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Enclosure : Statement of allegations is on the reverse.

8. Sri Lodha has vehemently urged that in Para. 2 of the chargesheet the S.C.O.G. preferred to delete certain penalties which were typed out in the first instance. Those penalties are:

(1) dismissal, (2) compulsory retirement, (3) reduction to lower post or to a lower stage in time-scale.

9. The striking of these penalties according to him, shows that the authority that had issued this chargesheet had prejudged the conduct of the petitioner before the enquiry was actually launched. This prejudging of a man, according to Sri Lodha, vitiated the entire enquiry as the person, who had been prejudged by a competent authority empowered to impose penalty on the petitioner loses all enthusiasm in fighting his case before the enquiry officer which may result in gross injustice to him. He also urged that the framing of a charge in such a manner shows that the conduct of the delinquent officer was prejudged by the disciplinary authority and such a chargesheet, therefore, was not in consonance with the provisions of Article 311 of the Constitution which provides certain safe grounds to the Government servant, Sri Lodha's contention is that in accordance with the provisions of Article 311(2) of the Constitution the disciplinary authority cannot form any opinion about the punishment to be inflicted to the delinquent officer before the conclusion of the enquiry and, therefore, the chargesheet on the basis of which the enquiry into the alleged charges is initiated should not mention the proposed punishment. According to Sri Lodha such a mention of punishment in the first notice is a clear violation of the guarantee embodied in Article 311(2) of the Constitution. In support of this contention reliance has been placed on S. Manickam v. Superintendent of Police, Nilgiris, and Ors. 1963-II L.L.J. 62 and certain observations of the Supreme Court in Khem Chand v. Union of India and Ors. 1969-I L.L.J. 167.

10. Sri Bhargava, on the other hand, pointed out that the Discipline and Appeal Rules prescribe a form for the issue of a chargesheet in which all these penalties, which the authority can impose on a delinquent officer, have been mentioned. His argument is that the chargesheet Ex. 1 was issued by the S.C.O.G. on the said prescribed form and if by mistake certain penalties printed in that form were not struck off before issuing the chargesheet it cannot be said that the S.C.O.G. had prejudged the conduct of the petitioner. As for striking out only certain penalties in Para. 2 of the chargesheet, his contention in the alternative was that by striking these penalties the issuing authority simply wanted to indicate to the petitioner that the procedure that the enquiry officer may adopt at the enquiry shall be in accordance with the procedure prescribed by Rule 1712 of the Discipline and Appeal Rules which relates to the infliction of the major penalties. Sri Bhargava further urged that in this particular case as the petitioner could be punished by imposing major penalties the issuing authority did not strike off the penalty of removal in the chargesheet as that would have been the maximum penalty that could be imposed on the petitioner in the circumstances of the case. It was also urged that in spite of this chargesheet, the S.C.O.G. ultimately thought it desirable to punish the petitioner by imposing a penalty of stopping his two increments and, therefore, in these circumstances it is difficult to say that the S.C.O.G. had prejudged the conduct of the petitioner and the proposed penalty for the alleged charges before making any inquiry into them.

14. It cannot be denied that in the present case the chargesheet did contain the proposed penalties, but it does not necessarily mean that the S.C.O.G. who had issued that chargesheet had prejudged the conduct of the petitioner. This fact that the S.C.O.G. after enquiry awarded a minor penalty to the petitioner of stopping two increments itself negatives this argument of Sri Lodha that his client's matter was prejudged by the punishing authority. It is not the grievance of the petitioner that a second notice about the proposed penalty was not served on him. In such circumstances, the argument of Sri Bhargava that the chargesheet was given on a prescribed form that mentions all the penalties prescribed under the rules and they were not properly struck off before it was served on the petitioner appears to be quite sound. It may also be mentioned here that Sri Lodha could not point out before the Court as to how his client was prejudiced by this chargesheet which mentioned certain penalties which tinder the rules could be imposed on the petitioner if he were found guilty of the charges mentioned therein. The General Manager while exercising his power of review after a second enquiry served the petitioner with a second notice to show cause why the proposed penalty of removal may not be imposed on him and the petitioner availed this opportunity to explain his conduct. In these circumstances, it is difficult to hold that the cause of the petitioner was in any manner prejudiced by the chargesheet Ex. 1.

15. In S. Manickam v. Superintendent of Police, Nilgiris, and Ors. 1963-II L.L.J. 62 (vide supra), the chargesheet contained the proposed penalty and the officer was asked to show cause why he should not be dismissed. In the opinion of the learned Judge this defect was of such a nature that vitiated the enquiry as, according to him, the mentioning of the penalties in the chargesheet necessarily leads to an inference that it was a case of prejudging the conduct of the petitioner. With all respect, I regret. I cannot agree with the finding recorded by the learned Judge. The judgment is so short that it is difficult for me to know whether In that case second notice was issued to the petitioner or not. Secondly, the learned Judge was of opinion that the chargesheet was not in consonance with the provisions of Article 311. I have already mentioned the scope of Article 311 in this judgment. If the second opportunity was afforded to the delinquent officer to establish his innocence under the requirements of Article 311 of the Constitution, then the defect of mentioning the penalties in the chargesheet becomes meaningless and in such circumstances it is difficult to say that the case of the officer was prejudged by the disciplinary authority.