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Showing contexts for: section 299 in Pratik Jagdishbhai Thakkar & 5 vs State Of Gujarat & on 5 May, 2017Matching Fragments
Section 299 Section 300
A person commits culpable Subject to certain exceptions
homicide if the act by which the culpable homicide is murder if the
death is caused is done .... act by which the death is done ....
INTENTION
(a) with the intention of (1) with the intention of causing
causing death; or death; or
(b) with the intention of (2) with the intention of causing
causing such bodily injury as is such bodily injury as the offender
likely to cause death; or knows to be likely to cause the
death of the person to whom the
harm is
caused; or
(3) with the intention of causing
bodily injury to any person and the
bodily injury intended to be inflicted
is sufficient in the ordinary course
of nature to cause death; or
KNOWLEDGE
HC-NIC Page 16 of 47 Created On Sat May 06 01:27:56 IST 2017
(c) with the knowledge that the (4) with the knowledge that the act
act is likely to cause death. is so imminently dangerous that it
must in all probability cause death
or such bodily injury as is likely to
cause death and without any excuse
for incurring the risk of causing
death or such injury as is mentioned
above
14. Clause (b) of Section 299 corresponds with Clauses (2) and (3) of Section 300. The distinguishing feature of the mens rearequisite under Clause (2) is the knowledge possessed by the offender regarding the particular victim being in such a peculiar condition or state of health that the intentional harm caused to him is likely to be fatal, notwithstanding the fact that such harm would not in the ordinary way of nature be sufficient to cause death of a person in normal health or condition. It is noteworthy that the 'intention to cause death' is not an essential requirement of Clause (2). Only the intention of causing the bodily injury coupled with the offender's knowledge of the likelihood of such injury causing the death of the particular victim, is sufficient to bring the killing within the ambit of this Clause. This aspect of Clause (2) is borne out by Illustration (b) appended to Section 300.
16. In Clause (3) of Section 300, instead of the words 'likely to cause death' occurring in the corresponding Clause (b) of Section 299, the words "sufficient in the ordinary course of nature" have been used. Obviously, the distinction lies between a bodily injury likely to cause death and a bodily injury sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death. The distinction is fine but real, and if overlooked, may result 'in miscarriage of justice. The difference between Clause (b) of Section 299 and Clause (3) of Section 300 is one of the degree of probability of death resulting from the intended bodily injury. To put it more broadly, it is the degree of probability of death which determines HC-NIC Page 17 of 47 Created On Sat May 06 01:27:56 IST 2017 whether a culpable homicide is of the gravest, medium or the lowest degree. The word "likely" in Clause (b) of Section 299 conveys the sense of 'probable' as distinguished from a mere possibility. The words "bodily injury... sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death" mean that death will be the "most probable" result of the injury, having regard to the ordinary course of nature.
19. Thus, according to the rule laid down in Virsa Singh's case (supra), even if the intention of accused was limited to the infliction of a bodily injury sufficient to cause death in the ordinary course of nature and did not extend to the intention of causing death, the offence would be murder. Illustration (c) appended to Section 300 clearly brings out this point. 20. Clause (c) of Section 299 and Clause (4) of Section 300 both require knowledge of the probability of the act causing death. It is not necessary for the purpose of this case to dilate much on the distinction between these corresponding clauses. It will be sufficient to say that Clause (4) of Section 300 would be applicable where the knowledge of the offender as to the probability of death of a person or persons in general as distinguished from a particular person or persons being caused from his imminently dangerous act, approximates to a practical certainty. Such knowledge on the part of the offender must be of the highest degree of probability, the act having been committed by the offender without any excuse for incurring the risk of causing death or such injury as aforesaid.