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jaliya [1996 JX(Guj) 197];
iv. Yogesh P. Sukhanandi vs. State of Gujarat [1996 (2) GLR 410];
v. S. Ranganathan vs Sabeetha and Others [Contempt Petition No. 2337/2017, Decided on 18.04.2018]

7. Learned advocate Mr. Brijesh Trivedi has strongly and earnestly objected to this and has urged that the incident of contempt being continuous, such an objection need not be sustained at all. He accepted that the Courts have recognised the fact that the Contempt of Court Act provides that the initiation of proceedings of contempt shall have to be within one year of the committal of the alleged contempt. The Court also in case of Pallav Sheth vs Custodian [2001 Law Suit SC 1043] examined whether there can be any legislation indicating the manner and to the extent that the power can be exercised, if there exists power under Articles 129 and 215 which can be said to be absolute. He emphasized that the Court has been categorical with providing for the quantum of punishment for what may or may not be regarded or even for initiation of proceedings for contempt, is held not to have abrogated or stultified the contempt jurisdiction under Articles 129 or 215 of the Constitution of India.

7.1. According to him, in the instant case the contempt being continuous where the officer concerned had chosen not to abide by what had been provided in the order and therefore, the contempt has continued for all these years and that would entitle the applicant to approach this Court even after one year. He urged that the preliminary objection raised of limitation not only should be not entertained but the Court should continue the proceedings under Article 215 and issue writ under Article 226 of the Constitution of India.

[48] The provisions of Sec. 17 of the Limitation Act are applicable in the present case. The fraud perpetuated by the appellant was unearthed only on the Custodian receiving information from the Income Tax Department, vide their letter of 5-5-1998. On becoming aware of the fraud, application for initiating contempt proceedings was filed on 18-6- 1998, well within the period of limitation prescribed by Sec. 20. It is on this application that the Special Court by its order of 9-4-1999 directed the application to be treated as a show-cause notice to the appellant to punish him for contempt. In view of the abovestated facts and in the light of the discussion regarding the correct interpretation of Sec. 20 of the Contempt of Courts Act, it follows that the action taken by the Special Court to punish the appellant for contempt was valid. The Special Court has only faulted in being unduly lenient in awarding the sentence. We do not think it is necessary, under the circumstances, to examine the finding of the Special Court that this was a continuing wrong or contempt, and therefore, action for contempt was not barred by Sec. 20."

21. The ratio thus culls out is that the powers of the High Court under Article 215 of the Constitution of India can not get stultified or abrogated merely because there is a provision of Section 20 of the Contempt of Courts Act. At the same time, the High Court cannot entertain the contempt applications beyond the period of one year so as to dilute the provisions of law prescribed under Section 20 of the Contempt of Courts Act. Only in exceptional circumstances, to mitigate gross injustice to the party, to the society or in case of public importance or in case of continuous contempt, the Court can sparingly exercise such powers. All contempt applications, if are entertained after a period of one year, it would render Section 20 of the Contempt of Courts Act nugatory. The Court needs to examine the peculiar facts and circumstances prevalent in each case and interpret the provision in a pragmatic manner rather than in general way.