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13. The above-quoted provisions of the Limitation Act also brine into sharp relief what is otherwise equally evident on principle. A wrongful dispossession of immovable property or a continuance in adverse possession thereof is by itself an independent wrongful act This would per se give rise to a cause of action to the plaintiff. If thereafter the person in wrongful possession continues to deprive the rightful owner of the usufruct of the said property either actual or constructive he commits a second and independent wrongful act thus giving rise to another distinct cause of action. Hence a wrongful dispossession of immovable property, can be and in fact is distinct and separate from the wrongful deprival of the usufruct thereof to its owner. As has been authoritatively said there is no reason on principle why a plaintiff, if so inclined, may not acquiesce in the wrong of dispossession for some-time till he chooses to recover the same (subject to a limitation of 12 years) and vet claim from time to time (within the three years period of limitation) the profits of the land whilst it remains in the wrongful occupation of the defendant

"* * * * On the view we adopt, ejecting a person from immovable property in his possession, and thereafter preventins the person entitled to the profits of immovable property from enjoying them are not the same cause of action, but distinct causes of action, being separate wrongful acts. On principle, we see no reason why a plaintiff should not if so disposed, acquiesce in the wrong of dispossession and leave the land with the defendant till he chooses to recover it (subject to the law of limitation), and vet claim from time to time the profits of the land while in the occupation of the defendant."

49. It would be pertinent to examine another argument at this stage. It is contended that as the period of limitation fore suit for mesne profits was different from the period of limitation provided for a suit for the recoyery of possession of immovable property, it could be inferred that the Limitation Act treats these causes of action as distinct and separate from each other. To me the argument appears to be devoid of the merit of plausibility. The starting point of limitation for both the claims would be the same, inasmuch as the moment the plaintiff is illegally dispossessed, he is entitled to recover possession as well as mesne profits for the period during which he remains dispossessed. The fact that a suit for the recovery of possession of immovable property can be brouaiht within twelve years while a suit for mesne profits would have to be brought everv three years is of no consequence for determining whether the two claims are based on distinct causes of action or on the same cause of action. A single cause of action may entitle a person to more than one relief and it could often happen that limitation for all these reliefs may not be the same, but that circumstances would not carry the implication that these reliefs have arisen out of different causes of action. To auote an example, a Government servant who is wrongfully dismissed may be entitled to a number of reliefs arising out of this cause of action including relief of reinstatement, back wages and promotion etc.. but the period of limitation for all these reliefs would not be Hie same even though they arise out of the same cause of action- Having examined the various arguments advanced on either Bide, the stage is now set for considering the case law on the subiect It would be pertinent to observe at the outset that there is a sharp conflict of opinion as to whether a suit for possession of immovable property and a suit for mesne profits arise out of the same cause of action or are based on different causes of action. The High Courts of Madras. Calcutta and Bombay have taken the view that a suit for possession does not bar a suit for mesne wonts accrued before the first suit, as the second suit is based on a cause of action different from that of the first suit. A contrary view has been taken by the High Courts of Allahabad. Oudh. Madhya Bharat. Peshawar and Sind and in some of the decisions of the Calcutta. Bombay and Orissa High Courts.

52. While proceeding to examine the case-law I would first consider the cases which have taken the view that wrongful possession of profits and wrongful ouster constitute distinct and separate causes of action. So far as the Lahore High Court is concerned, the matter was considered in Raja Bikrama Singh of Faridkot v. Prab Dial. 129 Pun Re 1889 (FB) and it was ruled as under:--

"The right to possess immovable property, and the right to eniov the profits of such property are, we think, two distinct rights, and not necessarily connected. They are often found to be vested in the same person as owner of the propertv but they may be and often are vested in different persons. An infringement of the former right does not necessarily involve an infringement of the latter right. An infringement of the right to possess immovable property may entitle the possessor to sue for two remedies, namely for damages for the trespass (not bv way of mesne profits), and for recovery of possession: but does not of itself entitle him to claim mesne profits. An infringement of the right to eniov property by taking its profits, entitles the person so permitted to sue for compensation for the loss sustained, that is for the profits actually received by the defendant, or what might with due diligence have been received by him. The two wrongs apoear to us to give rise to two distinct causes of action, the first arising when the act of trespass is committed; the second when the. mesne profits should have been receivable bv the plaintiff, but for the defendant's wrongful act"