Document Fragment View

Matching Fragments

7. Mr. Roy, the learned Advocate-General, appearing on behalf of the respondents in one of the Rules, at the very outset, has raised a pure question of law as regards the maintainability of the Rule against his clients. Mr. Roy submits that even if all the allegations contained in our order dated January 15, 2007 are taken to be true, those facts do not constitute any criminal contempt within the meaning of Section 2(c) of the Contempt of Court Act, 1971 (hereinafter referred to as the Act). According to Mr. Roy, in order to constitute criminal contempt within the meaning of the Act, there must be some positive "act" on the part of the contemner. Mr. Roy contends that mere inaction on the part of his clients in not taking step facilitating the entry of the Judges in the Court building cannot be described, by itself, as an act of criminal contempt within the meaning of the Act. Mr. Roy submits that even if it is assumed for the sake of argument that his clients remained as "silent spectators" and did not take any action against the agitators, such fact cannot be a ground for issuing a Rule for criminal contempt against his clients although if those allegations are correct, those can justify other penal actions against his clients in accordance with the law of the land. Mr. Roy further submits that "aiding or abetting" the acts of the other respondents cannot amount to criminal contempt within the meaning of the Act. Mr. Roy in this connection strongly relies upon the definition of criminal contempt provided in Section 2(c) of the Act and submits that the said definition not being an inclusive one but having been started with the word "means," the meaning of the definition cannot be extended by addition of any words or idea. In support of such contention, Mr. Roy relies upon the following decisions:

12. For the purpose of dealing with the preliminary objection raised by the learned Advocate-General, we shall presume all the allegations made in our order dated January 15, 2007 to be true and we shall decide whether such allegation, if found to be true, constitutes commission of criminal contempt on the part of Mr. Roy's clients.

13. It is true that the definition of criminal contempt given in Section 2(c) of the Act starts with the word "means" and the general rule of interpretation in such a case as pointed out by the Supreme Court in the cases referred to by Mr. Roy is that ordinarily, the word or phrase used or defined in a statute must be taken to have been used in its ordinary sense and only in case of vagueness or ambiguity, occasion would arise for interpreting such definition so as to add something to the statutory language. However, the Supreme Court had the occasion to consider the effect of the word "criminal contempt" as used in Section 2(c) of the Act in the case of Delhi Judicial Service Association v. State of Gujarat where the Apex Court in paragraph A2 of the judgment made the following observations:

What constitutes contempt of Court? The common law definition of contempt of Court is : 'An act or omission calculated to interfere with the due Administration of Justice.' (Bowen LJ in Helmore v. Smith (1886) 35 Ch D 449 at 455). The contempt of Court as defined by then Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 includes civil and criminal contempt. Criminal contempt as defined by the Act : Means the publication whether by words spoken or written, or by signs, or by visible representations, or otherwise of any matter or the doing of any other act whatsoever which scandalises or tends to scandalize, or lowers or tends to lower the authority of any Court, or prejudices, or interferes or tends to interfere with, the due course of any judicial proceeding; or interferes, or tends to interfere with, or obstructs or tends to obstruct, the Administration of Justice in any other manner. The definition of criminal contempt is wide enough to include any act by a person which would tend to interfere with the Administration of Justice or which would lower the authority of Court. The public have a vital stake in effective and orderly administration of justice. The Court has the duty of protecting the interest of the community in the due administration of justice and, so, it is entrusted with the power to commit for contempt of Court, not to protect the dignity of the Court against insult or injury, but to protect and vindicate the right of the public so that the administration of justice is not perverted, prejudiced, obstructed or interfered with. "It is a mode of vindicating the majesty of law, in its active manifestation against obstruction and outrage." (Frank Furter, J. in Offutt v. I.J.S. (1954) 348 US 11). The object and purpose of punishing contempt for interference with the administration of justice is not to safeguard or protect the dignity of the Judge or the Magistrate, but the purpose is to preserve the authority of the Courts to ensure an ordered life in society. In Attorney-General v. Times Newspapers (1974) AC 273 at p. 302, the necessity for the law of contempt was summarised by Lord Morris as ;
22. In our view, the said decision cannot have any application to the facts of the present case, first, for the reason that in the said case, the learned Judge was dealing with the civil contempt as defined in Section 2(b) of the Act and accordingly, had no occasion to consider the effect of the definition of the criminal contempt within the meaning of the Section 2(c) of the Act; secondly, in the case before us, the four Government officials wilfully and deliberately, refused to, take any action for preventing interference with administration of justice in spite of full knowledge of the commission of cognizable offences with the object of helping the agitators to accomplish their unlawful object and thirdly, after the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Delhi Judicial Service Association (1991 Cri LJ 3086) (supra), wilful refusal to perform the duty cast upon a Government officer by the statutes thereby indulging in impediment in the process of due administration of justice definitely comes within scope of criminal contempt particularly when specific complaint had been made either by the District Judge or the Chief Justice. In this connection, it will be appropriate to refer to the following observation of the Supreme Court in the case of Delhi Judicial Service Association (supra), where the Supreme Court specifically held that if a person without participating abated commission of an act of contempt the same would amount to contempt itself: