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Two of the non-official members of the superseded New Delhi Municipal Committee, Shri S. L. Kapoor and another, filed Civil Writ Petitions in the Delhi High Court to quash the order of supersession dated February 27, 1980. The Writ Petitions were heard by a Full Bench of five judges and were dismissed on May 9, 1980. S. L. Kapoor has preferred this appeal after obtaining Special Leave of this Court under Art. 136 of the Constitution.

Before the High Court, as before us, the principal submission of the learned counsel for the petitioner- appellant was that the order of supersession was passed in complete violation of the principles of natural justice and total disregard of fair-play. It was pointed out that no notice to show cause against supersession was ever issued to the Committee, there was not the slightest hint until the order was made that there was any proposal to supersede the Committee and the Committee never had any opportunity either before or after the order of supersession was passed to offer their explanation against the allegations made in the order of supersession. The Full Bench upheld the claim of the petitioners that it was necessary to hear the Committee before an order under Sec. 238(1) of the Punjab Municipal Act was passed. But, held, the High Court, the Committee was made aware of the allegations and had been given opportunity to state its case or version in the case of atleast three out of the four grounds and therefore, there was no failure to observe the principles of natural justice. Even otherwise, the High Court expressed the view that undisputed facts were there and they spoke for themselves and no purpose would have been served by giving formal notice to the Committee of the allegations and the proposal to take action to supersede the Committee since the result would have been the same. In the view of the High Court there was no prejudice to the Committee by the failure to observe natural justice. Shri Soli Sorabjee, learned counsel for the appellant, questioned the conclusion of the High Court that the Committee had the opportunity to offer their explanation in regard to the allegations on which the order of supersession was passed. He also canvassed the view that the failure to observe the principles of natural justice did not vitiate the order of supersession since the observance of natural justice would have, on the undisputed facts, led to the same result.

The learned Attorney General who appeared for the Lt. Governor contended that Sec. 238(1) of the Punjab Municipal Act did not contemplate and did not require, as a matter of interpretation, that any opportunity should be given to the Committee before an order of supersession was passed. It was submitted that although much of the distinction between a judicial act and an administrative act had vanished, there was still a thin but discernible line between the two and that in the case of an administrative act some positive beneficial interest must be established before natural justice could be insisted upon. It was said that neither the Committee nor its members had any beneficial interest in the continuance of the Committee and therefore, the supersession of the Committee did not involve any Civil consequences such as would give rise to a right to be heard. The argument was initially pushed further and it was submitted that, in any case, an individual member of the Committee, none of whose individual rights had been infringed, had no locus standi to maintain the petition. The submission about locus standi was however, withdrawn by the learned Attorney General at a later stage and it is unnecessary for us to consider that question.

In Alfred Thangarajah Durayappah v. W. J. Fernando & Ors. the Municipal Council of Jaffna was dissolved and superseded by the Governor-General on the ground that it appeared to him that the Council was not competent to perform the duties imposed upon it. The Mayor sought to question the dissolution and supersession of the Council in the Supreme Court of Ceylon, on the ground that there was a failure to observe the principles of natural justice. One of the questions which arose for consideration was whether, as a matter of interpretation, natural justice was not excluded from action under Sec. 277 of the Municipal Ordinance under which provision the dissolution and supersession had been made. The argument was that words such as "where it appears to ......." or "if it appears to the satisfaction of ......." or "if the.........considers it expedient that ............." or "if the .........is satisfied that ........." stood by themselves without other words or circumstances or qualifications, a duty to act judicially was excluded, and so, was natural justice. The argument was accepted by the Supreme Court of Ceylon but the Privy Council disagreed with the approach. They observed that there were three matters which should always be borne in mind when considering whether the principle Audi Alteram Partem should be applied or not. The three matters were:

For these reasons their Lordships have no doubt that in the circumstances of this case the Minister should have observed the principle audi alteram partem:

Sugathadasa v. Jayasinghe [1958] 59 N.L.R. (457) was wrongly decided".

Narrow as were the considerations applied by the Privy Council to determine whether the principle audi alteram partem applied or not, Alfred Thangarajah, Durayappah v. W. J. Fernando & Ors. (Supra) appears to us furnish a complete answer to the submission of the learned Attorney General that, as a matter of interpretation, Sec. 238 of the Punjab Municipal Act did not contemplate and did not require that an opportunity should be given to the Committee before an order of supersession was passed. We may notice here that the language of Sec. 238(1) of the Punjab Municipal Act is very nearly the same as the language of Sec. 277(1) of the Municipal Ordinance which was interpreted by the Privy Council in Alfred Thangarajah Durayappah v. W. J. Fernando & Ors. (Supra) We have already referred to some of the relevant provisions of the Punjab Municipal Act to indicate some of the rights and duties of the Committee under that Act. A Committee so soon as it is constituted, at once, assumes a certain office and status, is endowed with certain rights and burdened with certain responsibilities, all of a nature commanding respectful regard from the public. To be stripped of the office and status, to be deprived of the rights, to be removed from the responsibilities, in an unceremonious way as to suffer in public esteem, is certainly to visit the Committee with civil consequences. In our opinion the status and office and the rights and responsibilities to which we have referred and the expectation of the Committee to serve its full term of office would certainly create sufficient interest in the Municipal Committee and their loss, if superseded, would entail civil consequences so as to justify an insistence upon the observance of the principles of natural justice before an order of supersession is passed.