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It is universally recognised that in regard to a large number of constitutional problems which are brought before this Court for its decision, complex and difficult questions arise and on many of such questions, two views are possible. Therefore, if one View has been taken by this Court after mature deliberation, the fact that another Bench is inclined to take a different view may not justify the Court in reconsidering the earlier decision or in departing from it. The problem of construing constitutional provisions cannot be reasonably solved merely by adopting a literal construction of the words used in the relevant provisions. The Constitution is an organic document and it is intended to serve as a guide to the solution of changing problems which the Court may have to face from time to time. Naturally, in a progressive and dynamic society the shape and appearance of these problems are bound to change with the inevitable consequence that the relevant words used in the Constitution may also chance their meaning and significance. That is what makes the task of dealing with constitutional problems dynamic rather than static. Even so, the Court should be reluctant to accede to the suggestion that its earlier ,decisions should be lightheartedly reviewed and departed from.' In such a case the test should be : is it absolutely necessary and essential that the question already decided should be re- opened ? The answer to this question would depend on the nature of the infirmity alleged in the earlier decision, its impact on public good, and the validity and compelling character of the considerations urged in support of the

It is significant that Patanjali Sastri J. as he then was, who spoke for the Court, described as attractive the argument about the applicability of Art. 13 (2) to Constitution Amendment Acts passed under Art. 368, examined it closely, and ultimately rejected it. It was noticed in the judgment that certain constitutions make certain rights "eternal and inviolate", and by way of illustration, reference was made to Art. 11 of the Japanese Constitution and Art. 5 of the American.Federal Constitution. It was also noticed that the word "law" in its literal sense, may include constitutional law, but it was pointed out that "there is a clear demarcation between ordinary law, which is made in exercise of legislative power, and constitutional law which is made in exercise of constituent power". The scheme of the relevant provisions of the Constitution was then examined, and ultimately, the Court reached the conclusion that though both Articles 13 and 368 are widely phrased, the harmonious rule of construction requires that the word "law" in Art. 13 should be taken to exclude law made in exercise of the constituent power. In our opinion, this conclusion is right, and as we are expressing our full concurrence with the decision in Sankari Prasad's(1) case, we think it is necessary to indicate our reasons for agreeing with the conclusion of the Court on this point, even though the coffectness of this conclusion has not been questioned before us in the course of arguments. If we had felt a real difficulty in accepting this part of the conclusion, we would have seriously considered the question as to whether the matter should not be referred to a larger Bench for a further examination of the problem.

Apart from the fact that the words used in Art. 368 are clear and unambiguous in support of the view that we are taking, on principle also it appears unreasonable to suggest that the Constitution-makers wanted to provide that fundamental rights guaranteed by the Constitution should never be touched by way of amendment. It must not be forgotten that the fundamental rights guaranteed, by Art. 19, for instance, are not absolute; the scheme of this article itself indicates that the fundamental rights guaranteed by subclauses (a) to (g) of clause (1), can be validly regulated in the light of the provisions contained in clauses (2) to (6) of Art. 19. In other words, the broad scheme of Art. 19 is two-fold; the fundamental rights of the citizens are of paramount importance, but even the said fundamental rights can be regulated to serve the interests of the general public or other objects mentioned respec- tively in clauses (2) to (6), and that means that for specified purposes indicated in these clauses, even the paramountcy of fundamental rights has to yield to some regulation as contemplated by the said clauses. It is hardly necessary to emphasise that the purposes for which fundamental rights can be regulated which are specified in clauses (2) to (6), could not have been assumed by the Constitution-makers to be static and incapable of expansion. The Constitution-makers must have anticipated that in dealing with socioeconomic problems which the legislatures may have to face from time to time, the concepts of public interest and other important considerations which are the basis of clauses (2) to (6), may change and may even expand; and so, it is legitimate to assume that the Constitution- makers know that Parliament should be competent to make amendments in these rights so as to meet the challenge of the problems which may arise in the course of spcio-economic progress and development of the country. That is why we think that even on principle, it would not be reasonable to proceed on the basis that the fundamental rights enshrined in Part III were intended to be finally and immutably settled and determined once for all and were beyond the reach of any future amendment.

Let us illustrate this point by reference to some of the provisions of the Constitution (First Amendment) Act, 1951 itself. By this Act, Articles 15, 19 and 31 were amended. One has merely to recall the purpose for which it became necessary to amend Articles 15 and 19 to be satisfied that the changing character of the problems posed by the words used in the respective articles could not have been effectively met unless amendment in the relevant provisions was effected; and yet, if the argument that the fundamental rights are beyond the reach of Art. 368 were valid, an these amendments would be constitutionally impermissible. That, we think is not the true purport and effect of Art. 368. We are, therefore, satisfied that this Court was right in rejecting the said argument in the case of Sankari Prasad(1). This question can be considered from another point of view. The argument that the fundamental rights guaranteed by Part in are eternal, inviolate, and beyond the reach of Art. 368, is based on two assumptions. The first assumption is that on a fair and reasonable construction of Art. 368, the power to amend the fundamental rights cannot be held to be included within the constituent powers conferred on Parliament by the said Article. We have already held that a fair and reasonable construction of Art. 368 does not justify this assumption. The other assumption which this argument makes, and must of necessity make, is that if the power to amend the fundamental rights is not included in Art. 368 as it stands, it cannot ever be included within its purview; because unless it is assumed that the relevant power can never be included in Art. 368, it would be unrealistic to propound the theory that the fundamental rights are eternal, inviolate, and not within the reach of any subsequent constitutional amendment. It is clear that Art. 368 itself can be amended by Parliament, though cl. (e) of the proviso requires that before amending Art. 368, the safeguards prescribed by the proviso must be satisfied. In other words, even if the powers to amend the fundamental rights were not included in Art. 368, Parliament can, by a suitable amendment of Art. 368, take those powers. Thus, the second assumption underlying the argument about the immutable character of the fundamental rights is also not well founded.