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2. In these circumstances we are asked to hold that Section 43 of the Civil Procedure Code applies and that the plaintiff, having in his former suits omitted to sue in respect of the property now in question, is precluded from maintaining the present suit for partition of that property. Stated in the abstract, the question may be said to be whether one of two tenants in common, having sued for partition of part of the property so held by them, is at liberty to bring a separate suit for the remainder of the property. Now it is quit clear that, in applying Section 43 of the Code, it has first to be seen whether the cause of action alleged in the plaint is identical with the cause of action alleged in the former suit Pittapore Raja v. Suriya Rau I.L.R. 8 Mad. 520 Mussummat Chand Kour v. Partab Singh L.R. 15 I. A. 156 Moonshee Buzloor Ruheem v. Shumsoonnissa Begum 11 M.I.A. 551 at p. 605 and that by the term cause of action must be understood all the circumstances alleged by the plaintiff to exist which, if proved or admitted, will entitle him to the relief prayed for Mussummat Chand Kour v. Pariah Singh L.R. 15 I.A. 156 Read v. Brown L.R. 22 Q.B.D. 128. The class of cases to which Section 43 is intended to apply is indicated by the illustration. Where there has been an infringement of one right and one cause of action has arisen the plaintiff must make his whole claim once for all in one suit. For instance, a plaintiff, who complains of wrongful detention or misappropriation of his securities, cannot, after recovering the securities or some of them in one action, afterwards sue to recover the remainder, or damages for the detention of them Moonshee Buzloor Ruheem v. Shunsoonnissa Begum 11 M.I.A. 551 at p. 605 Serrao v. Noel L.R. 15 Q.B.D. 549. There being one single cause of action and the plaintiff having had "an opportunity in the former suit of recovering what he seeks to recover in the second, live former recovery is a bar to the latter action. " The rule of law embodied in Section 43 operates not to give the defendant a ground of exception to the first suit, but, by prohibiting a second suit, indirectly to compel the plaintiff to include big whole demand in the first suit. There are, however, cases in which the nature of the right is such that independently of Section 43, the plaintiff is prohibited from severing his claim. For example, a mortgagor cannot redeem part of the mortgaged property on payment of a proportionate part of the mortgage debt. It is the right of the mortgagee to retain the whole security for any part of the debt. If the mortgagor chose to relinquish a part of the mortgaged property and sought to recover the remainder on payment of the whole debt, the mortgagee would have no reason to complain and he would, under Section 43, have a complete answer to a second suit brought to recover the omitted part see Ukha v. Daga I.L.R. 7 Bom. 182. But it is another question whether, when a prayer for partial redemption has been granted or refused, the mortgagor can institute another suit. If the prayer were refused, that is, if the mortgagee insisted on his right to have the whole mortgage redeemed once for All. I conceive that the dismissal of the first suit would clearly be no bar to the institution of a second and properly-framed suit. The case of Kakaji Ranoji v. Bapuji Madhavrav 8 Bom. H.C.R. App. C.J. 205 is an authority, if any is needed, on this point. Would it make any difference if the prayer for partial redemption were granted, with the result that the mortgagee was allowed to remain in possession of part of the property as security for the unpaid portion of the debt? The difference is one not recognized in Section 43 and therefore if there is any distinction to be drawn the reason for it must be sought elsewhere. In the case above cited the plaintiff, a member of an undivided family, had first demanded a share of a particular portion of the family property. That suit had been dismissed on the ground that it was not properly framed. The plaintiff then sued to have the whole property brought together and divided. It was observed by MELVILL, J., with reference to the argument that this suit was barred by Section 7 of the Code of 1859, that "so far from these two being the same cause of action, they present all the difference which is expressed by saying that the one is a cause of action and the other is no cause of action." This observation, it appears to me, would have been none the less true if the first suit instead of being dismissed had been decreed in the plaintiff's favour. The cause of action as alleged in the plaint cannot be altered by the result of the suit. Nor can it possibly be held that a decree for partial redemption or partial partition estops the plaintiff from claiming redemption or partition of the rest of the property or from alleging that it is held by the defendant as mortgagee or tenant in common. If there is any estoppel in the matter, it is rather against the defendant than against the plaintiff. In the present case it appears to me that the right put forward in the former suits is different from that put forward in the present suit, and that therefore there is no identity of causes of action. The right on the part of a tenant in common to have each field separately divided between himself and his co-tenant is one thing: the right to claim a partition of all the fields held by them as tenants in common is another thing. There has no doubt been an adjudication as to certain parcels of land on the footing of an alleged right of the former sort. To hold that that circumstance prohibits a general suit for partition would lead to the remarkable conclusion that the tenancy in common in respect of the yet undivided lands must continue indissoluble except by consent of the parties or perhaps by suit instituted by the Nair. As far as the Zamorin is concerned, he must for ever be in the position of a tenant in common who has no right to partition. Similarly in the analogous case of mortgagor and mortgagee, the latter, it is supposed, may continue to bold part of the land under the mortgage, while the former is debarred from bringing any further action. In both cases the explanation is the same. It cannot be said that the causes of action are identical when the one plaint omits matters which the defendant is entitled to have included and the other is not open to that exception.