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15. On the other hand, submission of the respondent is that none of the ingredients of Section 34 of the Act for setting aside of the award is made out in the present petition. It is submitted that a decision on the issue of limitation is primarily a question of fact. The decision of the arbitrator is clearly a decision on the facts of this case. The arbitrator‟s is the last word on facts and this Court not being an appellate forum vis-à-vis the arbitral award cannot go into the correctness or otherwise of the findings of fact. It is argued that the learned Arbitrator has rightly held that the letter dated 03.10.1994 constitutes a notice for invocation of arbitration. In any event, the letter dated 14.02.1995 was clearly a letter invoking the arbitration agreement. Consequently by virtue of Section 37(3) of the Arbitration Act, 1940, as also Section 43(2) of Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, the arbitration proceedings stood commenced upon the issuance of the said notices. He refers to decisions in Milkfood Ltd. v. GMC Ice Cream (P) Ltd. (2004) 7 SCC 288; J.C. Budhraja v. Chairman, Orissa Mining Corporation Ltd. and Anr. (2008) 2 SCC 444; Utkal Commercial Corporation v. Central Coal Fields Ltd. (1999) 2 SCC 571; Morena Mandal S.S.K. Ltd. v. New India Assurance Co. Ltd. (1999) 5 SCC 697 to submit that the arbitration commences by service of notice and issuance of request for appointment of an arbitrator. He submits that the interpretation of these documents (dated 3.10.1994 and 14.2.1995) by the learned arbitrator cannot be said to be an implausible interpretation. The same cannot be interfered with in these proceedings merely because the Court may be of the view that another interpretation was equally possible.

19. Both parties have filed their respective written submissions and have also relied on them. Having considered the rival submissions of the parties and in view of the facts disclosed above, I am of the view that there is no merit in the objections raised by the petitioner to the impugned award on the ground that the claims of the respondent were barred by limitation.

20. Section 37(3) of the old Act and Section 43(2) of the new Act substantially provide that an arbitration shall be deemed to have commenced on the date request for the disputes to be referred to arbitration is received by the respondent. In this case the learned Arbitrator has found, as a matter of fact, that the claims pertained to the period 1992-93. This is also evident from the aforesaid narration of facts which is also not disputed. The learned Arbitrator has further found that the respondent had issued two notices to invoke arbitration, the first on 03.10.1994 and the second on 14.02.1995. The limitation for invoking arbitration was three years from the date of accrual of the cause of action, which as aforesaid, accrued in the years 1992-93. Consequently, the invocation of arbitration on 3.10.94 or at the latest on 14.2.1995 was well within the period of limitation by virtue of Sections 37(3) of the old Act or Section 43(2) of the new Act. The arbitration was deemed to have commenced upon the receipt of the aforesaid notice(s) by the petitioner.

23. Consequently, in my view Article 137 of the Limitation Act is of no relevance in the facts of this case. At best, what could be said is that on the expiry of the period of three years from the date of invocation of arbitration i.e. 3.10.1994/14.2.1995, the remedy of the respondent to approach the Court to seek the appointment of the Arbitrator got barred by limitation. However, the respondents‟ right to get its disputes with the petitioner resolved through arbitration did not get extinguished and the arbitration agreement, though not enforceable through a judicial process, continued to subsist. Consequently, if an Arbitrator was appointed by the petitioner (even after the expiry of the period of limitation within which the respondent could enforce the arbitration agreement by approaching the Court under Section 8 of the old Act or Section 11 of the new Act), it cannot be said that the appointment of the arbitrator is illegal or that the claim of the respondent preferred before the Arbitrator, so appointed by the petitioner, was barred by limitation. I may refer to the following extract from J.C. Budhraja v. Orissa Mining Corpn. Ltd. (supra) at this stage: