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23. Mr. Damle would further contend that condition No. 7 of General Body Resolution No.161 is in three parts, namely, (i) restriction on Lessees to induct sub-tenants only during tenure of lease, (ii) permission to Lessees to continue to retain possession for themselves on payment of rent fixed as per rent control legislation, and (iii) first right of Lessees and sub-tenants to remain as tenants of Municipal Corporation. That therefore, condition No. 7 does not create any right of extension or renewal of lease in favour of Lessees or their sub-tenants. That interpretation sought to be advanced by Mr. Godbole would result in perpetual lease of Municipal property, which is not the intention behind passing Resolution No.161 or in executing the Lease Deed. That the rule of harmonious construction is required to be applied while reading the Lease Deed in conjunction with the conditions of the General Body Resolution.

27. So far as Writ Petitions filed by the successors-in-title of lessees and sub-tenants are concerned, Mr. Damle would oppose the same without prejudice to the contentions raised in the Writ Petitions filed by k 39/74 wp_1057.20_group_SMC.doc the Municipal Corporation. He would submit that the directions for payment of damages issued by the Principal District Judge cannot be disturbed as there is unauthorized use of Corporation's property after expiry of the lease and the occupants must be liable to be paid damages. So far as the directions of the learned Principal District Judge for consideration of application dated 3 October 2017 for renewal of lease is concerned, Mr. Damle would submit that in the event of this Court arriving at the conclusion that Lessees had some right to seek renewal of lease, the ultimate decision about renewal of lease must be left to the wisdom of the Municipal Corporation. That being public property vested in the Municipal Corporation, the same cannot be subject to unilateral rights of private persons and that the ultimate decision for grant or refusal to grant renewal of lease must be left to the public authority. He would submit that if the contention of the successors-in-title of lessees and sub-tenants is accepted, they would perpetually continue to hold the Municipal property as there is no outer period specified in either General Body Resolutions or the lease deed after which the right of renewal would cease to exist. He would submit that interpretation of General Body Resolutions and lease deed to mean unilateral right of renewal in perpetuity would result in situation where the successors-in-title of lessees and sub-tenants would never return the Municipal land. That such interpretation would lead to absurdity and therefore required to be avoided. He would pray for dismissal of Writ Petitions filed by the successors-in-title of lessees and sub-tenants.

29. The entire controversy between the parties revolve around the nature of rights created in favour of Lessees by three documents of (i) General Body Resolution No.161, dated 13 December 1967, (ii) General Body Resolution No.181, dated 29 December 1967, and (iii) Lease deed, dated 4 January 1968. The documents are interpreted by the Municipal Commissioner to mean tenure of only 50 years without any further unilateral right to seek renewal or extension. On the other hand, successors-in-title of lessees and sub-tenants read those three documents to mean creation of an absolute right to seek 'extension' of tenure of lease. Alternatively, the successors-in-title of lessees and sub- tenants contend that even if right of 'renewal' is to be read in those three documents, renewal is automatic subject to fixation of rent for subsequent tenure. It would therefore be necessary to refer to the relevant clauses/terms and conditions of those three documents.

51. Mr. Godbole has attempted to suggest that Resolution No.161 is a unilateral act of Municipal Corporation to which the Lessees were not parties. In fact, this argument clearly turns against Mr. Godbole's clients. Execution of Lease Deed is sort of a ministerial act performed in pursuance of the authority derived from the General Body Resolution k 59/74 wp_1057.20_group_SMC.doc Nos.161 and 181. It must be borne in mind that it's a municipal property and can be disposed of only by the authority of Standing Committee/General Body. Therefore, what is not intended by the General Body of the Municipal Corporation cannot be incorporated in the Lease Deed. If the Lessees wanted to seek any variance in the conditions of the General Body Resolution No.161, they were required to approach the General Body, which appears to have been done in the present case. Resolution No.181 was adopted shifting the location of the town-hall as per request of the Lessees. Here the dates of adoption of Resolution No. 181 assumes importance. Resolution No. 181 was adopted on 29 December 1967 at lessee's request amending the terms and conditions of earlier Resolution No. 161. This was done before execution of the Lease Deed on 4 January 1968. Thus if lessees were not agreeable to condition No. 7 of Resolution No. 161 dated 13 December 1967, they had the option of seeking modification of that condition before execution of the lease deed. However, modification of condition No. 7 of the Resolution No. 161 was not sought by the lessees, thereby raising a presumption that the lessees were agreeable to retain lease only for 50 years and to become Municipal Corporation's direct tenants in respect of premises in their possession thereafter. This conduct of lessees not only falsifies their contention that Resolution No. 161 was unilateral act of Municipal Corporation, but in fact suggests that they always knew that the tenure of lease was for 50 years only.