Document Fragment View
Fragment Information
Showing contexts for: ejectment execution in Sm. Sita Agarwalla And Ors. vs Harrimally Currimbhai Lalji Sajan And ... on 14 May, 1979Matching Fragments
13. The appeal was heard by P. N, Mukherjee, J. and Niyogi, J. The arguments before the Division Bench centred round the provisions of Section 88 of the West Bengal Non-Agricultural Tenancy Act, 1949 which was a permanent Act. Section 88 runs thus:
"The provisions of this Act shall have effect in respect of all suits, appeals or proceedings including proceedings in execution for ejectment of a non-agricultural tenant which are pending at the date of commencement of this Act."
14. The Division Bench has considered the judgments of Das and Guha Roy, JJ. in Jadunath Das v. Mrinal Kanti Saha, (1954) 58 Cal WN 502; of S. R. Das Gupta and Mallick, JJ. in Panchu-moni Dassi v. Bhuban Mohan Mukherjee, (1955) 59 Cal WN 243; and of Guha Roy and Renupada Mukherjee, JJ. in Tarapada Biswas v. Mrityunjay Mukherjee in . The Division Bench has noted that all the three previous Division Benches have ultimately agreed in holding that, for the application of the section to a particular case, in which a decree for ejectment was passed before the West Bengal Non-Agricultural Tenancy Act, 1949 and during the currency of the Bengal Non-Agricultural Tenancy (Temporary Provisions) Act, 1940, it was necessary that an execution proceeding should be actually pending at the date of coming into operation of the permanent Statute of 1949.
24. Mr. Mitter, learned Counsel for the appellant, has submitted to us that the West Bengal Non-Agricultural Tenancy Act, 1949 is a prospective legislation except for purposes of Section 88 thereof, He concedes that if the said Act was applicable to the instant case, his clients would not be entitled to execute the decree for eviction in view of the provisions of Sections 7 and 9 of the Act. But his contention is that the provisions of the said Act cannot be attracted to the instant appeal inasmuch as no proceeding in execution for ejectment was pending at the date of commencement of the Act. In fact, between the 2nd July, 1946 and the 24th March, 1950, no execution petition was filed in any Court and the 1949 Act came into force on the 15th May, 1949 before steps for execution were launched.
27. The conclusions reached in this judgment of the Division Bench were followed, as we have already seen, in two other Division Bench judgments of this Court except that Renupada Mukherjee, J. was inclined to give a wider interpretation to Section 88 although he did not differ from Guha Roy, J. In this state of the law, it seems to us that, there is no scope for arguing propositions contrary to what has already been held by this Court. On the facts this case it cannot be said that either any suit or appeal or execution proceeding for ejectment was pending at the date of commencement of the 1949 Act to invoke the provisions of Section 88 of the said Act. The order for stay which the High Court had granted was a bar even to the initiation of any execution proceeding and the bar was removed only when the 1949 Act came into force.
42. On the basis of this judgment it is submitted to us that an execution proceeding is a proceeding in continuation. A suit is there and execution is the continuation of the suit. If the suit is pending because it is unsatisfied, execution must also be deemed to be pending,
43. This line of argument, in our opinion, would give a far-fetched meaning to the word 'pending' in Section 88 of the 1949 Act. Because it is a welfare legislation the Court should try to interpret its provisions liberally keeping in view the purpose for which it has been enacted; but liberal interpretation has its limitations. "Proceedings in execution for ejectment" have been specifically referred to in Section 88. On the facts and in the circumstances of this case we cannot by any stretch of imagination hold that any proceeding in execution for ejectment was pending at the date of commencement of 1949 Act when even the initiation of such a proceeding was barred by the stay order passed by this Court on the 2nd July 1946. An extended meaning to the word 'pending' as suggested by Mr. Ghosh would make the expression "including proceedings in execution for ejectment" in Section 88 redundant. The Supreme Court in Sevantilal v. Commr. of Income-tax (Central) Bombay, , has said that it is a sound rule of interpretation that a Statute should be so construed as to prevent the mischief and to advance the remedy according to the true intention of the makers of the Statute. We shall be going against the true intention of the makers of the Statute if we extend the meaning of the word 'pending' in Section 88 of the West Bengal Non-Agricultural Tenancy Act, 1949 to a proceeding in execution for ejectment which could not be launched at all on the date of commencement of the Act in view of the order for stay that was passed on the 2nd July, 1946.