obtained under Section 52; but the sanction under Section 177 I.P.C. is properly obtained, the prosecution under Section 52 will be incompetent whereas the trial under Section 177 I.P.C. can proceed. Even in respect of trial of both these offences, it is provided that a Presidency Magistrate or a First Class Magistrate can try; but Section 177 I.P.C. can be tried by a Second Class Magistrate unless he is specially empowered by the Central Government. This. In my opinion, does not make any difference. If a person is prosecuted for two offences, one triable by a superior Court and the other by a Lower Court, the Superior Court can try both the offences. In this case, the Second Class Magistrate cannot try the offence under Section 52 of the Income-tax Act. Certainly, the First Class Magistrate or a Presidency Magistrate as the case may be, may try. In Craies on Statute law -- Page 367 -- it is stated.