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6. Before we turn to the more detailed consideration of Section 171 of the Indian Companies Act, it may also be noted that the particular arrears of income-tax, which the appellant has endeavoured to collect through the machinery of Section 46 of the Income-tax Act, do not come within the prescribed class of taxes for which the Crown can claim even the limited priority given by Section 230 of the Indian Companies Act. Having regard to the delay in assessment, these arrears were not due from the company at the date of the winding up order. In respect of them the Crown ranks as an ordinary unsecured creditor. None the less, the appellant claims not only that the appellant is free to exercise in this case the machinery of Section 46 of the Income-tax Act, but that also the appellant is free to collect these arrears in full without any obligation to account to the Liquidators or to bring into Court any excess above what the appellant might receive if a claim as an unsecured creditor had been made. It appears that, excepting the power of the Court under Section 171 to impose a condition at the time of granting leave, there is no machinery or provision in the Act to compel the appellant to account for or bring into Court any such excess. Accordingly, this claim to exercise the machinery of Section 46, if successful, would in effect enable the Crown to secure for the arrears set out above, the very priority to which both in England and India the Crown has been held not entitled.

7. Hitherto, though it may be that attempts have been made to collect arrears of income-tax due from a company in liquidation through the machinery of Section 46 of the Income-tax Act, the Income-tax authorities have, upon objection being taken by the Liquidators, submitted to prove their claim in the liquidation like any other creditor. Cf. Governor-General in Council through the Commissioner of Income-tax, Punjab, v. Sargodha Trading Company Limited, (In Liquidation) above referred to. This they are now not prepared to do and the appellant presses for the sanction of the Court to be given to the right to exercise the machinery of Section 46 of the Income-tax Act in respect of arrears of income-tax due from a company in liquidation uncontrolled by the Court in which the company is being wound up.

14. As regards (a), there was much discussion before us in this case, as there had been in other cases, whether a matter concerning an act ordered or done in the collection of the revenue would not also be included in a matter concerning the revenue, or whether it would not be something additional to or different from a matter concerning the revenue. In Dewarkhand Cement Co., Ltd. v. Secretary of State [1939] Bom. 320: S.C. 41 Bom. L.R. 297 the learned Judge (Rangnekar J.) basing himself on an observation in the judgment delivered by Lord Phillimore in Alcock, Ashdown and Co. v. Chief Revenue Authority, Bombay (1923) L.R. 50 I.A. 227: S.C. 25 Bom. L.R. 940 came to the conclusion that two different ideas are expressed in the respective parts of the section; the first refers to the preliminary proceedings taken for the purpose of determining the amount of the revenue in any case, and the second to the machinery to enforce payment of the revenue so determined. Another view suggested in the course of the hearing before us was that all claims directly in respect of revenue by or against the Crown would be matters concerning the revenue, whereas claims against individual officials in respect of acts ordered or done in the collection of the revenue might not be included in matters concerning the revenue and that accordingly the later words had to be added for the protection of officials and to prevent indirect attacks upon the revenue. It is not, in our judgment, necessary to come to any final conclusion on these views. On the facts of this case, we are satisfied that by reason of the makiing out and forwarding to the Collector of a certificate in the form and manner prescribed by Section 46(2) of the Income-tax Act, thereby putting into operation the machinery of Section 46 for the collection of the arrears of income-tax in question as arrears of land revenue, an act was done in the collection of the revenue, and in granting the injunction in this case the High Court was exercising original jurisdiction in a matter concerning an act done in the collection of the revenue.

17. If accordingly we are of opinion that the certificate prescribed by Section 46(2) was-made out and forwarded to the Collector under that sub-section by officials bona fide and not absurdly believing that the machinery under Section 46 was legally proper and available for the collection of the arrears of income-tax in question due from the respondent Company, we must conclude that Section 226(1) applies to this case, and that in granting the injunction appealed against the High Court was purporting to exercise original jurisdiction concerning an act ordered or done in the collection of the revenue bona fide and not absurdly believed to be according to the law for the time being in force, and that by reason of Section 226(1) and the decision in Richard Spooner v. Juddow, the High Court had no jurisdiction in the matter, and their order was ultra vires and void.