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11. In order to appreciate the evidence of dying declarations, it would be convenient to take the second dying declaration first for consideration. It is at Ex. 14 recorded by Deputy Mamlatdar, Shantilal Bhanubhai, P.W. 6. The police had sent yadi Ex. 15 to Executive Magistrate for recording the dying declaration. With the yadi, the Deputy Mamlatdar came and he ascertained from the doctor whether the patient was conscious or not and got made his endorsement below yadi Ex. 15 that the patient was conscious at 14-45 hours on 30-10-1982. He asked the relatives of the patient and the doctor to go out and thereafter he asked Dahyabhai as to what had happened and as Dahyabhai went on speaking, he had taken down his statement and below the statement, he obtained thumb impression of Dahyabhai because Dahyabhai was not in a position to sign as he was being administered glucose celline. In the cross examination, he has stated that during his service of six years as Deputy Mamlatdar, he has recorded several dying declarations and that he had been given necessary authority for the same and he had gone to record the dying declaration on behalf of the Executive Magistrate, as the Executive Magistrate had sent him for the purpose, He had not received any written instructions, but he was given the yadi by the Executive Magistrate. The cross examiner has not challenged the statement that he has recorded several dying declarations and has been given necessary authority for the same. Since there was no such challenge, it is clear that the cross examiner was satisfied about the authorisation of the Deputy Mamlatdar for the purpose of recording dying declaration. Even if it is assumed that he had no authority, the fact remains that the deceased did make the dying declaration and the Deputy Mamlatdar recorded such dying declaration. Section 32 of the Evidence Act does not require that a dying declaration must be recorded by the Executive Magistrate only. In fact, there is no requirement that dying declaration should be recorded by Executive Magistrate only. The dying declaration can be recorded by anyone even by the police or any other person and the probative value of such dying declaration will vary in the circumstances of each case. Dying declaration recorded by an Executive Magistrate may have greater probative value, but that does not mean that the dying declaration recorded by any other person has necessarily less probity. Just as Executive Magistrate is likely to be an independent person not connected with the complainant or the assailant's side, his recording of dying declaration would be more reliable, and so is the case when the dying declaration is recorded by any other independent officer. This witness has recorded several dying declaration in the past and there is no doubt whatsoever that be is an independent witness.

20. In the case of Mohar Singh and Ors. v. State of Punjab , the dying declaration was recorded by the investigating police officer and the Supreme Court observed that the deceased had given very detailed and graphic narration of the case starting from the enmity and the minutest picture of assault and the Supreme Court found that it was impossible to believe that the deceased even if conscious would make such a detailed statement having regard to the injuries on him. Moreover, the dying declaration was recorded by the investigating officer and it was not attested by the wife of the deceased who was also stated to be available and, therefore, the Supreme Court held that such dying declaration has to be excluded from consideration. In the present case, the second dying declaration before the Deputy Mamlatdar is not a detailed one. It is a very short one showing as to who had assaulted Dahyabhai.

21. In the case of Tehal Singh and Ors. v. State of Punjab , the Supreme Court held that dying declaration need not have been made in expectation of death and such dying declaration, may in certain situation, be very detailed and it may in a given case, arouse suspicion, but it cannot necessarily lead to the inference that the statement is a fabricated one. In that case, the dying declaration was recorded by a Head Constable and he had recorded it in his own way what the deceased had stated. Even then the Supreme Court held that no infirmity could be attached to that dying declaration on this account. Under Section 32(1) of the Evidence Act, a declaration of a person not surviving is admissible as dying declaration and it is not necessary to have been made in expectation of death. That statement of the person may be a detailed one. However, when it is made in expectation of death, in such a case, it would be only natural that it is very brief and not detailed one. In the present case, the first dying declaration Ex. 4 is made before the police officer in the form of FIR and it is a detailed one. The second dying declaration recorded by the Deputy Mamlatdar is a short one. Both of them are recorded on the same day and there would be more credence to one recorded by the Deputy Mamlatdar who is an independent officer and statement before him is more natural and reliable.

25. In the case of Rabi Chandra Padhan and Ors. v. State of Orissa , in a para 7, the Supreme Court observed as follows:

It is well settled by a catena of decisions of this Court that if after searching scruting the Court is satisfied that the dying declaration represents a truthful version of the occurrence in which the deceased received injuries which led to his death then even in the absence of any independent corroboration, a conviction can be founded thereon.
In that case, dying declaration Ex. 9 was fairly detailed one and in that dying declaration, deceased had named original accused Nos. 2 to 8 as his assailants. In the second dying declaration before the Tahsildar, it was a short cryptic statement. It was not in the question and answer form and in fact there was no proper questioning and accused Nos. 2 to 7 were mentioned by the deceased as his assailants and the name of accused No. 8 was omitted and the Supreme Court observed that the deceased in a later dying declaration implicated more persons as his assailants than on the earlier occasion when his memory must by quite fresh, the Court is put to caution that the deceased may have been prompted to implicate some innocent persons or is drawing on his imagination or is using the occasion to wreak vengeance on some persons. But the case before the Supreme Court (as before us) was reverse to this. In the second dying declaration, he did not refer to the presence of accused No. 8 and the Supreme Court observed that such a situation cannot be put on par with one that was before the Supreme Court in Thurukanni Powpuah's case . In the present case before us, second dying declaration is in no way an improvement on the earlier dying declaration and there is no reason to belive that someone had tutored the deceased before his second dying declaration was recorded.