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14. But in my opinion, the contention raised on behalf of Mrs. Mehta that in view of the provisions of the Public Premises Act, the provisions relating to the unauthorised occupation of the Board premises in Housing Board Act stood repealed, cannot be accepted. I have quoted Section 19 earlier which provides for repeal of certain Acts. Mrs. Mehta attempted to argue that this is a case of express repeal. According to her, the Bombay Government Premises (Eviction) Act, 1955 and 'any other corresponding law providing for eviction of the occupants from the public premises' are repealed. She submitted that this is a case of express repeal and one has to forget the provisions concerned the unauthorised occupation and eviction contained in the Housing Board Act in view of Section 19 of the Public Premises Act. I am afraid I cannot uphold the said argument of Mrs. Mehta. So far as the principles of interpretation of statutes are concerned, they are very clear. It is well known that repeal is of two types; (i), Express Repeal and (ii) Implied Repeal. So far as express repeal is concerned, there is no difficulty since the legislature itself provides for repeal of a named statute or statutes. In the instnat case, by Section 19 the legislature has expressly repealed the Bombay Government Premises (Eviction) Act, 1955. This is express repeal. In view of express repeal, it is not open to the Court now to refer to, rely on or base its decision on the Bombay Government Premises (Eviction) Act, 1955. But Mrs. Mehta is not right in submitting that the relevant provisions of the Housing Board Act are expressly repealed. When the legislature in Section 19 has stated that any other corresponding law providing for the eviction of the occupants from the public premises, is repealed' it cannot be said to be express repeal but implied repeal. One has to consider the relevant provisions of both the statutes, namely, the provisions of the Public Premises' Act and of the Housing Board Act and relying upon and following the well established principles of Interpretation of Statutes come to a conclusion Whether the provisions of the Housing Board Act stood repealed or whether both the statutes stand together and, can be given effect to by harmonious construction. If it is possible the 'corresponding law' cannot be treated as repealed, but must be given effect to. On the other hand, if one comes to the conclusion that 'corresponding law' cannot be given effect to without violating the provisions of the repealing statute, by applying the doctrine of implied repeal, no effect can be given to that 'corresponding law.'

21. From the above two judgments of the Supreme Court, it becomes clear that what is required to be seen by the Court in construing the statutes which come up for interpretation is the ambit and scope of both the Statutes, operation of the fields occupied by them, underlying object of the enactments, time of the brinding into force the respective statutes; policy and the legislative intent as conveyed by the language used in both the Statutes, etc.

22. An additional factor to be considered, by the Court while interpreting the Statute in question is 'whether the legislature itself has treated a particular legislation having been repealed by the subsequent statute'. In case of express repeal, there is no difficulty at all. But in case of implied repeal, such difficulty may arise. Since I am of the opinion that the instant case is not of express repeal, it is necessary to consider whether the legislature itself has treated the relevant provisions of the Housing Board Act as repealed. The Public Premises Act is Gujarat Act 12 of 1973. It was brought into force on June 26, 1973. Relying On these facts the learned counsel for the respondents submitted that had the legislature considered and treated Section 56 of the Housing Board Act as repealed, it would neither have amended Clause (i) of Section 56(1)(a) nor inserted clause (ii-a) thereto. They also submitted that the Court will not presume that the legislature has made an amendment in the statute which was repealed and that any amendment, modification, substitution or addition in the statute has been made by the legislature in futility or without application of mind and that it should be ignored. In this connection my attention was invited to the case of Municipal Corporation, Delhi v. Shivshanker, reported in AIR 1971 SC 815 : (1971 Cri LJ 680). In that case also a similar contention was advanced that in view of the enactment of the Essential Commodities Act, 1955 and the Fruit Products Order, 1955 issued thereunder, the provisions of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1954 stood impliedly repealed. Considering the purpose and object of both the statutes, the Court rejected the said argument. The Court also observed: "The two provisions may, therefore, have within these narrow limit conterminous fields of operation." Both the statutes can function with full vigour side by side in their own parallel channels. Even if they happen to some extent to overlap, Section 26 of the General Clauses Act fully protects the guilty parties against double jeopardy or double penalty."

26. A similar is the effect of insertion of Clause (iia) in Section 56(1)(a) of the Housing Board Act. In the Public Premises Act, there is no provision relating to the commission of any act contrary to the provisions of the Gujarat Ownership Flats Act, 1973 or of the Declaration, Deed of Apartment or of the bye-laws made under that Act or of any rules or regulations made under such bye-laws. This ground is available only under the Housing Board Act in respect of the Board premises. This is also an addition made by the Legislature by Gujarat Act No. 13 of 1973. It cannot be forgotten that the Public Premises Act is Act No. 12 of 1973. If the doctrine of implied repeal is applied and the provisions of the Housing Board Act are treated as impliedly repealed the Court cannot give effect to the legislative amendment made by Gujarat Act No. 13 of 1973 and the said amendment will have to be ignored. It is settled principle of interpretation of statutes that the Court will not presume that the legislature has made any amendment in a repealed statute. Thus, the amendments made in the Housing Board Act in 1973 also tend to negative any legislative intendment of implied repeal of that Act by virtue of Section 19 of the Public Premises Act.

27. Having given thoughtful and anxious consideration to the question involved in these petitions and applying the well established principles laid down in various decisions referred to above to the facts and circumstances of the present case, I am of the view that the Public Premises Act has neither expressly nor impliedly repealed any of the provisions of the Housing Board Act for the following reasons. Both the statutes, viz. the Public Premises Act as well as the Housing Board Act have been enacted by the same legislature; both of them deal with premises belonging to certain specified categories; both of them make a departure from the general law regulating the relationship of landlord and tenant contained either in the Transfer of Property Act or in the Bombay Rents, Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control Act, 1947; both of them lay down summary procedure for eviction of unauthorised occupants from the premises belonging to the specified categories; the Public Premises Act has not expressly repealed any of the provisions of the Housing Board Act; the legislature has not treated the provisions of the Housing Board Act as having been impliedly repealed which is apparent from the amendments made in the Housing Board Act by Acts 1 of 1973 and 13 of 1973. For all these reasons, in my considered opinion both the statutes can be said to be special statutes and none of the provisions of the Housing Board Act has been repealed by Public Premises Act.