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36. Though the rules closely associated with the traditional concept of natural justice may not have been breached in this case, the contention of the appellant that the process of decision-making stands vitiated for lack of procedural fairness has to be examined given the nature of challenge raised.

37. Memory refreshed; we now proceed to examine whether the appellant has set up any case for interference.

38. The second and the fourth charges levelled against the appellant that he had proceeded on leave without sanction thereof and in not complying with the orders of his superior officers seem to be the most vital charges. Undoubtedly, no public servant can claim leave as a matter of right. Leave is a matter regulated by rules and such rules need to be duly adhered to by each public servant. While there can be no quarrel on this aspect, we have not found any such circumstance from the record to afford ground for holding that the appellant did commit a serious misconduct. In order to establish that the appellant had committed a serious misconduct by proceeding on leave without leave being sanctioned (leave cancelled as per PW-1), the prosecution endeavoured to prove that the Civil Surgeon had refused to sanction leave, prayed by the appellant, and that he was telephonically informed by the Senior Assistant of such refusal. That the appellant had visited the office of the Civil Surgeon, remained there from 3.00 pm to 5.00 pm and submitted his application for leave which was duly acknowledged, have not been disputed by the prosecution. Interestingly, the Inquiry Officer while exonerating the appellant of the second part of the third charge reasoned that neither the Senior Assistant had been produced in the inquiry as a witness nor were call details produced, and what PW-1 said is mere hearsay; hence, in the absence of proof, that part of the charge is not proved. This was a valid reason assigned by the Inquiry Officer, which the Disciplinary Authority even accepted. On the same analogy and for the same reason, the appellant could not have been held guilty in respect of the second charge. There is no record of the Civil Surgeon’s refusal to sanction leave being communicated to the appellant either. In such view of the matter, we have no hesitation to hold that there was no legal evidence based whereon the appellant could have been held guilty of the second and fourth charges.