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5. As far as the facts are concerned, the learned Advocate Mr. Khandare for the petitioners submits that there was enough material before the Enquiry Officer to prove the charges No. 3, 5, 6 and 7. There was no perversity or arbitrariness. The charge regarding conviction for the offence punishable under Section 117 read with 110 of the Maharashtra Police Act, was sufficient to dismiss the respondent No. 1 being an offence of the kind contemplated under Rule 42 (g) and WP10611.18 42 (p) of the Maharashtra Non-Agricultural Universities and Affiliated Colleges Standard Code (Terms and Conditions of Service of Non- Teaching Employees) Rules, 1984, (hereinafter the Standard Code). Similarly, continuous absence for more than two years was also a serious charge and demonstrated his negligence in discharging the duty as contemplated under Rule 42 (i). Such continuous absence was duly proved. Cumulative effect of proof regarding the major charges of conviction in a criminal case coupled with continuous absence from duty are sufficient and justified imposition of a major penalty of dismissal. By no stretch of imagination, it can be said that the punishment imposed was grossly disproportionate so as to enable the Tribunal to cause any interference in exercise of the judicial power. He would therefore, submit that giving a complete go-bye to the settled principles, the Tribunal by the impugned judgment and order, has injudiciously replaced the punishment of dismissal and has imposed a lesser punishment. The Tribunal has, therefore, exercised the discretion and judicial power injudiciously. This Court should intervene under writ jurisdiction.

11. As far as Charge No. 5 is concerned, obviously it was duly proved since the respondent No. 1 was convicted. But it is to be borne in mind that he was held guilty for breach of Rule 42 (g) of the Standard Code which requires conviction in respect of an offence involving moral turpitude. Considering the fact that the ingredients of the offence did not contain anything about misbehavior under the influence of liquor and as there was medical examination report of respondent No. 1 to the effect that he had not consumed alcohol, it was indeed incorrect and illegal to hold the Charge to have been proved under Rule 42 (g) of the Standard Code.

117. Penalties for offenders under Sections 99 to 116 Any person who contravenes any of the provisions of sections 99 to 116 (both inclusive) shall, on conviction, be punished with fine which may extend to [twelve hundred rupees]."

13. It is in view of the trifle nature of this offence coupled with the fact that the respondent No. 1 was not found to be intoxicated during the said incident, it was indeed a case of no evidence rather than some evidence. The Tribunal in my considered view was clearly within its jurisdiction and power to make such observations by appreciating the material in concluding that though there was a conviction, it was not for an offence involving moral turpitude as is required by Rule 42 (g) of the Standard Code.