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The plaintiff is the appellant. The suit was for declaration, mandatory and prohibitory injunction. The suit was dismissed by the trial court and it was confirmed by the appellate court.

2. The plaintiff contends that the A schedule property belongs to him and is in his direct possession. The B schedule describes the pathway which, according to him, passes through the property of the defendants. In the plaint, it was contended that it has a width of 6 feet and a length of 26 meters. It was contended that from 1943 onwards, B schedule pathway was being used by the plaintiff and his predecessors-in-interest openly, peaceably and continuously, as of right and as of easement and without any interruption for more than 22 years. It was alleged that the 1st defendant constructed a foundation  without leaving the prescribed distance. It was also contended that a wall of granite stones was put up reducing the width of B schedule pathway. That portion was separately shown as C schedule. The 2nd defendant also put up constructions encroaching into the B schedule way. That portion was shown as D schedule. Hence, the plaintiff sought mandatory injunction for removal of C and D schedule walls put up by D1 and D2 respectively. He also sought for a prohibitory injunction restraining the defendants from interfering with the plaintiff's user of the B schedule pathway and also not to reduce the width of the pathway.

3. The suit was resisted by the defendants contending that the plaintiff is not entitled to get any easement right. The entire properties were paddy fields. There was only a ridge having a width of 1= feet in between the property of the 1st defendant and that of defendants 2 to 4. The width of the ridge was subsequently altered to 2 feet. The claim made by the plaintiff for  mandatory and prohibitory injunction was denied.

4. The Commissioner's report and plan were marked as Exhibits C1 to C3(b). Though the case originally pleaded by the plaintiff was that there is a pathway of a width of 6 feet starting from the public road on the north and through the defendant's property, a pathway of such a width could not be found by the Commissioner. Of course, it was contended by the plaintiff that the width was reduced by the defendants by putting up walls on either side of the pathway, the Commissioner could find a way having a width of 2 feet.

10. These aspects were highlighted by the courts below to hold that the contention raised by the plaintiff, that he has a right of easement by prescription, is unsustainable. It is submitted by the learned counsel for the appellant that the compound wall on either side of the pathway was put up on the eve of or subsequent to the filing of the suit and as such it cannot be said that a decree for mandatory injunction will cause undue hardship to the respondents.

11. The learned counsel for the appellant would submit that the lie and position of the pathway claimed by the plaintiff and seen by the Advocate Commissioner is having a width of 2 feet. It was contended by the defendants that it was only a ridge of a width of 1= feet. The appellant's counsel argues that for a reasonable use of the pathway it should have a width of atleast 3 feet. Hence, the learned counsel for the appellant now confines the relief to have a pathway of a width of 3 feet.

12. It is pointed out that the case originally set up by the appellant was that there was a pathway of a width of 6  feet and that it was used by the plaintiff. But the width of the pathway noted by the Commissioner, as the 'B' schedule, is only 2 feet. It is also pointed out that originally it was contended that the said pathway passes through the property of the first defendant, but later, the suggestion put to DW1 is to the effect that the pathway is situated in between the property of the first defendant and defendants 2 to 4. In other words, if that case is accepted, the said pathway should fall outside the property of the first defendant. There was no case that the 'B' schedule pathway was a public way. If the pathway does not pass through the property of the first defendant, how the plea of easement by prescription can be sustained is another pertinent question put by the learned counsel for the respondents. Since the plea was one of right of easement by prescription, the courts below did not sustain the plea raised by the appellant. There is no acceptable evidence to hold that there has been in existence a pathway of a width of 3 feet and that has been used without interruption and as of right and as an  easement. But, however the fact remains that there is a pathway having a width of 2 feet starting from the road on the northern side and passing through the property of the first defendant to the property of the plaintiff. The respondents have no objection in the appellant using that pathway having a width of 2 feet.