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1. This is an appeal by the plaintiff from the decree of Pankridge, J., dismissing his suit. The premises, No. 187 Darmahatta Street, form part of the estate of the late Akhoy Kumar Ghose of which the defendant is the administratix. From 1910 these premises were let to the firm of Kalicharan Udit Narayan as monthly tenants. These monthly tenants having erected certain pucca buildings thereon, assigned or conveyed to the plaintiff their interest in the premises and in the structures by a deed dated 8th December 1921. In December 1927, the defendant having brought an ejectment suit, obtained possession of the premises in execution, but the decree in ejectment was, by consent, vacated on 3rd February 1928 by an order passed in appeal therefrom.

10. The legislature did not, in my judgment, intend to clear up the matter during the continuance of the term, and after the term to leave it, as under the decision of Wilson, J., in Rassiklall's case (1880) 5 Cal 688, it remained a question of Hindu or Mahomedan lavs, according to the personal law of the parties. Nor did it intend to leave open as regards any point of time the question whether in a Presidency town the rule of equity to be applied was different from the rule to be applied in the mofussil. It established a principle inconsistent with the principle of quicquid plantatur by declaring the tenant's right to remove, but it limited and defined the tenant's right to remove a right to be exercised during the term. In so doing it failed to notice that cases of hardship might arise where a tenancy was suddenty determined, e.g., by a mortgagee's sale, by the action of Government in land acquisition proceedings. Even in more ordinary cased a practice grew up to postpone execution under ejectment decrees in order to enable the tenant to remove structures erected by him. The limit produced difficulties and these difficulties were the reason of the amendment of 1929. It is clear that Clause (h) as amended negatives any right to remove after the time limited by the clause. The present case falls to be decided by the unamended clause but in my judgment no new principle was introduced by the amendment. It extended the period within which the lessee could remove beyond the "continuance of the lease" to any further time during which the lessee is in possession of the property leased, but did nothing more. After all the tenant's right to remove is not two rights: (1) to remove during the term and (2) to remove after the term. In the original Clause (h) I think the phrase, during the continuance of the lease has a negative value, that the right to remove was intended to be declared as qualified thereby.