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A Division Bench of the Calcutta High Court in the case of Achhiman Bibi v. Abdur Rahim Naskar, AIR 1958 Cal 437, examined the same question and pointed out (at p. 440):--

"We hold that there is considerable difference between a salt for mere declaration and a suit for declaration coupled with a prayer for possession. It is true that by a decree for declaration without more the position of person in wrongful occupation will not be disturbed, even if the decree be passed in his presence. If such person continues in possession even after the declaratory decree, he may, nevertheless, acquire prescriptive title. The consequences are different if the suit for declaration is coupled with a claim for possession, as was done in the present case and such suit is decreed."

Ismail, J. in the Madras decision further stated (at pp. 285, 286 of AIR):--

"Let us test the proposition of the learned counsel for the appellant from a practical point of view. Suppose a person is in wrongful possession of the property and after he has been in such wrongful possession for three years, the reel owner files a suit for declaration of title and recovery of possession. Assume that for some reason or other the suit was pending for nearly 9 years before the Court and after 12 years from the commencement of the possession of the defendant (person in wrongful possession) the suit was decreed, Can it be held that since the decree itself was passed 12 years after the adverse possession commenced the defendant had perfected title to the suit property by adverse possession and therefore acquired a good title and the decree-holder cannot thereafter execute the decree and recover possession of the property? That merely emphasises the fact that when a suit for declaration of title and recovery of possession is instituted before the adverse possession has culminated in the acquisition of prescriptive title the time during which the suit is pending cannot be taken advantage of by the person in wrongful possession and tacked on to the period during which he was in possession before the institution of the suit for the purpose of claiming prescriptive title."

11. The net result, therefore, is that in the instant case where the defendant had obtained a decree for possession and had levied execution of that decree, plaintiff was not entitled to acquire any prescriptive title by tacking the period of possession prior to the suit and subsequent to it. The running of adverse possession got suspended with the institution of the suit in 1954 and as long as the decree remained executable, plaintiff was not entitled to maintain that his possession being for more than twelve years continuously could fructify into prescriptive title.