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1. In this case the appellant obtained a decree for ejectment of a tenant in South Malabar and, after depositing the amount ascertained as due to the tenant for improvements under the Malabar Improvements Compensation Act, applied before the District Munsif for execution of his decree by ejectment of the tenant from all the lands mentioned in the decree, or in the alternative he added that if the tenants claimed that any improvements had been effected subsequent to the decree in kudiyiruppus, parambas and hills, execution might be granted of the other properties, that is, nilams (double crop lands), palliyals (single crop lands) and nattupoyils (seed-beds).

3. The District Judge held that partial ejectment, before compensation was finally settled upon the other lands which were left in possession of the tenant, was contrary to the provisions of Section 5 of the Malabar Tenants Improvements Act, and he therefore allowed the Appeal and directed the District Munsif not to grant the petitioner's prayer till he finally determined the question of valuation.

4. Section 5 of Madras Act I of 1900 provides that any tenant to whom compensation is due shall be entitled to remain in possession until ejectment in execution of a decree or order of Court. The section does not make the payment of the compensation a condition precedent to ejectment. Section 6(b) contemplates re-valuation being calculated on the condition at the time of ejectment and provides that the decree shall be varied in accordance with such order of the Court executing the decree. It, does not provide that ejectment shall be stayed until re-valuation is made.

8. In the result the Appeal must be allowed, and the District Munsif's order will be restored with costs here and in the Lower Appellate Court.

Ramesam, J.

9. I will only add that, even if a plaintiff decree-holder who obtained a decree under the Act is not entitled to eject the defendant until he pays the sum mentioned in the decree for improvements, it does not follow that, when he pays the amount so mentioned to the defendant or (when he refused to take it) into Court, the mere fact that the defendant is asking for the further valuation mentioned in Section 6(3) operates as a stay of execution of the decree for ejectment or that an order for ejectment should not be made until the supplemental enquiry contemplated in Section 6(3) is made. None of the cases cited by the learned Counsel for respondents, Kannyan Baduvan v. Alikutti (1919) I.L.R., 42 Mad., 603 (F.B.), Paramesara Ayyar v. Kittunni Valia Mannadiar (1917) 33 M.L.J., 691, Abdulla Koya v. Kallumpurath Kanaran (1917) 33 M.L.J., 463, Kunhikutti Haji v. Gower (1913) 24 M.L.J., 472, support such a proposition. I agree with my learned brother in doubting the correctness of Chowakkaran Keloth v. Karuvolote Parkum (1015) 29 I.C., 559 at page 560. I agree with the order proposed by him.