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1. Both these Petitions can be disposed of by a common order since the parties to both these Petitions have challenged the common order which is passed by the Industrial Tribunal in Reference (IT) No. 43/2002.

2. The Industrial Court partly allowed the Reference and directed the appropriate Government to take necessary action under Sections 10(1), (2)(a) to (d) of the Contract Labour (Regulation and Abolition) Act, 1970] (hereinafter referred to as "CLRA Act") within a reasonable period. The Tribunal held that the contract which was entered into between the Contractor and the Company was not sham and bogus but was a genuine contract. However, on the basis of other material on record, it directed the appropriate Government to take necessary action under the aforesaid provisions of the CLRA Act.

12. On the other hand, Cama, the learned senior counsel appearing on behalf of the Company submitted that the order passed by the Tribunal directing the appropriate Government to abolish the contract was patently illegal. He submitted that having held that the contract was genuine, it was- not open for the Tribunal to direct the appropriate Government to abolish the contract under Section 10 of the CLRA Act. He submitted that Union had to exercise its option in choosing the relief which they were claiming from this Court. He submitted that the relief of direction being given to the appropriate Government to abolish the contract could not only be granted on the assumption that the contract is not genuine. He submitted that the Union was pressing for the said relief which was granted by the Tribunal and, in that event, it could not pursue the argument that the contract was sham and bogus at the same time. He then submitted that in view of the ratio laid down in Gujarat Electricity Board (supra), it was not open for the Tribunal to give a direction to the State Government to take action under Section 10 of the CLRA Act since, admittedly, the Union which was espousing the cause of workmen was not a Union of permanent workmen. He invited my attention to paragraphs 44 and 55 of the said judgment in Gujarat Electricity Board (supra) in support of the said submission. He, therefore, submitted that, under any circumstances, the order passed by the Tribunal directing the Government to abolish the contract was liable to be set aside. He also relied upon the judgment of the Apex Court in Steel Authority of India Ltd v. Union of India and Others (2007) 1 SCC (L&S) 630 : 2006-III-LLJ-1037. He also submitted, after inviting my attention to para 121 Clause (5) of the judgment of the Apex Court in Steel Authority of India Ltd. and Ors. v. National Union Waterfront Workers and Ors. , that in view of the observations made by the Apex Court in the said para, the words "on issuance of prohibition notification 'under Section 10(1)" clearly indicated that it was not open for the Tribunal to decide the question regarding genuineness or otherwise of the contract as long as notification under Section 10 had not been issued by the appropriate Government. He submitted that, therefore, on that count also, the order of the Tribunal directing the appropriate Government to issue notification was liable to be set aside.

13. The learned senior counsel appearing on behalf of the Company then submitted that mere continuous service by workmen in the Company need not, by itself, convert a legitimate contract into a sham and bogus contract. He, therefore, submitted that merely because the workmen had worked with the Company since 1985 that, by itself, need not be a factor which would decide whether the contract was genuine or not. He then invited my attention to the CLRA 19 Act and submitted that the existence of a genuine contract was a rule and the burden of proof that it was otherwise, was on the workmen who alleged that the said contract was not genuine. After inviting my attention to the provisions of the CLRA Act. he invited my attention to para 10 of the judgment in National Union Waterfront Workers (supra) wherein the Apex Court had directed the circumstances under which the said Act was enacted. He then invited my attention to para 102 of the said judgment wherein the Apex Court has specifically held that there would not be any automatic absorption of contract labour on the issuance of notification for abolition of contract under Section 10(1) of the CLRA Act. He then invited my attention to para 103 of the said judgment and submitted that there would be no automatic absorption of the contract labour in the establishment in either of the three classes of cases as arising in the said judgment. He then invited my attention to the; judgment in the case of Bharat Heavy Electrical Ltd. (supra) and submitted that, in the said judgment, the circumstances under which Hussainbhai Calicut's case was distinguishable was considered. After inviting my attention to; para 11 of the said judgment, he submitted that the Apex Court had clearly held that whether the workman is an employee of the principal employer or not depends on the facts and circumstances of each case and that the case of; Hussainbhai Calicut neither dissented nor diluted in the judgment of National Union Waterfronts Workers (supra). He submitted that the emphasis which was placed by the learned Counsel for the Union on the ratio of the; said judgment was misplaced. He then invited my attention to the judgment in Ram Singh's case (supra) and drew my attention to para 16 of the said judgment and submitted that the crux of the entire issue of determining whether the, workmen were employees of the Company or not, was the control of the Company over the means and the method of getting the work done from the employees and if the workmen were in a position to demonstrate that, only then the, normal rule of "contract is genuine" is vitiated. He then submitted that the judgment in Indian Petrochemicals Corporation Ltd. (supra) was limited to its own facts and the ratio of the said judgment should not be ipso facto made applicable to the facts of the present case. He then invited my attention to the judgment of the Supreme Court in State Bank of India and Ors. v. State Bank of India Canteen Employee's Union (Begal Circle) and Ors. and the judgment in Employers in relation to the Management of Reserve Bank of India v. Reserve Bank of India . He submitted that in both these cases, the Apex Court had held that merely because the employer had been paying 95% of the subsidy, that alone should not be a test to determine whether the contract was sham and bogus or not. He submitted that, on the contrary, when the ratio of the said judgment was applied to the facts of the present case, the Tribunal correctly applied the ratio of the said judgment to the facts of the present case. He then invited my attention to paras 10 and 35 of the judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of Workmen of Nilgiri Co-op Mkt. (supra) wherein various facets of control by the Company over its workmen were taken into consideration and submitted that the burden of proof was on the complainant and no adverse inference could be drawn against the Company if it did not produce the documentary evidence which was in its possession. He submitted that, the finding, whether the contract was genuine or not could not be determined either by assumption or presumption but on the basis of facts and circumstances of each case. He then submitted that while exercising jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India and particularly before issuing a writ of certiorari, the High Court, while exercising the said jurisdiction, though it was akin to appellate, original or corrective jurisdiction, however, could not substitute its own decision in place of the decision given by the Tribunal. He submitted that the Tribunal, in the present case, had examined the entire material on record and had given a finding after appreciating the evidence on record. He submitted that the view taken by the Tribunal, therefore, was not a perverse view and, therefore, it was not open for this Court to substitute the view which was taken by the Tribunal by appreciating the evidence on record. He relied upon the judgment of the Apex Court in Surya Dev Rai v. Ram Chancier Rai and Ors. .

6. Three points arise for determination in these appeals:
(i) what is the true and correct import of the expression "appropriate government " as defined in Clause (a) of Sub-section (1) of Section 2 of the CLRA Act;
(ii) whether the notification dated December 9, 1976 issued by the Central Government under Section 10(1) of the CLRA Act is valid and applies to all Central Government companies; and
(iii) whether automatic absorption of contract labour, working in the establishment of the principal employer as regular employees, follows on issuance of a valid notification under Section 10(1) of the CLRA Act, prohibiting the contract labour in the concerned establishment.