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The appellant, Sri S. Govinda Menon is a member of the Indian Administrative Service. He was the First. Member of the Board of Revenue, Kerala State and was holding the post of Commissioner of Hindu Religious and Charitable Endowments. On the basis of certain petitions containing allegations of misconduct against the appellant in the discharge of his duties as Commissioner the Kerala Government instituted certain preliminary enquiries and thereafter started disciplinary proceedings against the appellant and also placed him under suspension under rule 7 of the All India Services (Discipline and Appeal) Rules, 1955, hereinafter called the 'Rules'. A copy of the charges together with a statement of certain allegations was served on the appellant who thereafter filed a written statement of defence. After perusing the written statement the Government passed orders that his explanation was unacceptable and that the charges should be enquired into by an Enquiry Officer to be appointed under rule 5 of the Rules. Accordingly Sri T. N. S. Raghavan a retired I.C.S. Officer was appointed to hold the inquiry. The appellant then filed the present writ petition before the High Court of' Kerala praying for grant of a writ of certiorari to quash the proceedings initiated against, him and for a writ of mandwmus calling upon. respondent No. 2, State of Kerala, to allow him to function as the. First Member of the Board of Revenue. As no application for stay was made and as no order of stay Was passed by the High Court Sri T. N. S. Raghavan proceeded with the inquiry and submitted his report to the Union Government finding the appellant guilty of charges 1 to 4 and 9. The union of India, after consideration of the report, issued a 'Show Cause Notice' Ex. P-9. The appellant thereafter filed an application before the High Court for amendment of the writ petition. The prayer in this amended petition was for the issue of a writ of prohibition restraining the first respondent Union of India-from proceeding further in pursuance of the 'Show Cause Notice' and also for quashing the same. The application for amendment was allowed by the High Court. The main contention of the appellant was that the proceedings initiated against him were entirely without jurisdiction as no disciplinary proceedings could be taken against him for acts and omissions with regard to his work as Commissioner under the Madras Hindu Religious and Charitable Endowments Act, 1951 (Madras Act XIX of 1951), hereinafter called the 'Act' and that the orders made by him being of quasi-judicial character can be impugned only in appropriate proceedings taken under that Act. After hearing the arguments advanced on both sides, Mathew, J. rejected the objections raised by the appellant regarding want of jurisdiction and held that the, respondents had power to proceed with the inquiry into the charges. S. Velu Pillai, J. on the other hand, took the view that quasi judicial decisions became final and conclusive if they were not set aside or modified in the manner prescribed by the statute and if the decisions are not so challenged, their correctness or legality must be taken to be conclusive, and such quasi judicial decisions cannot form the subject-matter of charges in disciplinary proceedings against the appellant. Velu Pillai, J. held that the Union Government had therefore no jurisdiction to proceed with the inquiry on the first part of charge 1, charge 2, the first part of charge 3 and charge 4, but the Union Government had jurisdiction to proceed with the inquiry with regard to the second part of charge No. 1, the second part of charge No. 3 and charge No. 9. In view of this difference of opinion the matter was placed before Govinda Menon, J. who agreed with the view taken by Mathew, J. and in the result the writ petition of the appellant was dismissed.

(2) 59 CL.R. 369.

(2) The penalty of dismissal, removal or compulsory retirement shall not be imposed on a member of the Service except by an order of the Central Government.

It is not disputed that the appropriate Government has power to, take disciplinary proceedings against the appellant and that he could be removed from service by an order of the Central Government, but it was contended that I.A.S. Officers are governed by statutory rules, that 'any act or omission' referred to in rule 4(1) relates only to an act or omission of an officer when serving under the Government, and that "serving under the Government" means subject to ,the administrative control of the Government and that disciplinary proceedings should be, therefore, on the basis of the relationship of master and servant. It was argued that in exercising statutory powers the Commissioner was not subject to the administrative control of the Government and disciplinary proceedings cannot, therefore, be instituted against the appellant in respect of an act or omission committed by him in the course of his employment as Commissioner. We are unable to accept the proposition contended for by the appellant as correct. Rule 4(1) does not impose any limitation or qualification as to the nature of the act or omission in respect of which disciplinary proceedings can be instituted. Rule 4(1)(b) merely says that the appropriate Government competent to institute disciplinary proceedings against a member of the Service would be the Government under whom such member was serving at the time of the commission of such act or omission. It does not say that the act or omission must have been committed in the discharge of his duty or in the course of his employment as a Government servant. It is therefore open to the Government to take disciplinary proceedings against the appellant in respect of his acts or omissions which cast a reflection upon his reputation for integrity or good faith or devotion to duty as a member of the Service. It is not disputed that the appellant was, at the time of' the alleged misconduct, employed as the First Member of the Board of Revenue and he was at the same time performing the duties of Commissioner under the Act in addition to his duties as the First Member of the Board of Revenue. In our opinion, it is not necessary that a member of the Service should have committed the alleged act or omission in the course of discharge of his duties as a servant of the Government in order that it may form the subject-matter of disciplinary proceedings. In other words, if the act or omission is such as to reflect on the reputation of the officer for his integrity or good faith or devotion to duty, there is no reason why disciplinary proceedings should not be taken against him for that act or omission even though the act or omission relates to an activity in regard to which there is no actual master and servant relationship. To put it differently, the test is not whether the act or omission was committed by the appellant in the course of the discharge of his duties as servant of the Government; The -test is whether the act or omission has some reasonable connection with the nature and condition of his service or whether the act or omission has cast any reflection upon the reputation of the member of the Service for .integrity or devotion to duty as a public servant. We are of the opinion that even if the appellant was not subject to the administrative control of the Government when he was functioning as Commissioner under the Act and was not the servant of the Government subject to its orders at the relevant time, his act or omission as Commissioner could form the subject-matter of disciplinary proceedings provided the act or omission would reflect upon his reputation for integrity or devotion to duty as a member of the Service. ,In this context reference may be made to the following observations ,of Lopes, L. J. in Pearce v. Foster(1) :

"If a servant conducts himself in a way inconsistent with the faithful discharge of hip duty in the service, it is misconduct which justifies immediate dismissal. That misconduct, according to my view, need not be misconduct in the carrying on of the service or the business. It is sufficient if it is conduct which is prejudicial or is likely to be prejudicial to the interests or to the reputation of the master, and the master will be justified, not only if he discovers it at the time but also if he discovers it afterwards, in dismissing that servant."

It is apparent that the first part of charge No.1 read with the relevant allegations is that in utter disregard of the provisions of s. 29 of the Act and the Rules and without being satisfied that the leases were beneficial to the Devaswoms the appellant sanctioned them and this action of the appellant discloses misconduct, irregularity and gross recklessness in the discharge of his official duties. The charge is therefore one of misconduct and recklessness disclosed by the utter disregard of the relevant provisions of s. 29 and the Rules thereunder in sanctioning the leases. On behalf of the respondents it was argued both by Mr. Sarjoo Prasad and Mr. Bindra that the Commissioner was not discharging quasi-judicial functions in sanctioning leases under s. 29 of the Act, but we shall proceed on the assumption that the Commissioner was performing quasi- judicial functions in granting leases under s. 29 of the Act. Even upon that assumption we are satisfied that the Government was entitled to institute disciplinary proceedings if there was prima facie material for showing recklessness or misconduct on the part of the appellant in the discharge of his official duty. It is true that if the provisions of s. 29 of the Act or the Rules are disregarded the order of the Commissioner is illegal and such an order could be questioned in appeal under s. 29(4) or in revision under s. 99 of the Act. But in the present proceedings what is sought to be challenged is not the correctness or the legality of the decision of the Commissioner but the conduct of the appellant in the discharge of his duties as Commissioner. The appellant was proceeded against because in the discharge of his functions he acted in utter disregard of the provisions of the Act and the Rules. It is the manner in which he discharged his functions that is brought up in these proceedings. In other words, the charge and the allegations are to the effect that in exercising his powers as Commissioner the appellant acted in abuse of his power and it was in regard to such misconduct that he is being proceeded against. It is manifest therefore that though, the propriety and legality of the sanction to the leases may be questioned in appeal or revision under the Act, the Government is not precluded from taking disciplinary action if there is proof that the Commissioner had acted in gross recklessness in the discharge of his duties or that he failed to act honestly or in good faith or that he omitted to observe the prescribed conditions which are essential for the exercise of the statutory power. We see no reason why the Government cannot do so for the purpose of showing that the Commissioner acted in utter disregard of the conditions prescribed for the exercise of his power or that he was guilty of misconduct or gross negligence. We are accordingly of the opinion that the appellant has been unable to make good his argument on this aspect of the case. We pass on to consider the next contention of the appellant that the first part of charge No.1 is not sustainable because the only rules said to have been violated was the rule regarding auction. It was argued that the rule regarding auction did not apply to long-term leases falling within the scope of s. 29(1) of the Act and the first part of charge No.1 was therefore not sustainable. We are unable to accept this argument as correct. The statement of allegations in respect of charge No.1 sets out the provisions of s. 29 of the Act, the rules made under cls.