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7. In U.P.State Road Transport Corporation vs. U.P.Parivahan Nigam Shishukhs Berojgar Sangh 1995(2) SCC 1 the Apex Court laid down that in the context of the object and scheme of Apprentice Act, legitimate expectancy is there for some preferential treatment in the matter of offering appointment by the establishment to apprenticeship trainees. The court pointed out that appointment ought to be offered to such trainee apprentices in preference to direct recruitment by laying down guidelines to regulate such preference. One was relaxation in the mode of calling names from employment exchange. Another direction envisaged was that their names should be listed in order of yearwise apprentice ship training and inter se order of preference in offering appointment as and when vacancy arises should be maintained on that basis subject to other qualifications. Specific observations were made about age relaxations in cases where appointments are not offered in near future. The court devised formula by which age could be relaxed in such cases by exercising discretion vesting under the relevant rules of the organization governing recruitment.If no such rules exist then, the age relaxation could be maximum up to the period for which training was imparted. That relaxation was to operate generally in all cases and not individually. It was never envisaged that relaxation of unlimited period to be given in the case of offering appointment to the apprentice trainees and that too in cases of few applicants. The order relaxing the upper age limit in the case of petitioner which was made in September 1993 can only have one of the two effects firstly that the age was relaxed in respect of vacancies which were being considered then and not for any future vacancies which were not in contemplation to be filled at that time. If that were so no fresh age relaxation was there for vacancies which were not filled in 1993. The other interpretation, which is advanced by learned counsel for the petitioner, is to treat relaxation permanently in case of the petitioner. Thus construed the petitioner or some of the individual case were given free period to be appointed in future, at any time without any upper age limit at any time. That obviously would be against all norms of giving relaxation in age irrespective of claims of others to compete for such recruitment and those who are excluded on the basis of attaining maximum age. Neither such permanent relaxation was envisaged by the decision of the Supreme court in U.P. S.R.T.C (supra) nor any such rules have been shown in existence under which indefinite age relaxation for the purpose of filling of future vacancy could be filled up. The relaxation in upper age limit could be an exercise each time when vacancies are to be filled.