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(b) As I said, all this took place about the year 1908. The accused's marriage with his first wife took place about the year 1897. Prosecution 2nd witness's son, prosecution 3rd witness, says "accused did not live in our family after his marriage, but sometimes with us and sometimes with his own family.... There was no ill-feeling between accused and his father about his living with us. Accused managed the auctioned lands while he lived in our family. In 1912, Ramaswami Aiyar, Sub-Inspector of Police, came to hold an inquiry. Then some of the lands were under cultivation, we and accused were cultivating them." Prosecution 5th witness himself says that the accused lived in prosecution 2nd witness's family till his wife died and that when accused was in his (prosecution 2nd witness's) family, he was managing the lands mentioned in Exhibit B (Exhibit B being the document alleged to have been altered by forgery). Mr. G.S. Ramachandra Aiyar, a Vakil of this High Court of fourteen years' standing, is accused's sister's husband. He says as defence 4th witness: "Till 1905, accused was living in his own family house. After that he lived both in prosecution 2nd witness's family and in his own family house. There was a quarrel between accused and his father as accused wanted to have all the family properties for himself. During the negotiations of Exhibit III, prosecution 2nd witness said he originally sought the lands at the auction for the benefit of accused's family. He gave me to understand that the enjoyment was with the accused. While accused's wife lived, prosecution 2nd witness and he were on good terms. Prosecution 2nd witness in 1912 appeared to be a trustee, the beneficiary being accused's family and prosecution 2nd witness had to be reimbursed in a sum of about Rs. 12,000. I understood the accused had the benefit of the produce of the lands." It is admitted that in the negotiations which led to the writing of Exhibit B in 1912, prosecution 2nd witness agreed to convey the lands for Rs. 12,000 to the accused's family though the lands, etc., were worth Rs. 30,000, He has in February 1917 given up the lands, etc., agreeing to receive Rs. 19,000 (see Exhibit IV).

6. Coming to the second point, I am of opinion on the evidence that the additions have not been shown to have been made with any dishonest or fraudulent purpose. The accused seems to have been in possession of the lands to be sold by prosecution 2nd witness. Prosecution 2nd witness seems also to have been in possession of some jewels and vessels belonging to the accused's family. Accused honestly thought that the signatures of his father and his brothers could not be obtained without mention being made in the document of these matters, and he might have further honestly believed that he could persuade his father-in-law, though he had already signed the document, to agree to these subsequent alterations. Even if this further assumption is untenable, dishonest or fraudulent intent does not follow. The making of a false receipt in order to support a true state of facts was held not to be forgery in Ram Prasad Maity v. Emperor 12 C.W.N. 1113 : 8 C.L.J. 317 : 8 Cr. L.J. 418. In Emperor v. Surendra Nath Ghosh 7 Ind. Cas. 629 : 12 C.L.J. 277 : 14 C.W.N. 1076 : 11 Cr. L.J. 505 : 88 C. the addition of a name to the list of attesting witnesses of a kabu-liyat was held not to be a forgery if there is no fraudulent or dishonest intention. In Manika Asari v. Emperor 28 Ind. Cas. 102. (1915) : M.W.N. 278 : 16 Cr. L.J 246, decided by Sir William Ayling, J., the conclusion is thus stated in the head-note: "Where the accused altered a document without the authority of the executants after its execution and it was proved that the alteration was made to prevent other people from setting up a claim to property which was admittedly in the possession of the accused, the object cannot be said to be dishonest and the man is not guilty of forgery under Section 46 A of the Indian Penal Code. An intent to defraud implies something more than mere deceit. The advantage intended to be secured must be something to which the party perpetrating the deceit is not entitled either legally or equitably. There can be no intention to defraud where no wrongful result was intended or could have arisen from the act of the accused. A man cannot be convicted of forgery where his intention has been merely to secure something to which he was legally entitled." (I would add, "or to which he thought bona file he was legally entitled.") In Queen v. Kishen Pershad 2 N.W.P.H.C.R. 202 it was held that the prosecution, in order to establish that a title has been asserted with a fraudulent or dishonest intent, must show that the accused had no reasonable ground for asserting the title. The conviction for forgery of the accused was set aside in that case on the ground that the prosecution had not proved such intent. In Guddappa, In re 1 Weir 542 it was held that the making of a document untrue in certain particulars is not forgery, if it is not shown that it was made fraudulently or dishonestly and that mere intention to deceive is not sufficient. A similar view was held in Queen-Empress v. Sheo Dayal 7 A. 459. A.W.N (1885) 85 : 4 Ind. Dec. (N.S ) 720 with reference to receipts manufactured to support actual payments.

7. I shall now deal with the third contention. It is clear that no legal right or liability can at all be based upon Exhibit B, (a) either in its unaltered state before the additions in dispute were made; or (o) in its altered state after the additions in dispute. In R. v. Turpin 2 Car & K. 820 Baron Platt says: "I think that this prosecution must fail. Until the signatures of a majority of the Parish Officers were attached to this cheque, it was an incomplete instrument and the altering it" (as regards the amount) when incomplete, is, therefore, no forgery. The prisoner must be "acquitted." The oases in Siwsami Chetti v. Sevugan Chetti 25 M. 889 : 12 M.L.J. 17, Amirtham Pillai v. Nanjah Gounden 23 Ind. Cas. 464 : 26 M.H.J. 257 : 15 M.L.T. 205 : (1914) M.W.N. 250 : 1 L.W. 243, and hethiri Menon v. Gopalan Nair 80 Ind. Cas. 713 : 2 L.W. 714. 29 M.L.J. 291, (1915) M.W.N. 586, 18 M.L.T. 220, 39 M. 597, and the evidence on the side of the prosecution itself which I have already set out show that neither in its altered state nor in its unaltered state could any legal right or liability be created or be purported to be created under this document, because it is not signed by three of the five intended executants, nor does it purport to be signed by them. And as Halsbury, Volume 9, paragraph 1417, puts it, "if an instrument, had it been genuine, would have been effectual in the ordinary course of business between the parties...no defect being...on the face of it, such instrument may-be the subject-matter of a forgery, although the instrument itself, if genuine, would have been void in law for want of compliance with some statutory direction....An instrument which after making or alteration still remains incomplete cannot be an order. An ineffectual addition to a document which already constitutes a complete order is not forgery, but where the document is so far incomplete that a signature is required as a conditions of payment the false making of such signature is forgery." An incomplete document cannot be a valuable security or a document which is or purports to be a document by which any legal right is created or affected. See illustration to Section 30 of the Indian Penal Code. A document incomplete on its face neither is, nor purports to be, a document creating or affecting rights. If the accused had obtained or forged the additional signatures required to convert the document into a complete agreement on its face, he might be convicted of forgery if my view on the second point is erroneous. Even if he intended to obtain the signatures of his father and brothers to the altered document without obtaining prosecution 2nd witness's authorization or ratification of the alterations, the mater would not have passed beyond the stage of preparation for committing an offence.

16. This appeal coming on for hearing under Section 429 of the Code of Criminal Procedure on the 26th and 30th of October 1917, having been posted to be spoken to on the 7th of November 1917 and having stood over for consideration till this day, the Court (Oldfield, J.) delivered the following

17. The accused has been convicted of an offence punishable under Sections 467 and 464 of the Indian Penal Code in the alternative, the forgery being alleged as consisting in certain alterations in Exhibit B made after its execution by 2nd prosecution witness and accused, the result being the making of a false document, purporting to be a valuable security. Both learned Judges, before whom the appeal originally came, held that the alterations were so made by accused; and nothing now advanced leads eye to dissent from this conclusum. The questions, to which the argument has been mainly directed before me, are (1) whether the alterations were made dishonestly or fraudulently; (2) whether they could amount to forgery either of a document or a valuable security, if, as is alleged, they were made before the completion of the document; (3) whether the sentence is excessive.