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- no problems with the SIA ever occurred or were notified to Fittydent.

5. On the basis of the evidence submitted, the Sole Arbitrator is convinced that in any case Brawn did not pursue the SIA application in good faith as required by Austrian law and, hence, that the approval can be deemed to have been granted.

6. Regarding Respondent's initial application dated March 25, 1994 (Annex 2 to Respondent's submission dated April 6, 1998), Claimant has submitted a legal opinion according to which Brawn's plain paper application was incomplete (Claimant's Exhibit C35). Brawn's holding that the SIA approval was denied on the merits and that the requested information could be provided by applicants by other means than filling out the SIA form is not substantiated by Respondent. Weight regarding the incorrectness of Brawn's assertion is also given by the Sole Arbitrator to Brawn's failure to respond to Claimant's Request for Production of Documents dated February 9, 1999 concerning the SIA application and respective correspondence with the Indian authorities.

7. Regarding Brawn's alleged follow-up contacts with the SIA, Brawn's submissions likewise lack any sufficient specification. Under Austrian law, Brawn was bound to the obligation to secure governmental approval of the License Agreement until final rejection of the approval regardless of the duration of the proceedings. The Sole Arbitrator has no reason to conclude that such a final decision of the SIA on the merits with reference to the defectiveness of the know-how supplied by Fittydent or with reference to an invalid choice-of-law clause has been rendered by the SIA as alleged by Respondent.

8. According to the SIA form, as affirmed by the legal opinion submitted by Claimant (Claimant's Exhibit C36), only public interests but not defects of the know-how were considered relevant in SIA proceedings and an exception to the Indian choice-of -law requirement could have been obtained. The need for technology would have justified a departure from the standard conditions.

9. Further weight for the unfoundedness of Brawn's position is given by the Sole Arbitrator to the fact that Brawn also failed to respond to Claimant's second Request for Production of Documents dated April 23, 1999 concerning respective correspondence with the SIA. Brawn merely submitted a letter to the SIA dated August 17, 1998 (Annex B to Respondent's submission dated May 13, 1999) from which the Sole Arbitrator can only conclude that Brawn had either withdrawn its initial application for approval or its request to keep its application in abeyance, both of which would have violated the duty to pursue the application until final rejection in good faith.

10. In particular, Brawn's letter to the SIA dated June 28, 1994, in which Brawn requested the SIA to keep its request for approval of the License Agreement in abeyance (Annex A to Respondent's submission dated June 28, 1994), clearly contradicted Article 8.1 of the license Agreement according to which Brawn was to carry the risk of the suitability of the Products for the Indian market rather than Fittydent.

26. In my opinion, the view of the arbitral Tribunal is a plausible view and in any event, the same cannot be interfered with in proceedings filed under Section 48 of the Act, 1996.