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13. Elaborating the submissions, the learned counsel invited our attention in particular to the paragraph 14 of the judgment in Vyankatlal's case, wherein it was observed that the principles laid down in Orient Paper Mills Ltd. v. State of Orissa and others , M/s. Shiv Shankar Dal Mills v. State of Haryana and others , The Sales Tax Officer, Banaras and others v. Kanhaiya Lal Makund Lal Sraf and in M/s. Amar Nath Om Parkash and others v. State of Punjab and others , though based on the specific provisions of the Acts applicable to those cases, can safely be applied also to other cases inasmuch as the amount was not paid by the respondents in the case from their coffers; and that there was no question of refunding the amount to the respondents who had not eventually paid the amount towards the fund, for doing so would virtually amount to allow the respondents unjust enrichment. Mr. Nadkarni then contended that, as their Lordships of the Supreme Court observed, the principles laid down in Orient Paper Mills, Shiv Shanker Dal Mills, Kanhaiya Lal Makund Lal Saraf and Amar Nath Om Parkash can be applied to other cases inasmuch as the moneys collected had not came from the coffers of the person claiming the refund thereof and therefore, refund is to be refused since it would amount to unjust enrichment, it is apparent and obvious that law has been laid down to the effect that taxes collected without authority of law are not to be returned to the persons from whom they were collected because the moneys had not come from their colffers and the refund, in such circumstances, would amount to unjust enrichment. He, therefore, submitted that the second respondent has rightly refused the refund of the amount of Central Sales Tax collected from the petitioners, as the said amount had not come from petitioners' coffers but from the consumers. The judgment in Vyankatlal's case lays the law on the question of non-restitution of tax illegally collected on basis of the theory of unjust enrichment and as such, Cawasji's case is no more good law. He further contended that, thus, the view taken by Jahagirdar, J. in an unreported judgment delivered on 21st July, 1986 in Writ Petition No. 1362/1980, Parle Products Limited and another v. Union of India and another, does not seem to be correct.

And lastly, in paragraph 12, it was observed that the task of writing legislation to protect the interest of the nation is committed to Parliament and the legislatures of the States and that reference has been made to this aspect only to alert their attention to the present state of law. In other words, the Supreme Court has made it clear that if tax is paid under a mistake of law or is collected without the authority of law, the same has in all cases to be refunded to the party who paid it, irrespective of the time when the tax was paid. The only limitation that Their Lordships had laid down is that the writ petition or suit for the purpose of refund should be filed within three years from the discovery or knowledge of the mistake of law. The law as above laid down by the Supreme Court in Cawasji's case has been consistently followed by this Court. It is not necessary for us to make a detailed reference to all such decisions of this High Court, for it suffices to advert to the judgment in Chipkar's case reported in 1985 (23) E.L.T., 334, passed on the difference of opinion between Lentin and Sawant, JJ. After reviewing in detail and minutely the relevant decisions of the Supreme Court and of this Court on the subject, Shah, J. observed in paragraph 39 that the question as to whether unjust enrichment is a valid defence to the restitution in respect of the excess duty collected by the department without the authority of law has been squarely answered by the Supreme Court in Cawasji's case, specially when the Supreme Court observed that there is no provision under which the court could deny refund of tax even if the person who paid it has collected it from his customers and has no subsisting liability or intention to refund it to them, or, for any reason, it is impracticable to do so. This view was later on followed also by Jahagirdar, J. in Parle Products Limited (supra).

17. We already stated that that in Cawasji's case, the Supreme Court has in clear and unambiguous terms laid down that if a Tax is paid under a mistake of law or is collected without the authority of law, this amount of the Tax paid has to be refunded even if the person who paid it has collected it from his customers and has no subsisting liability or intention to refund it to them or, for any reason, it is impracticable to do so. Cawasji's case was one in respect of Taxation, more particularly, relating to refund of Tax, unlike Vyankatlal's case. In the latter case, in fact, the question was as regards the fixation of price and the observations made were strictly on the facts of that particular case, where the difference of price collected was meant for the Government Sugar Fund. It was in this context that the Supreme Court observed that, in the particular facts of that case where the said difference of price has been paid by the consumers and not by the Jaora Sugar Mills and where the said difference was to be credited to the Sugar Fund, the principles laid down in the cases referred to by Their Lordships were applicable. No general proposition of law was laid down and thus, in our view, the direct judgment in Cawasji's case was not disapproved. We may also point out that if other was the intention of the Supreme Court while deciding the Vyankatlal's case, a specific reference would have been made by Their Lordships to the Cawasji's case. Thus, in our opinion, Vyankatlal's case does not help the case of the respondents, as it does not replace the law laid down in Cawasji's case. We are supported in this by Jahagirdar, J. in Parle Products Limited case. In this view of the matter, the second respondent could not have refused the refund claimed by the petitioners on the ground that that would give cause to unjust enrichment.

19. In Vallabh Class Works's case, Their Lordships of the Supreme Court held that the appellant in that case had filed a writ petition to the High Court on 28.9.1976 for directing repayment of the excess duty paid by them, but no relief could be granted in that petition in view of the provisions of Article 226 of the Constitution as it stood then and the petition had to be withdrawn; that even granting that on the date of making each payment of excise duty in excess of the proper duty payable under law, the appellants should be deemed to have discovered the mistake, only such excess payments made which would fall within the period of three years should have been ordered to be refunded. This was held by the Supreme Court on the facts of that particular case where it had not been possible to find with precision the date on which the appellants had discovered the mistake of law. The Supreme Court, therefore, observed that the appellants could have, with due diligence, discovered their mistake each time they made a payment of their debts. But, in the circumstances, since the writ petition was filed on 28.9.76, Their Lordships held that they were entitled to only a period of three years. This decision has been distinguished in Parle Products Limited's case. In fact, after having referred to the facts and the reasonings in Vallabh Glass Works, Jahagirdar, J. observed that it is clear that the Supreme Court has proceeded on the basis that everytime a payment was made by an assessee, the assessee could have asked for refund of the excess amount so paid, because everytime the payment was made, it was made on the basis that the mistake of law was discovered at the time of payment. This view, according to the learned Judge, is not in any manner, opposed to Cawasji's case since that was exclusively dictated by the peculiar facts in Vallabh's case. Hence, he held that refund of tax paid under mistake of law should be ordered without the limitation imposed in Vallabh Glass Works' case. Similarly, in Shalimar Textiles (above), Pendse, J. construing the law laid down in Cawasji's case, held that the refund is to be ordered without any limitation, provided the writ petition is filed within three years of the discovery of the mistake of law. We too are of the same view. We may however observe that these are two decisions of this Court (Shalimar Taxtiles and Parle Products) interpreting Cawasji's case on the said point, and hence, we, are, in any case, bound by them as held in Panjumal Hassomal Advani v. Harpal Singh Abnashi Singh Sawhney and others . It will also be useful to mention that we are fortified in the view we have taken by the decision of the Supreme Court in Auriaya Chamber of Commerce, Allahabad's case (supra) as Their Lordships observed that if a mistake either of law or of fact is established, the assessee is entitled to recover the money and the party receiving them is bound to return it, irrespective of any other consideration.