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3. Thereafter these writ applications have been filed.

4. Mr. P.K. Roy, the learned senior counsel appearing on behalf of the appellant, inter alia, has drawn this Court's attention to Entry 44 of List III, Entry 63 of List II and Entry 91 of List 1 of the 7th Schedule appended to the Constitution of India and submitted that keeping In view the aforementioned entries it Is absolutely clear that whereas; Entry 91 List 1 and Entry 63 of List II refer to the rate of Stamp duty. Entry 44 of List III does not refer to the rate. The learned counsel, therefore, contends that the Constitution of India recognised the distinction between the rates of stamp duty and mechanism of collection or management therefore. According to Mr. Roy, Stamp Duty by its nature is necessarily referable to and based on an Instrument and not a bare Incident or transaction. In support of the said contention strong reliance has been placed on IRC v. G. Angers & Co. reported in 1889 (23) QBD 579 and Minister of Stamps v. Towned reported in (1909) A.C. 633.

8. Mr. Anlndya Mitra, the learned senior counsel appearing on behalf of the respondents, on the other hand, submitted that the word 'rate' employed in Entry 91 of List I, Entry 44 of List III. Entry 63 of List II refers only to measure of tax. Reliance in this connection has been placed on Federation of Hotel & Restaurant v. Union of India and Goodricke Group Ltd. v. State of West Bengal reported in 1995 supp(1) SCC 707. It was submitted that stamp duly is not payable on a transaction or a negotiation but an execution of an instrument. It has been submitted that the legislature is free to adopt any method for assessment of rate as it chooses. Mr. Mltra would submit that similar State amendment brought in other State which are in pari material with section 47A of the said Act has been held to be intr vires. Reliance in this connection has been placed on State of Tamil Nadu v. T.N. Chandrasekharan , Smt. Ramkishori Gupta v. The State of Madhya Pradesh and Champaklal J. Gadanl v. State of Gujarat & Ors. . The learned counsel submits that the Court should not approach an eanactment with a view to dig holes or to search for defects. Strong reliance in this connection has been placed on State of Bihar v. Bihar Distillery Ltd. . It has been submitted that the power conferred upon the State cannot be said to be an unguided and as the expression 'market value' itself provides for adequate guidelines. Our attention has been drawn to their statements made in the Affidavit-in-opposition showing as to how absurd low valuations were being shown as apparent value thereof which necesslted enactment of the said Act.

17. Entry 44 of List III, Entry 63 of List II and Entry 91 of List I of the VII Schedule read thus :-

"Entry 44 of List III--Stamp duties other than duties or fees collected by means of Judicial stamps, but not Including rates of stamp duty.
Entry 63 of List II--Rates of Stamp duty In respect of documents other than those specified in the provisions of list 1 with regard to rates of stamp duty.
Entry 91 of List I--Rates of stamp duty in respect of bills of exchange, promissory notes, bills of lading, letters of Credit, policies of insurance, transfer of shares, debentures, proxies and receipts."
"Now, it is to be observed that what the Stamp Act deals with is not the bargain which arises out of the consent of the parties, but the instrument which records that bargain."

37. The aforementioned decisions have been considered by one of us (S.B. Sinha, J) In Umesh Thakur v. State of Bihar reported in 1994(1) PLJR 727.

38. As the subject matter of taxation is covered by Entry 44 of List III of the Seventh Schedule of the Constitution of India. Entry 97 of List I cannot be said to have any application whatsoever in the instant case.