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4. Aggrieved by the said conviction and sentence, the revision petitioner preferred an appeal in Crl.A.NO. 41 of 1998 before the Sessions Judge who made over the same to the II Additional Sessions Judge (Fast Track Court), Medak at Sangareddy. The learned appellate Judge after due hearing found that the prosecution failed to prove the charge under Section 306 I.P.C. beyond reasonable doubt, but succeeded to prove the charge framed under Section 498-A I.P.C. Hence, the learned appellate Judge set aside the conviction recorded for the offence under Section 306 I.P.C. and confirmed the conviction recorded for the offence under Section 498-A I.P.C. The sentence of three years and payment of fine of Rs. 200/- for the offence punishable under Section 498-A I.P.C. was confirmed.

5. Aggrieved by the same, the present revision is filed by the revision petitioner contending that the Courts below erred in recording the conviction for the offence punishable under Section 498-A I.P.C. against the revision petitioner as the ingredients of the said offence are not made out by the prosecution. It is further pleaded that the Courts below erred in placing reliance on the highly interested and discrepant testimony of PWs.1 to 6 and that the lower court should have seen that PWs. 4, 5 and 8 did not support the case of the prosecution and that except the interested testimony of family members of deceased, there are no independent witnesses to speak about the alleged harassment. It is further pleaded that having acquitted the accused for an offence punishable under Section 306 I.P.C. the learned judge erred in convicting the revision petitioner for the offence punishable under Section 498- A I.P.C. and that at any rate the sentence is unduly severe.

13. As seen from the above said evidence, PW-3 is not a direct witness to the alleged harassment of the deceased by the accused either in respect of the demand for dowry or in respect of the second marriage with the sister of deceased. The source of her information is the information said to have been given by the deceased. In cross-examination she stated that when the revision petitioner and Mangamma visited her house, they were happy and that they were happy even after the birth of their daughter. The Courts below relied on the evidence of this witness though this witness is not a direct witness for the alleged harassment. She did not even state that she went to the house of the accused and questioned them as to why they were harassing the deceased either for the dowry or to persuade her to accept for the second marriage of A-1. The only source of information for this witness is the alleged information given by the deceased Mangamma. Even if it is assumed that the deceased Mangamma had informed her mother about the alleged harassment, the statement of Mangamma to her mother cannot be taken as gospel truth and the said statement is a very weak piece of evidence as the deponent is not subjected to cross- examination. Further such statement of the deceased made to her mother even if true, is not admissible in evidence. Admittedly, the statement is not in relation to the cause of death of the deceased in this case. When the said statement was not regarding the cause of her death, it does not come within the purview of Section 32(1) of the Evidence Act. The evidence of PW-3 that her daughter informed her about the harassment becomes hearsay, which is not admissible in evidence. The Apex Court in Inderpaul v. State of M.P.(1st supra) categorically held that unless the statement of a dead person would fall within the purview of Section 32(1) of the Indian Evidence there is no other provision under which the same can be admitted in evidence and that in order to make the statement of a dead person admissible in law (written or verbal) the statement must be as to the cause of her death or as to any of the circumstances of the transactions which resulted in her death. Their Lordships further observed in the cited case that by no stretch of imagination can the statements of the deceased contained in letters, where reference had been made by her regarding her life in the house of her in-laws, and the statements quoted by the witnesses, who had not spoken of anything which they had seen directly, be connected with any circumstance of the transaction which resulted in her death. In that case also the matter therein relates to an offence punishable under Section 498-A I.P.C. The Division Bench of this Court followed the said decision. Earlier also the Apex Court in Gananath Patnaik v. State of Orissa (2nd supra) considered the admissibility of the statements made by the deceased during her life time to the witnesses regarding the harassment. In that case, the appellant was tried for a! n offence punishable under Sections 304-B and 498-A I.P.C., the trial Court acquitted the appellant for the charge under Section 304-B I.P.C. for want of acceptable evidence but convicted him for the offence punishable under Section 498-A I.P.C. The conviction under Section 498-A I.P.C. was confirmed by the High Court and the said confirmation of the sentence was challenged before the Apex Court. It was argued on behalf of the appellant that the finding of the trial Court was not based on legal evidence. In that case, the sister of the deceased stated before the trial court that the deceased had been telling her about her ill-treatment meted out to her by her husband and in-laws for non- fulfilment of balance dowry and about assaults by her husband etc. The Apex Court considered whether such deposition of the sister of the deceased is admissible in evidence. The Apex Court held that such a statement is not admissible in evidence so far as the offence punishable under Section 498-A I.P.C. and it has to be termed only as hearsay evidence.

18. PW-14 is the investigating officer. He has no direct knowledge about the alleged harassment. Therefore, there is absolutely no legal evidence adduced on behalf of the prosecution to prove the alleged harassment of the deceased by the revision petitioner to attract Section 498-A I.P.C. The Courts below without considering the admissibility or otherwise of the evidence of PWs.3, 6 and 7 regarding the alleged harassment, placed reliance on such evidence to record conviction. The Courts below failed to note that even if it is assumed that the deceased had made such statements to those witnesses, such evidence is a very weak piece of evidence as the deponent was not subjected to the cross- examination and that conviction cannot be based on such statements in the absence of corroboration. Therefore, this Court has no hesitation to hold that the conviction is based on no legal evidence and the appreciation of evidence by the Courts below is perverse and it resulted in miscarriage! of justice. Hence, this Court is of the considered view that the conviction and sentence recorded for the offence punishable under Section 498-A I.P.C. against the revision petitioner is not sustainable in law and are liable to be set aside. Thus, this point is found in favour of the revision petitioner. This Court has come across some more cases where the subordinate Courts placed reliance on the statements said to have been made by the deceased in respect of the alleged harassment, though such statements are not regarding the cause of the death of the deceased. Therefore, the attention of the subordinate Courts are required to be drawn to the law laid down by the Apex Court in Inderpaul v .State of M.P(1st supra) which was followed by the Division Bench of this Court in G.M. Ravi @ Purushotham v. State of A.P. (3rd supra). In the result, the Criminal Revision Case is allowed. The conviction and sentence recorded against the revision petitioner in S.C.No.47 of 1996 by the Assistant Sessions Judge, Sangareddy for the offence under Section 498-A I.P.C. which was confirmed in Crl.A.No.41 of 1998 by the Additional Sessions Judge (Fast Track Court), Medak at Sangareddy are hereby set aside and the revision petitioner is found not guilty of the charge under Section 498-A I.P.C. and accordingly he is acquitted and he is set at liberty forthwith if he is not required in any other case and his bail bonds shall stand cancelled. The fine amount, if any, already paid by the revision petitioner shall be refunded to him.