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"I venture to express the hope here that no further attempt will ever be made by any Bench however full and however authoritative, as, in my view, to define the word 'judgment' in the year 1954 as the framers of the statute intended the word to apply in 1862 or 1865 is attempting to impossibility".

(5) It is essential that I should, first discuss the landmarks of the case-law, upon this aspect. It is only after such a discussion that we can hope to distil or precisely define those criteria, which, whether applied cumulatively or singly, will determine when an adjudication of a learned single Judge of this Court, is or is not a 'judgment' for the purpose of Clause 15 of the Letters Patent. Ancillary to this undertaking, but essential to it, are the following questions. What precisely is the character of a plaint presented in forma pauperis to the learned Judge? Is it a suit, or a composite entity partaking both of the character of a proceeding preliminary to a suit and a suit, which may or may not eventuate in a suit? Is it, on the contrary, an independent proceeding? Can it perhaps be regarded more justifiably, a as prefatory but a distinct proceeding which may or may not lead to a suit? Equally, what is the character of the liability of the defendant, when he is given notice in such proceedings, and appears and contests the application of a petitioner plaintiff? Is it not a valuable right, not to be thus sued by a litigant who may harass the defendant by an unconscionably exaggerated claim, and, moreover, a right which is forever lost by the adjudication granting leave, and which cannot be further agitated at any stage of the suit which follows, or an appeal from it?

The provision for dispaupering the plaintiff relate to a different contingency altogether, and are not her relevant. Nor, I think, can the argument be really made stronger for a contrary view, or by emphasising that an order granting leave to sue in forma pauperis does not put an end to the actual suit. That would be a legitimate criticism, if the proceeding under Or. XXXIII, C.P.C., has to be regarded either as composite with the suit, or merely preliminary to the suit. Thought it may not be an independent proceeding, in the strict sense, I think that these views are erroneous, and that it should be properly regarded as prefatory but distinct, involving a right a liability of it own. That is also the view which derives authority from Raj Narain Saxena v. Bhimsen, (FB), which held that an application for permission to sue as a pauper, which is not granted, is not a plaint. With regard to the argument that court-fee is purely a matter between the State and the citizen, and does not concern any right of the defendant. I may point out that the judgment of the Supreme Court in Rathnavarmaraja v. Vimala, , which has been cited, relates to the question of the proper court-fee payable on a plaint, with reference to the Madras Court-fees and Suits Valuation Act 14 of 1955, and does not at all impinge on the right of a defendant to contest, after notice, the claim of the plaintiff that he should be permitted to sue in forma pauperis.

It is superfluous to add that the power of the High Court under S. 115, C.P.C. to revise the order of a Subordinate Court cannot and does not have its exact counterpart in the Letters Patent.

(63) In view of the above decisions and considerations, I am rather disinclined to rely on the criterion suggested by Sri Mohan Kumaramangalam, namely, because the defendants will not be entitled to canvass the correctness of the order of the single Judge granting permission to sue in forma pauperis in the appeal from the decree which might be passed against them, the order should be held appealable. The argument is, however, useful as emphasising that the application for permission to sue in forma pauperis is really a distinct prefatory proceeding and cannot be considered as a mere step towards obtaining the final adjudication so as to be unappealable, according to the test of Sir Arnold White, C. J.