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15. Further, it was submitted that the gift deed apart from being an unregistered document, it is not duly stamped and only one witness has attested the document and it cannot be called a gift deed much less and absolute gift deed. By referring to the plaint prayer, it is submitted that there is no sub-section (f) in Section 34 of the Specific Relief Act to exercise discretion, there should have been demand and denial. Therefore, it is contended that the gift deed is a incomplete transaction and there is no question of animus and even if, the plaintiff claims to have been in possession of the property for 100 years, it cannot became adverse to the interest of the defendants. The learned counsel by referring to the cross examination of PW-1 submitted that PW-1 had stated that the plaintiff requested to execute gift deed and there is no such pleading in the plaint. As regards the Property Tax remittance, it was submitted that it is in respect of two Door Nos. namely Door No.13 in 3rd Cross Street and Door No.8 in 4th Cross Street and the Property Tax remittance in the name of the plaintiff was without the knowledge of the defendants and the same cannot be an animus for raising the plea of adverse possession. Further, it is submitted that the plaintiff was running a school in the premisses and there is no question of taking possession of running school. It is further submitted that in Ex.P.3, the plaintiff admitted that after surrendering plot Nos.2, 3 & 4, the plaintiff was in occupation of the remaining land and building in plot Nos.11A, 11B & 11C as a lessee. In the absence of any proof of surrender of lease the status of the plaintiff is the only as a lessee and not that of a Donee. Further, the gift deed is not in consideration of the surrender of 20 grounds and the recital in Ex.P.2 cannot be looked into, as it is an unregistered document and the learned Single Judge rightly refused to exercise discretion and dismissed the suit. In support of his contentions, the learned Senior counsel placed reliance on the decisions of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in K.B.Saha & Sons Private Limited vs. Development Consultant Limited [2008 (8) SCC 564]; S.Kaladevi vs. V.R.Somasundaram & Ors [2010 (5) SCC 401]; Bondar Singh & Ors., vs. Nihal Singh & Ors., [2003 (2) CTC 635]; State of Haryana vs. Mukesh Kumar & Ors [2011 (10) SCC 404]; Roop Singh (dead) through Lrs vs. Ram Singh (dead) through LRs [2000 (3) SCC 708]; Khepa Gorain vs. Kus Gorain [1998 (9) SCC 144]; Chatti Konati Rao & Ors., vs. Palle Venkata Subba Rao [2010 (14) SCC 316]; Kamakshi Builders vs. Ambedkar Educational Society & Ors., [2007 (12) SCC 27]; P.T.Munichikkanna Reddy & Ors., vs. Revamma & Ors., [2007 (6) SCC 59]; Konda Lakshmana Bapuji vs. Govt., of A.P., & Ors., [2002 (3) SCC 258]; Thakur Kishan Singh (dead) vs. Arvind Kumar [AIR 1995 SC 73]; Vishwanath Bapurao Sabale vs. Shalinibal Nagappa Sabale & Ors., [2009 (12) SCC 101]; Annakili vs. Vedanayagam & Ors., [2007 (14) SCC 308]; and Union of India vs. Ibrahim Uddin & Anr., [2012 (8) SCC 148] and the decisions of the Division Bench of this Court in A.C.Lakshmipathy vs. A.M.Chakrapani Reddiar & 5 Ors., [2001 (1) L.W. 257] and Kuppuraj vs. K.Arjunan & Ors., [1981 (1) MLJ 222]. Summing up his arguments, the learned Senior counsel submitted that the decisions relied on by the plaintiff pertain to Government grants and are clearly distinguishable and the gift deed is not admissible in evidence and clearly hit by proviso to Section 49 of the Registration Act, as there is no collateral transaction in the instant case. It is therefore submitted that it was an attempted gift and the same is an incomplete transaction and therefore the remedy is only to file a suit for specific performance. In the absence of any pleadings or "proof of animus", the learned Single Judge rightly refused to exercise discretion and dismissed the suit.

21. Thus the founder trustee, who was the lessee continued to be in possession of the total extent of 29 grounds and 486 sq.ft., together with the building thereon. Founder Trustee C.M.K.Viswanatha Mudaliar, died on 29.08.1979, he had executed a Will dated 13.04.1966 bequeathing the property to his wife  viz the first defendant, which fell to his share in the partition between himself and his sons. The said property being the property which was subject matter of lease granted in favour of the founder trustee of the plaintiff trust. The first defendant obtained probate of the said Will before this Court in O.P.No.373 of 1983, dated 12.07.1984. Thus, she became the absolute owner of the said property, namely plot Nos.11A, 11B & 11C together with the building thereon. After about nearly 6 months, two documents came to be executed between the plaintiff and the defendants. The interpretation and effect of these two documents are subject matter of controversy in this appeal. Ex.P.2 is a deed of gift dated 06.01.1985, executed by the first defendant in favour of the plaintiff. The said document is an unregistered document executed on a non judicial stamp paper dated 02.01.1983. Ex.P.3 is an agreement, which is also executed on the same date namely 06.01.1985, executed by all the defendants in favour of the plaintiff. By virtue of Ex.P.2, the first defendant transferred and conveyed by way of gift an extent of 9 grounds and 1400 sq. ft., together with the building thereon, (the suit schedule property) in favour of the plaintiff. Under the Ex.P.3 agreement, there was arrangement between the parties as regards the surrender of the remaining larger extent of land to the defendants.

27. The first objection raised by the learned Senior counsel appearing for the defendants is that Ex.P.2 being an unregistered instrument cannot be looked into for any purpose and no title flows to the plaintiff by virtue of such unregistered document.

28. The learned Senior counsel appearing for the plaintiff would fairly state that the plaintiff does not claim title to the property based on the unregistered gift deed, Ex.P.2. His submission would be that Ex.P.2 could be looked into for collateral purpose, to understand the arrangement and conduct of parties, to ascertain the nature of possession and status of the plaintiff after 06.01.1985. It is true that in terms of Section 49 of the Registration Act, no document required under Section 17 to be registered shall be received as evidence of any transaction affecting such property or conferring such power, unless it has been registered. The proviso to Section 49 is an exception to Section 49 and it provides that the bar to the reception in evidence of an unregistered document of transfer will not apply in certain cases. Therefore, for collateral purposes i.e., purposes other than establishing title, an unregistered instrument can be looked into by virtue of the proviso.

41. As rightly pointed out by the learned Senior counsel appearing for the plaintiff no such contention was raised in the written statement, therefore, the defendants would be precluded from raising such a contention more so in the absence of any pleadings or evidence. For the sake of argument, if the plea raised by the defendants is to be considered, the same deserves to be rejected for the simple reason that Ex.P2 & Ex.P3 form part of a composite transaction. The link between these two documents are inextricable. The intention of the parties was very clear and though Ex.P.2 is an unregistered document, the same could be looked into for a collateral purpose to assess conduct of the parties. The Division Bench of this Court in the case of A.C.Lakshmipathy vs. A.M.Chakrapani Reddiar & 5 Ors., [2001 (1) L.W. 257] held that the document which was a family arrangement in the said case being unstamped and unregistered document cannot be looked into for any purpose, similarly oral evidence cannot be let in about the contents of the said document. After analyzing the case law on the subject as regards for what purposes such document could be looked into, it was held that the same can be looked into for a collateral purpose and whether the purpose is a collateral purpose is a question of fact and depends upon the facts and circumstances of each case. Therefore, a straightjacket formula cannot be laid down for the purpose of stating what is collateral purpose. In such circumstances, the case laws relied on by the learned Senior counsel for the defendants cannot be made applicable in the abstract without reference to the facts of the case on hand, which appears to be peculiar.