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4. In this petition, as observed by me earlier, the petitioner has called in question the correctness of the orders Annexures-E and F, whereby respondents 1 and 3 have, in the purported exercise of the power conferred on them under Rule 97(4) of the Karnataka Land Revenue Rules, 1966 (hereinafter, referred to as "the Rules"), dereserved the gomal land measuring 1,097 acres situated at Ugargol village and reserved the same for the purpose of the 5th respondent-Institution in exercise of the power conferred under Section 71 of the Karnataka Land Revenue Act, 1964 (hereinafter, referred to as "the Act"). According to the petitioner, the impugned orders seriously affect the rights of the villagers; and if the impugned orders are given effect to, the villagers will be deprived of their right to graze their cattle on the gomal land, which is absolutely required by the villages. It is also asserted in the petition that the lands situated at Ugargol and Harlapur villages are all dry lands and the villagers had to depend upon the rain for cultivating their lands and that being the position, the villagers have taken up Dairy Farming and Poultry Farming as their main profession and in that regard, they foster cattle and breed them. It is also stated in the petition that as per the 1990 Census, there were 7,723 cattle in Ugargol and Harlapur villages and 820 catties in Yellammana Tanda village; and since 1990, the cattle strength has increased considerably. According to the petitioner, the cattle of the village require more than an area of 3,000 acres as gomal land according to the norms fixed under Rule 97 of the Rules having regard to the cattle strength in the villages; and if the impugned orders are given effect to, the villagers will have hardly about 500 acres. The petitioners have also stated that the Village Panchayat has passed a Resolution dated 8th August, 1997 requesting the respondents to withdraw the impugned orders. It is their further case that similar resolution has been passed by the Co-operative Society requesting the respondents to withdraw the impugned orders. It is also stated that since the Authorities have not withdrawn the impugned orders, there was wide-spread protest by the villagers and a 'bundh' was also observed by the villagers on 20th of October, 1997. It is also the case of the petitioner that the land in question has been dereserved from gomal and has been reserved for the purpose of the 5th respondent just to oblige Sri G.M. Mamoni, Deputy Speaker of Vidhana Sabha, as he happens to be the Chairman of the 5th respondent-Institution.

BETTASUR VILLAGE:
Gomal land available is 536 Acres 33 Guntas.
YEDRAVI VILLAGE:
Gomal land available is 312 Acres 35 Guntas.
Total acres of Gomal lands available in the above adjoining villages of Ugargol Village which is used by the cattle of Ugargol and the adjoining villages for grazing is 1,280 acres.
As per the catties in the Ugargol Village (5,117) the total land required as Gomal is 1,523 Acres.
Available is 947 Acres 13 Guntas. Short by 578 Acres.
If the lands available in the adjoining villages is taken into account a further extent of 1,280 Acres are available for grazing.

6. Sri S.M. Byadgi, learned Counsel appearing along with Sri C.S. Patil for the petitioner, challenged the impugned orders mainly on five grounds. Firstly, he submitted that since the provisions have been made under Rule 97 of the Rules providing for reservation of the Government land for pasturage; and sub-rule (4) of Rule 97 of the Rules confers power on the Deputy Commissioner to dereserve the land taking into consideration the relevant circumstances, the first respondent had no power under the provisions of the Act and the Rules framed thereunder to pass the order at Annexure-E dereserving the land from gomal purpose and to reserve the same for the purpose of the 5th respondent-Institution. Secondly, he submitted that since admittedly the order at Annexure-F has been passed by the third respondent pursuant to the order at Annexure-E passed by the first respondent, the order at Annexure-F is liable to be quashed on the ground that the said order has been passed on account of the dictation of the first respondent and in total disregard of the provisions contained in sub-rule (4) of Rule 97 of the Rules. According to him, since power has been conferred on the Deputy Commissioner under sub-rule (4) of Rule 97 of the Rules to reduce the extent of the land reserved for gomal purpose, the said power is required to be exercised by the Deputy Commissioner alone and not by anybody else. In support of this submission that the order at Annexure-F has been passed on account of the dictation of the first respondent is liable to be quashed, he relied upon a decision of the Supreme Court in the cases of Commissioner of Police, Bombay v Gordhandas Bhanji and Bangalore Medical Trust v B.S. Muddappa and Others. Thirdly, he submitted that since the land in question is admittedly a gomal land and has been reserved for the purpose of grazing village cattle, the impugned order at Annexure-F is liable to be quashed on the ground that the Deputy Commissioner has failed to pass an order recording his reasons that he is of the opinion that the extent of free pasturage is required to he reduced below the prescribed limit. Elaborating this submission, he pointed out that unless the Deputy Commissioner makes an order recording reasons after taking into consideration all relevant circumstances that he is of the opinion that the extent of the free pasturage is required to be reduced below the prescribed limit, it is not permissible for him to reduce the extent of land already reserved as gomal. He also submitted that since the order impugned does not state any reasons for the conclusion of the Deputy Commissioner for reduction of the gomal land and it is solely based on the direction given by the first respondent-State in the order at Annexure-E, it is not permissible for the respondents to support the order at Annexure-F by giving reasons in the Statement of Objections filed by the respondents. In support of this submission, he relied upon the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Mohinder Singh Gill and Another v Chief Election Commissioner, New Delhi and Others. Fourthly, he submitted that since the land in question has been reserved for the purpose of free pasturage of the cattle of the village as gomal land in terms of Section 71 of the Act and if the Deputy Commissioner intended to dereserve the land from gomal for any other purpose, he should have notified the proposal to the members of the general public and called for their objections; and on consideration of such objections and other relevant matters alone, he could have proceeded to make an order in terms of Rule 97(4) of the Rules. In support of this submission that the villagers have a right of hearing in a matter like this, he relied upon the decisions of this Court in the cases of Manjunatha K.P. and Others v State of Karnataka and Others and B. Veeranna and Others v State of Karnataka and Others. Finally, he submitted that having regard to the total cattle strength in the villages in question, the extent of gomal lands available in the villages in question being highly disproportionate to the total extent of the land required to be reserved for the purpose of free pasturage in terms of Section 71 read with sub-rule (1) of Rule 97 of the Rules, the impugned orders are liable to be quashed on the ground that they have been passed without taking into consideration the interest of the village cattle, the interest of the rural agriculturists and in an arbitrary manner. According to the learned Counsel, if the impugned orders are allowed to stand, it would seriously affect the interest of the village cattle and it would seriously affect the village community and right to livelihood guaranteed to the rural agriculturists. Elaborating this submission, he pointed out that keeping in mind that large number of villagers depend upon their livelihood on the cattle strength, provisions have been made under the Act and also the Rules framed thereunder to reserve the Government land for the purpose of free pasturage for the cattle of each village at the rate of 12 hectares for every hundred heads of cattle. Therefore, the learned Counsel would point out that unless there is sufficient material on record to show that there is equally alternative mode of pasturage is available in the village, it is not permissible to reduce in a mechanical manner the land which is already reserved for pasturage. It is his submission that village cattle are as important as human beings, especially when the villagers in the village mainly depend upon the agriculture and Dairy Farming for their livelihood. He submitted that all these matters have been given a total go-by while passing the impugned orders and the impugned orders came to be passed in a mechanical manner and without application of mind and totally on account of extraneous and irrelevant considerations. It is also his submission that the 5th respondent-Institution does not require 1,034 acres of land and the reservation of such a vast extent of land is totally disproportionate to the need of the public, who visit Yellamma Temple a few days in a year. He also pointed out that the claim made in the impugned orders that 15 lakhs of devotees visit the temple, is totally baseless and the figure given in the impugned orders that 15 lakh devotees visit the temple itself clearly demonstrates that the impugned orders came to be passed without application of mind and in a mechanical manner. According to him, the devotees who visited the temple from the year 1993-94 to 1996-97, at no point of time, exceeded 11 lakhs per year. In this connection, he drew my attention to the Certificate dated 4th of November, 1997, a copy of which has been produced as Annexure-V, issued by the Chief Officer of the 5th respondent-Institution, which discloses that 7,13,373 was the minimum number of devotees who visited the temple during the year 1993-94 and 10,84,999 was the maximum number of devotees who visited the temple during the year 1995-96.

Therefore, even from the stand taken by respondents 1 to 4 in the statement of objections, it is clear that the order Annexure-F came to be passed by the Deputy Commissioner pursuant to the order Annexure-E passed hy the State Government and in the light of the direction given in the said order. As observed by me earlier, under sub-rule (4) of Rule 97 of the Rules, it is only the Deputy Commissioner who is conferred with the power for reasons to be recorded in writing on consideration of all the relevant circumstances, who could reduce the extent of the gomal land below the prescribed minimum. Admittedly, the land in question is a gomal land. It is not in dispute that the impugned order reduces the extent of the land reserved as gomal, below the prescribed minimum. In the records of the Deputy Commissioner made available to me by the learned Government Advocate on my direction, I did not find anything to show that the Deputy Commissioner had independently applied his mind with regard to the total extent of the land available in the villages in question and the number of cattle heads and other alternative lands available for the purpose of fodder, etc., of the village cattle; and that he was satisfied that the extent of the land reserved for gomal, can be reduced. Therefore, I have no hesitation to come to the conclusion that the order Annexure-F came to be passed only pursuant to the order Annexure-E passed by the State Government. Hence, it is clear that the Deputy Commissioner, who is required to exercise the powers conferred on him under sub-rule (4) of Rule 97 of the Rules, had abdicated his functions and has passed the order Annexure-F on account of the dictation of the State Government made as per the order Annexure-E. The power conferred on the Deputy Commissioner is required to be exercised by him only on consideration of relevant circumstances. Since, while passing the impugned order Annexure-F, he has abdicated the powers conferred on him under sub-rule (4) of Rule 97 of the Rules, the order is liable to be quashed. In my view, I am supported by the decision of the Supreme Court, in the case of Commissioner of Police, supra. The Supreme Court, in the said case, while considering the power conferred on the Commissioner of Police, Bombay, in the context of the cancellation of licence granted to run a cinema theatre, has observed that when a power is conferred on an Authority, that Authority alone must exercise the power so conferred; and if the power or discretion so conferred on the Authority is exercised on the direction given by the higher Authority, such exercise of power is bad in law. It is useful to refer to the observations made by the Supreme Court at paragraphs 9, 10 and 17 of the said decision, which read as hereunder: