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(e) In the three cases there were 'special reasons' within the meaning of s. 354, sub-s. (3) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 for the passing of the death sentence in each and, therefore, the High Courts were justified in confirming the death sentence passed under s. 368(a) of the Code. Indeed, they are illustrative of the rate type of cases, that is, first degree murders, where a death sentence is usually awarded in any civilised country. These were cases of diobolical, cold-blooded brutal murders of innocent persons, that is, first degree murders of extreme brutality or depravity. The inhumanity of some of the offences defied belief Any interference with the sentence of death, would be wholly unwarranted in each case. [l64G]

(f) It is the duty of the Court to impose a proper punishment depending upon the degree of criminality and desirability to impose such punishment as a measure of social necessity as a means of deterring other potential offenders. Failure to impose a death sentence in such grave cases where it is a crime against the society-particularly in cases of murders committed with extreme brutality, will bring to nought the sentence of death provided for by s. 302 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860. To allow the appellants to escape with the lesser punishment after they had committed such intentional, cold-blooded deliberate and brutal murders will deprive the law of its effectiveness and result in travesty of justice. [l68A-B]

It is apt to notice in this context that even on a traditional approach this is not a case for death sentence, if we are to be belighted by the guidelines in Carlose John. The murder there was brutal but the act was committed while the accused were in a grip of emotional stress. This was regarded as persuasive enough, in the background of the case, to avoid the extreme penalty. The ruling in Kartar Singh related to a case of brutal murder and of hired murderers with planning of the criminal project. In that background, the affirmation of the death sentence, without any discussion of the guidelines as between 'life' and 'death' awards was hardly meant as a mechanical formula. It is difficult to discern any such ratio in that ruling on the question of sentence in the grey area of life versus death. The holding was surely right even by the tests we have indicated but to decoct a principle that if three lives are taken, death sentence is the sequel, is to read, without warrant, into that decision a reversal of the process spread over decades.

In the three cases before us, there were 'special reasons' within the meaning of s. 354, sub-s. (3) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 for the passing of the death sentence in each and, therefore, the High Courts were justified in confirming the death sentence passed under s. 368(a) of the Code. Indeed, they are illustrative of the rare type of cases, that is, first degree murders, where a death sentence is usually awarded in any civilised country. These were cases of diabolical, cold blooded brutal murders of innocent persons, that is, first degree murders of extreme brutality or depravity. The inhumanity of some of these offenders defies belief.