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10. While considering such assertions, the Court has to remember that privilege is not a universal defence available in matters of defamation, but is a mere specie. Certain central questions for judicial consederation should initially be raised before privilege is made available to the defence. What was the occasion and how the parties were positioned to it ? Was the occasion such that which, in furtherance of public policy and convenience, should receive judicial protection by reason of necessity to safeguard its free and unaffected identity? In other words, what is the impact of the character of the occasion upon the matters that caused the injury? Lastly, would the necessities of public policy not be satisfied by extending qualified privilege Once these questions are satisfactorily appreciated and applied to the given set of facts, the operative field of privilege would become clear. If occasions were such that they required total protection, absolute privilege would be available, but in other cases, depending upon the facts, the field would be covered by qualified privilege. In the former, notwithstanding malice, the action would not succeed, but in the latter, if malice is evident or established, damages would be decreed against the defendant.

14. The residuary field of privilege which has also the basis of public policy and public convenience is governed by qualified privilege. That too has clear relevance to the occasion and is not a mere matter of arbitrary whim or choice of the person making the allegations. Occasions should be such where such qualified privilege is being claimed on the ground of public policy and convenience. Once the occasions are established, qualified privilege will extend to the statements which are per se defamatory and which are in fact untrue, but would be protected from the legal liability in torts. (See Watson v. M'Ewan, 1905 AC 480; Beresford v. White, (1914) 30 TLR 591, Watt v. Longsdon, (1930) 1 KB 130; and Lincoln v. Daniels, (1962) 1 QB 237). Upon such occasions, the person is permitted to state what he believes to be true, provided the statements are made honestly without any indirect or improper motive. The rule in this regard is based on general welfare of the society and is only available on the ground of public policy, provided the honesty of the maker of the defamatory statement is not in doubt. No doubt, reports of crime upon successful investigation lead to initiation of judicial proceedings, but from that it cannot be said that in all matters, complaints lodged with the Police are necessarily a step in an intended judicial proceeding. For it is equally possible that no judicial proceeding may ensue upon such a complaint to the police, the same being false and imaginary. Such a complaint is to the non-judicial authority and would rule out the extension of absolute privilege. The matter would fall in the arena of qualified privilege ordinarily, unless cognizance is taken by the Court of such report. However, in appropriate case, a question may arise when, after such a complaint, the same is lodged with the Court and did form part judicial proceedings. But that would be governed by different considerations. For the purposes of the present appeal, it is enough to observe that the character of the statement made to the police even under the Code of Criminal Procedure, is not the one to which privilege can be extended. The position of the police officer is not one of official confidence, (see Hittu Bansi v. Sheolal Dinaji, AIR 1948 Nag 243; L. Subbayya v. Sub-Judge, Vijayawada (2); and Haji Ahmad v. State , nor the inquiry is either quasi-judicial or judicial. It is for all purposes investigatory by reason of the authority conferred by law upon the police to investigate into the same. Once that be the character of the police complaint, the matter is clear. Investigative proceedings do nor furnish occasions for claiming absolute privilege. This position of law has been but beyond doubt even in England by the decision in Lincoln v. Daniels, (1962) 1 QB 237. There the Court was concerned with a defamatory statement contained in the complaint to the Bar-Council which had no quasi-judicial or judicial authority and had at the most investigative authority. In that case, all the learned Lord Justices were of the view that only qualified privilege could be extended. Devlin, L. J., after considering the decisions of the English Courts, has observed:-

"The function of the Bar Council was to investigate the matter and take any action that they thought proper. The same sort of description would apply to a complaint made at a police station or to a letter addressed to the Director of Public Prosecutions. Such 'Statements in aid of justice' are said, in Gatley on Libel and Slander (5th ed., P. 210) to attract qualified privilege, and authority is cited for the proposition, though it does not appear that the question whether the privilege should be absolute or qualified has ever been specifically considered."

16. As far as this Court is concerned, in Maroti Sadashiv v. Godubai Narayanrao , absolute privilege was not extended to the statements made before the police officer in the course of investigation, following the earlier decision of the Division Bench of this Court in Gangappagouda v. Basayya,. AIR 1943 Bom 167. That also appears to be the position of the decision of the Patna High Court in Surendra Nath v. Bageshwari Pd. , where to the statement contained in the complaint to the Superintendent of Police qualified privilege was extended, and the decision in T. Ayyangar v. K.S.Ayyangar , which is the case concerned the petition to the Deputy Inspector General of Police, where the plea of absolute privilege was negatived. Further, as far as the cases of this Court are concerned, the doctrine of absolute and qualified privilege has been considered in Keshavlal v. Bai Girija, (1899) 1 Bom LR 478, by observing that the same would be determined by the occasion, the relations and duty arising therefrom between the parties and the manner and circumstances under which the communication ws made. In respect of qualified privilege, it is available when the occasion is lawful, and is limited by the necessities of the case, if good faith is proved, but not where the express malice or mala-fides are established. Narasimha Shankar v. Balvant Lakshman, (1903) 5 Bom LR 664, is distinguishable as the case of privilege extended to a report by Government officer to the superior officer. Similarly, qualified privilege was extended to the statements made to the superior officer, though those statements were such which were not intended to be made in a Court of Justice nor made as any step or at any stage of the judicial proceedings, in the case of Jusab Tharia v. G. S. Morrison . These decisions of this Court clearly go to show that absolute privilege is not available unless the occasion is clearly identified for extension of such absolute privilege. By reason of official duty or by reason of any other public duty if the occasion arises, then the matter may be governed by qualified privilege. Complaints or statements made to the police, which do not form part of any judicial proceedings and particularly when matters do not go to Court, would not thus be governed by absolute privilege. Maximum that can be made available is the qualified privilege.